



**Service Contract N. TF/MADAD/2020/T04.225**

**External Monitoring and Evaluation for the European  
Union Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian  
Crisis**

**Evaluation of EUTF Syria-funded WASH  
Programmes/ Projects**

**Evaluation Report**

*Draft Final Report - December 2021*

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

<b>CDR</b>	Council for Reconstruction and Development
<b>CRP</b>	Country Response Plans
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organisations
<b>DoW</b>	Department of Water
<b>EBRD</b>	European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
<b>EIB</b>	European Investment Bank
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUD</b>	European Union Delegation
<b>EUTF</b>	European Union Trust Fund
<b>EM</b>	Evaluation Matrix
<b>EQ</b>	Evaluation Question
<b>FSM</b>	Faecal Sludge Management
<b>IDPs</b>	Internally Displaced Persons
<b>IPs</b>	Implementing Partners
<b>JMP</b>	Joint Monitoring Programme
<b>JRP</b>	Jordan Response Plan
<b>JC</b>	Judgement Criteria
<b>KR-I</b>	Kurdistan Region of Iraq
<b>LCRP</b>	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
<b>MENA</b>	Middle East and North Africa
<b>MoEW</b>	Ministry of Energy and Water
<b>MoPIC</b>	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
<b>MoWI</b>	Ministry of Water and Irrigation
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and evaluation
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organisation
<b>O&amp;M</b>	Operation and Maintenance
<b>QIN</b>	Quarterly Information Notes
<b>3RP</b>	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan

<b>ROM</b>	Results Oriented Monitoring
<b>SEQ</b>	Sub Evaluation Question
<b>ToR</b>	Terms of Reference
<b>ToC</b>	Theory of Change
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
<b>WAJ</b>	Water Authority Jordan
<b>WE</b>	Water Establishment
<b>WASH</b>	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organisation
<b>YWC</b>	Yarmouk Water Company

## Glossary

TERM	EXPLANATION
Added Value	'Added value' is the degree to which EUTF funding makes a difference, positively or negatively, beyond the sheer volume of aid.
Barriers	Barriers can be understood in two ways: i) barriers leading to the need for an intervention; ii) barriers in terms of possible risks faced during implementation of an intervention. This latter scenario is the focus of this evaluation and the associated evaluation question (EQ3).
Coherence: coordination, complementarity and synergies.	Coherence: in line with policy and strategies avoiding duplication. Coordination: communication at sector level, with partners and other donors throughout the project cycle. Complementarity: taking in to account and building from national and other donor interventions. Synergies: leveraging and or value adding as planned or emerging.
Intervention	Projects and/or programmes / activities conducted by EUTF.
The Madad Fund / European Union Trust Fund	For the purposes of this report, the Madad Fund is referred to generally as the European Union Trust Fund.
Outcome harvesting	Collecting of evidence of what has changed and then working backwards to determine whether and how an intervention has contributed to these changes.
Regional / Multi-Country Interventions	Interventions where two or more countries are covered within the programming and implementation.
Value for money – minimum assessment	The extent to which the interventions have obtained the maximum benefit from the outputs and outcomes it has produced within the resources available to it.

# 1. Executive Summary

## 1.1 Background

The Syrian conflict has had a devastating impact on Syria and many of the neighbouring countries and across the region. In response, the European Union (EU) through the financing modality of the EU Trust Fund (EUTF) has been helping to address the effects of the regional crisis. The EUTF was set up in 2014 for an initial period of 5-years<sup>1</sup> however, in response to the on-going need is only ending its commitment of funding, 2 years later, 14 December 2021 with implementation continuing until mid-2025.

Updated data shows as of October 2021, the numbers of registered Syrian refugees in the host countries of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey is currently 5.49M<sup>2</sup>, which increased since May 2021 when the number stood at 5.44M<sup>3</sup>. However, estimated numbers of refugees are significantly higher with 6.72M estimated to be residing within the four countries with the largest differences in registered and estimated numbers for Jordan and Lebanon.

Whilst pressure on service delivery in host communities has been partly alleviated through interventions by the EU and other donors, challenges such as affordability and reliability of services remain. From the WASH perspective, faecal sludge management (FSM) and hygiene in camps remain a challenge, coupled with eviction threats.

The worsening crisis in Lebanon is having significant effects on the population with fuel scarcity and price increases for basic commodities, exacerbated by a continuing political impasse and currency devaluation.

In December 2020, the EU Trust Fund in response to the Syrian Crisis - Phase II (hereafter EUTF) commissioned an evaluation of the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) portfolio. The evaluation formally commenced on 14 April 2021, the Inception Report was approved by EUTF 1 June 2021, the Desk Report approved 13 September 2021 and the verification phase completed 28 October 2021. The evaluation reflects the situation in the portfolio as of this latter date. The evaluation team comprises of 5 experts, including a Health Expert to support the team in respect of COVID-19 health related aspects.

### **Purpose**

The purpose of the evaluation is to analyse the EUTF Syria WASH portfolio in view of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and EU value-added and to provide conclusions and recommendations to inform future programming in the WASH sector. Two additional outcome areas were also considered: i) community engagement and ultimate beneficiaries behavioural change / making providers accountable; ii) level of responsiveness of the WASH institutions in terms of improved performance at the level of local (WASH) actors.

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<sup>1</sup> European Commission (2014) Commission Decision on the establishment of a European Union Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis, "the Madad Fund"

<sup>2</sup> [Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response: Durable Solutions \(unhcr.org\)](https://www.unhcr.org/situation-syria-regional-refugee-response-durable-solutions)

<sup>3</sup> [http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Durable\\_Solutions\\_May2021.pdf](http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Durable_Solutions_May2021.pdf)

## Evaluation sample

The evaluation examined a portfolio of 21 EUTF financed WASH interventions as set out below.

Project No.	Title	Partner	Country
T04.20	Promoting Sustainable Management of Water Services and Resources in Lebanon by Strengthening infrastructural and managerial capacities of local water establishments	GVC	Lebanon
T04.27	Improved Access to Water, Water Distribution Performance and Related Sewerage Disposal in Irbid Governorate for Host Communities and Syrian Refugees	AFD	Jordan
T04.34	Providing Lebanese and Jordanian communities hosting Syrian refugees with improved WASH infrastructure and facilities at community, institution, and household level.	ACTED	Jordan and Lebanon
[T04.77] T04.40	Strengthening the Resilience of Host Communities and Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (Kurdistan)	IT COOP	Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq
T04.53	Restoring the Water Supply for Food Production and Livelihoods in Post Conflict Areas	FAO	Iraq
T04.76	Strengthening the Economic and Social Resilience of Syrians, their Host Communities and Relevant National and Local Government Institutions	UNDP	Turkey
T04.90	Mitigating Social Tensions Among Vulnerable Populations Through Improved Water Services in Lebanon	UNICEF	Lebanon
T04.98	Improving Access to Safe and Affordable Water to Vulnerable Communities	NRC	Lebanon
T04.100	Sustainable Safe Drinking Water Supply for Vulnerable Communities Living in a More Protected Environment	CISP	Lebanon
T04.121	Supporting resilience for host communities, returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq	ACTED	Iraq
T04.132	Strengthening the Long-Term Resilience of Subnational Authorities in Countries Affected by the Syrian and Iraqi Crisis	UNDP	Lebanon and Iraq
T04.136	Dealing with Displacement – Resilient Subnational Government in Communities in the Region Affected by the Syrian Crisis	VNG	Lebanon and Iraq
T04.155	Technical Assistance and Support for the Municipal Resilience Facility (MRF)	EIB	Turkey
T04.172	Education and WASH COVID-19 response Programmes for Vulnerable Syrians and Syrian and Host Community School-aged Children in Jordan	UNICEF	Jordan
T04.206	Structuring water and wastewater services in Arsaal and two villages in the valley- Lebanon	AFD	Lebanon
[T04.208] T04.229	EUTF Support for an Integrated Solid Waste Management System in Syrian Refugee Camps and Neighbouring Communities Affected by the Syria Crisis	GIZ	Jordan
T04.247	Support for Urban Recovery and Peacebuilding in western Ninewa, Iraq	UN Habitat	Iraq
T04.272	Water and Wastewater Programme for Host Communities and Syrian Refugees in Lebanon	ACTED	Lebanon
T04.92	EUTF contribution to the West Irbid waste water network construction project	EBRD	Jordan

Project No.	Title	Partner	Country
AD March 2021	<i>Top-up of AD Dec 2019 to insert: - Blast response and; - Sector support during financial crisis.</i>	UNICEF	Lebanon
AD March 2021	<i>Top-up of AD "EUTF support for an integrated Solid Waste Management system in Syrian refugee camps and neighbouring communities affected by the Syria Crisis"</i>	GIZ	Jordan

## 1.2 Summary of key findings and conclusions

### Relevance

Each of the interventions within the WASH portfolio sample are aligned with the EUTF strategic objectives, principles and approaches, including the EUTF Results Framework statements and associated indicators. The EUTF-funded WASH interventions address fully justified needs across the four countries and are aligned with the relevant policies and/or strategies of the various governments.

Whilst there are multi-country interventions and country interventions, both types have been designed at country level, taking in to account and responding to national priorities.

EUTF WASH portfolio interventions are considered as having been responsive over time. This is evidenced in having responded to lessons learned both in terms of original design and programming, from one generation of interventions to the next. For example, responding to external factors such as COVID-19 and the Beirut blast.

### Effectiveness and Impact

Outputs are progressing at a mixed rate across the WASH portfolio with only a few interventions fully completed. However, those projects that have been completed have shown good outputs and those on-going are now making good progress despite initial delays.

Whilst outputs are progressing, the conversion of outputs to outcomes is less evident and although the planned outcome of improved access to water and sanitation services is predicted to being achieved, improved resilience of government departments remain challenged.

The positive partnerships between EUTF, IPs and ownership by national governments have been contributing factors to the progress of results. In addition a few external factors have also been identified as having a positive effect and are largely country specific. For example, security improvements leading to field travel and returns (Iraq). Negative effects tend to be more generic which include staff recruitment issues, delays in obtaining approvals from government, economic / currency devaluation (Iraq a). In the case of Jordan, country specific external factors also exist related to the dry summer and water scarcity issues. Lebanon has also had its own set of external factors related to the political and socio-economic crisis (fuel-electricity scarcity; financial; challenges to maintain skilled staff; hyper-inflation; public distrust; political impasse); Beirut blast). One further factor across the entire portfolio is that of COVID-19 which has negatively affected results across the entire WASH portfolio in terms of causing delays as opposed to direct health implications.

Given the status of outputs and outcomes it is still very early in the programme lifecycle of the WASH portfolio to understand the extent of impact of the EUTF WASH portfolio. This will only be possible over a longer period of time post completion.

### **Efficiency**

The EUTF-funded WASH portfolio is a mix of multi-country and country interventions and are generally efficiently delivering responding to country needs. Across the WASH portfolio interventions are being delivered to budget, contracting and procurement procedures are being followed, and monitoring and reporting is, in the main, being completed in a consistent and transparent manor.

The various stakeholders are all relevant and appropriate in terms of the varying intervention types. The challenges come with, in many cases, limitations in terms of the institutional, technical and financial capacities, in particular linked to operation and maintenance of infrastructure. This however, goes beyond that of the portfolio and is linked to sustainability.

### **Coherence: coordination, complementarity and synergies**

Coordination and complementarity with other donors (EU and non-EU) generally exist, in terms of programming and implementation, but to varying extents across the WASH portfolio. There is limited evidence of coordination within the broader WASH portfolio either as part of multi-country interventions or across the different countries in general. This is potentially a missed opportunity in terms of knowledge and practice on cross-cutting aspects such as innovation, water scarcity and resilience aspects, which are faced by most of the countries.

Complementarity and coordination of the EUTF WASH portfolio with the WASH sector at country level is clearly evident through the various stages of the project cycle.

### **Sustainability**

A number of generic factors across the WASH portfolio are identified as having the potential to affect sustainability, are known and where feasible, attempts are being made to address them. However, there is limited evidence of sustainability plans and exit strategies in place across the WASH portfolio. This inherent weakness of the beneficiary institutions coupled with the absence of exist strategies puts results at threat.

### **EU added value and visibility**

There is some evidence of added value due in part to the alignment of the portfolio with national priorities, collaboration and cooperation with national counterparts as well as engaging in policy dialogue.

All interventions have associated C&V plans documented as part of their programming documentation. However, the implementation of such varies across the portfolio for a variety of reasons and there are no associated indicators within the EUTF RF.

## Gender and special needs

Gender aspects feature within programming and implementation to a greater or lesser extent where applicable. Gender disaggregated data, where applicable, exists across the WASH portfolio for the majority of interventions for both outcome areas of infrastructure and capacities. However, accessibility and inclusiveness of persons with disabilities rarely appears in programme documentation across the entire portfolio whether in general terms or specifically related to WASH. This does not align with equity and inclusivity agendas and more needs to be done to rectify the situation.

### 1.3 Key Portfolio Recommendations (full details are given in Chapter 6)

- All IPs across the WASH portfolio should review/refine/develop (depending on state of existence) appropriate, feasible and pragmatic sustainability and exit strategies and review them on a regular (at least annual or ad-hoc in the case of external crisis) basis. These plans could be supportively reviewed in terms of overarching best practice, and for consistency not only at country level, but also in terms of higher-level strategic objectives and or requirements for policy dialogue.
- EU to ensure appropriate timelines are given to project design and planning to avoid the need for no-cost-extensions.
- EU should include a core set of recurring C&V indicators/KPIs as part of the overarching RF and ensure they feature within the DoA, IP logical framework, and reporting requirements (including QIN reporting).
- EU and IPs should ensure that gender and persons with disabilities considerations are mainstreamed in all programming activities and in turn measures for monitoring and reported on.
- Within Section 7 Country Portfolio Reports there are a number of country specific references.

## 2. Introduction and background of the evaluation

### 2.1 Introduction

In December 2020, the EU Trust Fund in response to the Syrian Crisis – Phase II (hereafter EUTF) commissioned an evaluation of the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) portfolio. The evaluation formally commenced on 14<sup>th</sup> April 2021 with the kick-off meeting held remotely via Zoom. The remote meeting was attended by all members of the evaluation team and Particip's EUTF monitoring and evaluation team; members of the EUTF Unit at headquarters and representatives of EU Delegations (EUD).

The evaluation team<sup>4</sup> presented the inception report (including the evaluation sample, evaluation questions, methodology for the delivery of the evaluation and a timeline for its implementation) with approval granted on 1 June 2021. The Desk phase followed which included the drafting of the evaluation matrix and preliminary answers to the evaluation questions for each country, with a preliminary synthesis at portfolio level. The draft Desk Report as submitted on 14 July 2021 was approved 13 September 2021. The Verification Phase commenced at the end of August 2021, in parallel to the submission of the final Desk Report. In turn this was completed with the verification debriefing on 28 October 2021. In mid-October, in parallel to the completion of the Verification Phase, the Reporting Phase commenced and has continued to this point with the Draft Final Report (this report) being submitted on 15 November 2021.

This evaluation has largely followed the methodology laid out in the Inception Report and Desk Report (Annex 1) and is adhering to the revised Evaluation Strategy (April 2021)<sup>5</sup>. Any minor adjustments that were made to the methodology presented in Annex 1 are detailed in Section 3.

This remainder of this document is structured as follows:

- Section 2 provides the introduction and the regional and country context;
- Section 3 details any adjustments to the approach and methodology;
- Section 4 provides the responses to the evaluation questions;
- section 5 sets out conclusions and lessons learned;
- Section 6 provides recommendations.

Furthermore, there are five Annexes providing the Approach and Methodology; Intervention List; Persons Interviewed; Documents Reviewed; Country Portfolio Reports.

#### 2.1.1 Overall objective of the evaluation

As presented during the kick-off meeting the overall objective as stated in the Terms of Reference (ToR) has been confirmed as: *“to assess the performance of the current generation of EUTF WASH support considering both regional and bilateral actions. The evaluation is aimed at improving the effectiveness and impact of the EUTF, strengthen stakeholders’ involvement, ensuring a successful communication and reinforcing the EUTF capacity to bring a change in the cooperation area in full respect of its natural environment”*

There is also the need to investigate the EUTF WASH programmes/projects with regard to their immediate capacity to cope with the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.

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<sup>4</sup> This evaluation was conducted by Rachel Norman (Team Leader) and key experts Andrew West, Jasna Ljubisic (joined the team for the start of the verification phase), Dr Egbert Sondorp, and junior evaluation expert Malik Al-Khawaja.

<sup>5</sup> *“Evaluation Strategy With Update 2021-2023 for Evaluations under the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian Crisis (April 2021)”*.

### 2.1.2 Purposes of the evaluation

The ToR also set out three purposes:

- Analyse the current EUTF WASH portfolio in view of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and coherence;
- Identify the added value, or comparative advantage of EUTF funding.
- Provide conclusions and recommendations to inform future programming in the WASH sector.

In response to the natural ending of the financing aid modality of the EUTF in December 2021, the third bullet point has been slightly amended to a broader remit of the WASH sector as opposed to specifically EUTF support. Furthermore, for the purposes of this assignment the term intervention (see the Glossary at the beginning of this Report) will be used to refer to EUTF programmes and/or projects.

Following the submission of the Draft Inception Report, the client requested the inclusion of a review of additional outcome areas:

- community engagement with the WASH providers in terms of ultimate beneficiaries' behavioural change / making providers accountable;
- level of responsiveness of the WASH institutions in terms of improved performance at the level of local (WASH) actors.

Where feasible and acknowledging limitations<sup>6</sup>, these, latter two aspects have been considered as part of both secondary and primary data collection.

### 2.1.3 Type of evaluation

As stated in the ToR, this is an evaluation of the EUTF **WASH Sector Portfolio** and implicitly is a formative evaluation given the link to informing future programming via other EU instruments. In addition, the evaluation could be of use to other donors and beneficiary country institutions.

The evaluation is a sector portfolio evaluation, hence has a focus primarily on analysing relevance, performance and sustainability at sector level rather than individual EUTF interventions. The evaluation sample (section 2 and Annex 2) has been used to explore and examine sector level trends and issues which in turn have been synthesised up to portfolio level. Where the evaluators have found a project-specific issue worthy of further investigation (for the purposes of highlighting a particular challenge or example of best practice) then the project was analysed in more depth and presented in the evaluation report. Project level assessments of performance are covered by either project evaluations that are commissioned by the EUTF Implementing Partner (IP) responsible for the intervention in question or by external Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) missions. This is not the purpose of this evaluation.

### 2.1.4 Scope of evaluation

The scope of the evaluation as presented in the ToR has been slightly amended in terms of the evaluation sample.

#### Geographical scope

The geographical scope remains as set out in the ToR as Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.

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<sup>6</sup> Secondary data collection could be citizens surveys carried out by implementing partners and/or national government service providers. Primary data collection could be service providers, right's holders/consumers/beneficiaries, local mayors and other representatives of municipalities.

## Evaluation Sample

The ToR specified 18 EUTF interventions across 4 countries either bilaterally or as a multi-country intervention as the evaluation sample (Annex 2). During the kick-off meeting the EUTF and EUD identified one additional intervention that had been omitted in error (T04.92) and proposed including a further two Action Documents (denoted in italics in the table in Annex 2). As agreed during the kick-off meeting, these latter two interventions were to be considered in terms of assessing relevance and lessons learned at a strategic level to understand to what extent lessons from earlier interventions have been incorporated into new / re-programming.

### 2.1.5 Target group of the evaluation

The target group of this evaluation, as set out in the ToR are specified as “refugees from Syria, IDPs and returnees (in Iraq) and vulnerable host communities benefitting from EUTF WASH support”. This collective group could also be considered as final beneficiaries of the interventions funded by EUTF and any associated change as a result of this evaluation.

The target group of the actual evaluation assignment could be better considered as the primary audience of the evaluation findings, conclusions and associated recommendations, namely: EUTF decision makers and operational staff; the EUDs; management staff of IPs of the interventions, national partners of the EUTF WASH sector and other relevant WASH sector stakeholders.

### 2.1.6 Cut-off dates

As agreed during the kick-off meeting, the date for setting the evaluation sample in the portfolio is from 2016 to end of March 2021. The cut-off date for the period of the review was the debriefing at the end of the verification phase (28 October 2021). The evaluators are not able to take into account any developments that have occurred after that date.

## 2.2 Regional Context and Specific Country Context

### 2.2.1 Regional Background

As reported in the evaluation ToR, the Inception and Desk Report, the Syrian conflict has had a devastating impact on Syria and many of the neighbouring countries and across the region. In response, the EU through the financing modality of the EUTF has been helping to address the effects of the regional crisis.

Updated data shows as of October 2021, the numbers of registered Syrian refugees in the host countries of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey is currently 5.49M<sup>7</sup>, which had increased since May 2021 when the number stood at 5.44M<sup>8</sup>. However, estimated numbers of refugees are significantly higher - with 6.72M estimated to be residing in the four countries, with the largest differences in registered and estimated numbers for Jordan and Lebanon. On average, for the region collectively, approximately 5% reside in camps (see specific country context for disaggregated data – only persons of concern in Jordan are reported to be residing in camps – Turkey does not have any camps). Whilst pressure on service delivery in host communities has been partly alleviated through interventions by the EU and other donors, challenges such as affordability and reliability of services remain. From the WASH perspective, faecal sludge management (FSM) and hygiene in camps<sup>9</sup> remain a challenge, coupled with eviction threats.

The worsening crisis in Lebanon is having significant effects on the population with fuel scarcity, increased electrical blackouts, and price increases for basic commodities, exacerbated by a continuing

<sup>7</sup> [Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response: Durable Solutions \(unhcr.org\)](https://www.unhcr.org/syria)

<sup>8</sup> [http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Durable\\_Solutions\\_May2021.pdf](http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Durable_Solutions_May2021.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> EUTF did not provide support to camps in Iraq.

political impasse and currency devaluation. In response the narrative has had to evolve to respond to the broader development amongst the wider population as opposed to focusing the communication campaign singly on the Syrian refugees. The situation in Iraq/KRI since the defeat of ISIL/Da'esh in 2017 and areas regained by the government allowed for displaced persons to return, although this has been slow due to large-scale destruction and continuing insecurity at local levels. The response by the Iraqi government to the rebuilding efforts has been absent, but government departments at regional level are working effectively and need continued support for the rebuilding efforts. Last October, Iraq held elections, which have not been without disturbances in the country. The general situation in Turkey, and Jordan has remained calm. Over the last months the media has reported COVID-19 vaccinations progressing slowly across the four countries. However, COVID-19 related restrictions are still in place.

### 2.2.2 Specific Country Context

This section provides an overview of the main issues facing each of the four countries covered by this evaluation in regard to WASH service provision for both Syrian refugees and other vulnerable sections of the population.

Table 1 provides a few key indicators that show the varied enabling environments and country contexts that the EUTF has been supporting.

Table 1 Key Figures relating to WASH across the portfolio of countries

Indicators	Iraq/KRI	Jordan	Lebanon	Turkey
Population	KRI population (2014): 5,122,747 (International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2018) 4.1 million M in need 1.5 M are IDPs and returnees ( <a href="#">Link</a> )	9.5M incl. 2.9M non-Jordanians <sup>10</sup>	Lebanon's population: 6.9 Million. 1.25 M vulnerable Lebanese (LCRP, 2021 update) <sup>11</sup>	84.34 M (2020)
Syrian refugees	329.500 refugees (including 241,650 from Syria). 99% live in KRI ( <a href="#">Link</a> ) 6 M are IDPs. Out of which, 4.7 Mm have returned and 1.3 M remain displaced ( <a href="#">Humanitarian Needs Overview Iraq, 2021</a> )	1.4M <sup>12</sup>	1.5 M (LCRP, 2021 update)	3.6 million M ( <a href="#">Link</a> )
(? Refugee) Pop. Living below poverty line	Due to Covid-19, Poverty increases of 21% and 28% p.p for refugees and IDPs respectively ( <a href="#">Resource</a> )	86% <sup>13</sup>	9 out of 10 Syrian Refugee families live in extreme poverty ( <a href="#">Resource</a> )	As of 2019, 45% of the Syrian Refugee live in poverty and 14% liver under extreme poverty ( <a href="#">Link</a> )
Available water	One-third of the country's population is estimated not to have access to safe water. Iraq faces difficulties to realise the target of 91% of households using safe	Individual per capita supply is expected to drop to 90 m <sup>3</sup> per year by 2025. (Water scarcity level is 500 m <sup>3</sup> per year	Only 48 percent % of the population has access to safely managed water and 20 percent % has access to safely	<i>Turkey is one of the most water rich countries of the Mediterranean, but due to an enormous population increase from 28 million M in</i>

<sup>10</sup> Population and Family health survey, Dept of Statistics/USAID/UNICEF/UNFPA, 2017

<sup>11</sup> Situation changing rapidly and therefore reported data may already be out of date.

<sup>12</sup> The National Strategy for the Health Sector in Jordan, 2016 – 2020

<sup>13</sup> PFHS, 2017)

Indicators	Iraq/KRI	Jordan	Lebanon	Turkey
	<p><b>drinking water</b> supply. Currently, 16% of households report daily problems with supply and 20% use an unsafe drinking water source (<a href="#">Link</a>)</p> <p>For the overall water supply, a reduction of up to 60% between 2015 and 2025 is estimated (<a href="#">Link</a>)</p>		<p>managed sanitation (<a href="#">resources</a>)</p>	<p><i>the 1960's to 68 million M in 2000 the availability of water resources has already decreased from around 4000 m3 to 1500 m3 per capita/year today – Water availability is expected to decline to 1000 m3 in 2050. (<a href="#">Link</a>)</i></p>
Available WASH financing	<p>Requirements USD 74.2 M (<a href="#">Humanitarian Needs Overview Iraq, 2021</a>)</p> <p>UNOCHA Financial Tracking System: Required USD 32.6 M. Coverage 107.1% (<a href="#">Link</a>)</p>	<p>60% of <b>WASH financial requirements</b> remained unfinanced<sup>14</sup></p>	<p>USD 222.8 M (Water) Needs-based appeal</p> <p>Partner Appeal USD 183 M (LCRP, 2021 update)</p>	<p>n/a – Turkey does not have a formal WASH sector. Financing for WASH related needs via national budget is well established.</p>

## Iraq

Iraq is hosting almost 250,000 Syrian refugees, of which more than 98% reside in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I). The vast majority are of Kurdish ethnicity of which approximately 61% reside among host communities with the remaining 39% living in one of the ten Syrian refugee camps across KR-I. In addition, Iraq is coping with 1.2M of internally displaced persons, of which 62% in the three programme target governorates hosting the largest number of IDPs (Nineveh 258k, Dohuk 250k, and Erbil 232k)<sup>15</sup>. This makes the situation in Iraq slightly different to that of the other 3 countries which generally respond to Syrians and host populations only. Reasons for Iraqi's remaining in displacement include lack of basic services along with lack of security, fear of unexploded ordinance and lack of livelihood opportunities.

The financial crisis in Iraq, including in the KR-I has impacted services and limited government capacity to take over financial responsibility for WASH services. A key concern remains the status of water resource versus demand, with already declining aquifer levels in North Iraq, exacerbated by increased water demand from refugees and IDP populations.

Challenges such as the on-going COVID-19 pandemic COVID-19 is exacerbating the needs of refugee households and has further hindered the WASH response in refugee camps with decline in donor funding.

On a more positive note, the security situation has been calm, albeit fragile, in Nineveh, and Dohuk governorates have been accessible for implementation of activities by implementing partners and contractors, with caution. where interventions are being carried out. In contrast, there have been incidents over the last year in Erbil governorate, Baghdad and areas with US bases, as well as after the October 2021 parliamentary election. Irregular rainfall has affected agricultural productivity and economic growth greatly in Nineveh governorate. The Irrigation project (T04.53) in this area is therefore showcasing its relevance.

<sup>14</sup> (JRP 2019)

<sup>15</sup> Reference: <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/>

Further support to government capacity to develop, operate and maintain services, and in establishing and enhancing community management structures and capacity (WASH Committees) is needed throughout Iraq. Moreover, reconstruction of the irrigation facilities in northern Iraq, destroyed as a result of the conflict with ISIS, is an indispensable first step in resettling the populations that have fled and providing them with long-term income and employment opportunities.

Ninewa Governorate is among the priority areas identified for a response to support vulnerable IDP and host communities. Ethnically and religiously mixed districts with severe needs in western Ninewa, which borders North East Syria, include Sinjar, Telafar and Al-Baaj. These areas remain severely underserved in terms of basic services, reconstruction and rehabilitation. Displaced populations from various ethnic groups are slowly returning but are broadly deterred by the lack of public services, livelihood opportunities and the lack of legal certainty around property rights.

The emphasis and contribution of the EUTF WASH Portfolio is focused on the northern governorate of Ninewa in Iraq, which is a post conflict area, including Mosul - Iraq's second largest city. Focus has also been on the north-western districts, Sinjar, Tel Afar and Baaj, of Nineveh governorate where large scale displacement occurred and returns have been slow due to the scale of destruction, lack of schools and water access.

Figure 1 Ninewa (Nineveh), north-western governorate of Iraq



The EUTF is currently supporting 3 country specific interventions that include specific WASH components with an approximate value of €24M. The interventions cover restoring water supply for food production and livelihoods, resilience for host communities, returnees and internally displaced persons, and support for urban recovery and peacebuilding in western Ninewa. In addition, there are 3 multi-country interventions that include Iraq and also WASH components within Iraq, with a total approximate value of €52.5M. These interventions are to strengthen the resilience of host communities and Syrian refugees, strengthen the long-term resilience of sub-

national authorities, and also to deal with displacement. At country level the first is:

Intervention T04.53 *'Restoring the Water Supply for Food Production and Livelihoods in Post Conflict Areas'* (May 2018 - December 2021) primarily focuses on agriculture, rural development, and livelihoods sectors in northern Nineveh. Activities include restoration of the North Al-Jazeera community irrigation infrastructure, including the main canal that conveys water from Mosul dam and its pumping station; and providing cash for work employment and return of livelihoods for agriculture. The intervention has been adapted to include provision of Covid-19 hygiene items (PPE) to veterinary staff of ministry of agriculture. There is no WASH specific activities funded under this intervention.

The second intervention T04.121 *'Supporting resilience for host communities, returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq'*. (2018-2020) also focused in Nineveh governorate; Mosul, Sinjar and Telafar; involves water and sanitation infrastructure rehabilitation, wash in schools, and community behavioural change communication (BCC) campaigns.

The third intervention, *'Support for Urban Recovery and Peacebuilding in western Ninewa, Iraq'* T04.247 has only recently commenced (September 2020) and is a two-year project. Operating in Baaj, Sinjar, Telafar districts (Nineveh), activities include construction of 450 low-cost houses with basic infrastructure, support for occupancy certificates, provision of improved WASH infrastructure for municipalities and public health centres, and WASH COVID- awareness raising.

The first of the three regional level interventions is intervention T04.40 *'Strengthening the Resilience of Host Communities and Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (Kurdistan)'* operating from February 2018 - June 2022 focusing on livelihoods and health sector. The activities have a limited scope in WASH with school rehabilitation in Duhok and Erbil.


The second regional level Intervention is T04.132: *'Strengthening the Long-Term Resilience of Subnational Authorities in Countries Affected by the Syrian and Iraqi Crisis (Lebanon/Iraq)'*. Commencing in January 2019 and scheduled to complete in January 2022 is being implemented in Sinjar (Nineveh), Mosul, Dohuk, Sumel, and Erbil. Activities include rehabilitation of small-scale WASH infrastructure and housing units, social media campaigns for Covid-19. In addition there is a component on urban recovery with focus on capacity strengthening of local governments, improving service delivery, and facilitating local economic development.

The third regional intervention T04.136 *'Dealing with Displacement – Resilient Subnational Government in Communities in the Region Affected by the Syrian Crisis (Iraq and Lebanon)'* runs from December 2018 – December 2022: Areas of coverage include Duhok, Sumel, Sheikhan and Tel Kheif. The primary focus is to maintain strength and resilience for local governments in Iraq and Lebanon (MASAR) – to ; improve municipal WASH infrastructure, Hygiene awareness sessions, solid waste management, GIS/ArcGIS mapping centres.

## Jordan

There are an estimated 1.3M Syrian refugees of which 672,023 are registered (52%), in turn 130,570 (19%) are registered as residing in camps with the balance 541,453 (81%) in households, primarily in northern governorates of Irbid and Mafraq, and Amman.

Figure 2 Areas of refugees in Jordan<sup>16</sup>




The increase of population has contributed to higher stress on water and wastewater management facilities, to further deterioration of water supply services and groundwater resources depletion, and to overloading of wastewater networks /cesspits with related risk of contamination of the shallow aquifers. There is a gap between both water and wastewater supply and demand. Water supply in Jordan is under a rationing system. Water is supplied per capita (cap)s – between 50-60 l/cap/day, delivered per schedule, e.g., once in fortnight, and then stored in tanks for use until next scheduled supply. Once the national conveyor project is completed and the gap is covered, water supply will turn to continuous. Urban areas are served with sewer

systems but some municipalities in the north don't have sewerage networks. There is a capital investment plan that defines priority areas to be served with sewage systems but financing of this plan requires funds much larger than available own budget. There are, an estimated 1.3M Syrian refugees of which 670,364 are registered (52%), in turn 130,183 (19%) are registered as residing in camps<sup>17</sup> with the balance 540,181 (81%) in households.

<sup>16</sup> <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36>

<sup>17</sup> [Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response \(unhcr.org\)](https://www.unhcr.org/syria-regional-refugee-response/)

Figure 3 Governorates of Jordan<sup>18</sup>



The emphasis and contribution of the EUTF WASH Portfolio is focused on the northern governorates of Jordan. The approach is transitioning from emergency to resilience/development, which is in line with both Jordanian and EU plans. There are four country level interventions and two regional interventions.

The first Intervention T04.27 'Improved access to water, water distribution performance and related sewerage disposal in Irbid governorate for host communities and Syrian Refugees' runs from 2016 to 2023 and focuses on the cities of Irbid and Ramtha (Irbid governorate). There are two components funded

by EUTF: implementation of an improved water distribution network (under component 1) and provision of improved water supply services to the vulnerable population (household level) under component 3. This project is also co-funded by ENI NIF (ENI/2016/381-021) i.e. 19.48 M€ NIF funds cover also component 1 and component 2 (TA), together with communication and visibility.

The second Intervention T04.92 'EUTF contribution to the West Irbid waste water network construction project' runs from 2018 to 2022. The focus includes providing wastewater infrastructure in the area, creating job opportunities in the construction sector and increasing awareness of water scarcity and water saving measures.

The third Intervention T04.172 'Education and WASH COVID-19 response programmes for vulnerable Syrians and Syrian and host community school-aged children in Jordan' commenced as an education sector intervention to which a WASH COVID-19 response was added. The COVID-19 response provided essential WASH services in refugee camps: Za'atari (Mafrqa), Azraq (Zarqa) and King Abdullah Park.

The fourth intervention T04:208 'EUTF support for an integrated solid waste management system in Syrian refugee camps and neighbouring communities affected by the Syrian crisis' is to provide environmentally friendly and cost-efficient sludge management in Azraq refugee camp (Zarqa) in addition to original implementation scope for strengthening of solid waste management system and creating job opportunities. Focus of our evaluation is on this additional component for sludge management.

The first of two multi-country interventions were T04.34 'Providing Lebanese and Jordanian communities hosting Syrian refugees with improved WASH infrastructure and facilities at community institution, and household level' with a focus in Jordan in Ajloun, Irbid and Mafrqa. Activities included: improving WSS infrastructure in targeted communities and institutional strengthening for efficient and sustainable resource management; improving access to water and sanitation in public institutions and improving access to household level WASH facilities (in Jordan specifically).

The second intervention T04.40 'Strengthening the resilience of host communities and Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq (Kurdistan)'. The focus in Jordan is in Irbid. Activities include strengthening of institutional capacities, rehabilitation of basic social infrastructure and services, and reinforcement of dialogue and resilience of local communities and capacities of local NGO's, CSO's

<sup>18</sup> Source: [Governorates of Jordan - Wikipedia](#)

and service providers are strengthened. However WASH activities in Jordan are not implemented under the intervention T04.40, but under T04.50, which is not in the evaluation sample.

## Lebanon

Lebanon hosts 1.5 million Syrian refugees who make up almost a quarter of the country's population. **Water and wastewater service systems are in severe disrepair** and do not provide for the needs of the Lebanese and Palestinian populations, or for the displaced persons from Syria<sup>19</sup>. These services were in poor state before the Syrian crisis, as a result of decades of poor management, under-investment and civil war. The situation in Lebanon has deteriorated since the commencement of this evaluation. For example (when the currency was still fixed to the us dollar) , the rapid devaluation of the Lebanese pound has been in freefall and as of , which as of October2021 is worth a thirteenth of the official value on the parallel market. More than three quarter of the population are living in poverty while dealing with loss of purchasing power, more frequent and longer electric blackouts and shortages of fuel and food.

In October 2021, a quarter of the country's power production capacity was halted as two power barges stopped delivering grid power. The two floating power stations from Turkish company Karpower/Karadenis were stationed near Beirut and provided 370 MW over the last 10 years. Since then, Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) (2021) announced a three-pillar electricity recovery plan, which has uncertainties as it's based on gas/fuel swap deals with surrounding countries.

Figure 4 Map of Lebanon



In terms of the context of water and sanitation three updates are noteworthy. First is the fact that the fuel and electricity crisis is directly impacting the provision of water pumping. Second is the pending approval, by the Government of Lebanon, of Lebanon's National Water Sector Strategy 2020 (NWSS 2020)<sup>20</sup>. Third is the fact that water establishments are bankrupt and are losing key staff, and because of currency devaluation receive less than 10% of revenue compared to 2 years ago and cannot upkeep operation and maintenance without donor support.

The protracted political deadlock in the country is a cause of increasing national and international concern. Donors are stating that they will not release funds until a cabinet has been formed and there is a clear commitment toward reforms. The

European Union's foreign policy chief stated in June 2021 that conflict among Lebanese leaders to secure power was to blame for the government crisis, and urged them to set their feud aside and form a cabinet or risk a total financial crash and sanctions<sup>21</sup>. Foreign aid would not flow without a government that engaged with the International Monetary Fund and delivered reforms to tackle corruption and mismanagement of funds. Since, September 2021, a new prime minister has been appointed. The political situation remains uncertain with national and international political incidents and dialogue ongoing, including the stance of political parties on the Beirut blast investigation.

<sup>19</sup> Source: Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), 2017-2021.

<sup>20</sup> <https://water-sector-strategy-moew.droppages.com>

<sup>21</sup> [https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/eu-warns-lebanons-leaders-sanctions-over-home-made-crisis-2021-06-19/;](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/eu-warns-lebanons-leaders-sanctions-over-home-made-crisis-2021-06-19/) <https://www.euronews.com/2021/06/19/eu-s-top-diplomat-josep-borrell-warns-of-sanctions-over-ongoing-crisis-in-lebanon>

As with other countries, the on-going COVID-19 pandemic is also continuing. Together, all of these enabling environment changes and challenges continue to have an impact on EUTF actions:

In the case of Lebanon, the EUTF WASH portfolio comprises of 10 actions (for the full list see Annex 2), which can be divided into the following categories.

**1. Achieving an improved and effective Water Establishment (WE)** that is financially viable and autonomous from the MoEW is the combined objective of EUTF actions supporting the water establishments (and is in line with Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), and National Water Sector Strategy (NWSS)).

Five EUTF Actions T04.20, T04.34, T04.90, T04.98, and T04.100 supported North Lebanon (NL) WE, South Lebanon (SL)WE and Bekaa (B) WE, with a limited scope for Beirut and Mount Lebanon (BML) WE, in water infrastructure support, in-house capacity building, and community engagement. A sixth action (T04.272 - ACTED) follows-up on the support to all four WEs piloting a modality of Establishment-Led Service Improvement & Cost Recovery (EL-SICR) for which infrastructure projects are identified. Solar water pumping to power boreholes is included in actions T04.24 and T04.90 for the Bekaa. The four WEs received additional support (€10M) to continue to supply water during COVID-19 pandemic, by an amendment to T04.90.

**2. Wastewater** services are being improved through the separation of waste and storm water networks in one district in Tripoli (North) and three in the Southern suburbs of Beirut (T04.34). Upgrading of the Ouzaii wastewater services was completed in 2020 (T04.100). Planned under interventions T04.272 there are also decentralised Wastewater treatment systems and technical assistance for informal tented settlements.

**3. WASH infrastructure** upgrades in schools, public health centres and detention centres (action T04.34).

**4. Beirut Blast, Covid-19, and financial crisis:** During Covid-19 pandemic it is vital that water service provision continues as greater quantities of water are required for hygiene purposes. The four WEs have suffered a reduced revenue. Action T04.90 is to receive a second top up (planned start in June October 2021 for €22M) for equipment for maintenance and operation to allow continuity of water and wastewater services and to rehabilitate/improve some infrastructures supplying water to the blast affected area. Another component is for rehabilitation and technical support for BML WE.

**5. Water and wastewater services in Aarsal, Ras Baalbeck and Fekha-Jdeydeh (Bekaa valley)**

Activities under this category are the improvement of living conditions of host communities and Syrian refugees (T04.206; period 2021 to 2014). Scope includes WWTP and 110 km sewerage for 66,500 persons in Aarsal and improvement of water services. BWE will benefit from 3 resident experts for the duration of the project. However, due to the crisis the scope of this intervention is being reviewed.

**6. Regional actions.**

- Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq (T04.40), includes 2 water infrastructure projects for Lebanon.
- Lebanon/Iraq (T04.132), *Municipal Empowerment and Resilience Project (MERP)* involves strengthening municipalities, including in procurement such as tenders, and also effective donor coordination around municipal engagement and capacity development.
- Iraq and Lebanon (T04.136) *Maintaining Strength and Resilience for Local Governments (MASAR)*. Hygiene awareness sessions are incorporated in other activities. These include Akkar (NLWE) water irrigation channels. Also included are solid waste interventions, improving municipal infrastructure, local administration strengthening, decreasing social tensions, and economic growth.

## Turkey

Turkey has been hosting the largest population of persons under temporary and international protection in the world for the last six years. As of November 2021, the number of registered Syrian refugees is 3,728,612, approximately 68% of the total number of Syrian refugees across the four countries.

Syrians living under temporary protection live in urban and rural areas across 81 provinces with less than 2% residing in the seven remaining Temporary Accommodation Centres. The Government of Turkey has met the majority of the financial costs related to the refugee response. However under the umbrella of the objectives of the Global Compact on Refugees and the principle of the Sustainable Development Goals and Leaving No-one Behind is now calling for increased and sustained international support. As with the other countries Turkey has also had to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 vaccination rate in Turkey is 70.5 % (based on number of vaccines administered).


As with other neighbouring countries, Syrian refugees have mostly exhausted their assets, face high levels of economic insecurity and have to contend with rising costs of living including for utilities. In turn this negatively affects vulnerable households and their ability to meet their basic needs. Compared to the other countries under review, the situation in the WASH sector in Turkey is comparably less critical. Service delivery responsibility is at municipality level and implementation of public infrastructure projects follow agreed national and local strategies.

According to the 3RP 2018-2019, in municipalities with high population density, waste volumes and water consumption have increased substantially and municipal services, such as firefighting, have experienced increased demand on resources. The increase in demand has led to challenges in terms of access to adequate services and increased competition between Syrians under temporary protection and host communities, risking a further increase in social tensions. Investments in municipal infrastructure and capacities therefore remain a high priority. This also concerns a further improvement of the water and wastewater services.

In Turkey the EUTF WASH Portfolio includes two interventions with an approximate value of €90M, of which one is completed, and the other is currently on-going. The interventions operate in five provinces in the south and southeast of the country, four of which border with Syria, where there is relatively a high population of Syrian refugees. The fifth province, Adiyaman province does not border with Syria.

The proportion of Syrian population living in these provinces compared to the total population is more than 20% in Hatay, Şanlıurfa and Gaziantep provinces. Kilis, a city bordering with Syria, is an exceptional situation as it is hosting a proportion of 73 % of Syrians living under temporary protection.

Figure 5 Map of EUTF projects, Turkey



The first of the two interventions, T04.76: *‘Strengthening the Economic and Social Resilience of Syrians, their Host Communities and Relevant National and Local Government Institutions, carried out by UNDP’* is operating in the provinces of Gaziantep, Kilis, Hatay and Sanliurfa. Activities include the construction of wastewater and solid waste facilities, and increasing the capacity of municipalities. In response to COVID-19: 1 million face masks, 5,000 personnel protection and medical equipment were produced and delivered, along with IT equipment for remote working, as well as provision of technical support.

The second intervention, T04.155: *‘Technical Assistance and Support for the Municipal Resilience Facility (MRF)’* is operating in the provinces of Kilis, Hatay, Sanliurfa, Gaziantep, and Adiyaman. Activities include strengthening the capacity of host municipalities to deliver municipal water, sanitation and solid waste services and to improve the perspectives of hosting refugees in a sustainable manner. The intervention is implemented, including project management, by the municipality bank of Turkey.

## 3. Approach and methodology of the evaluation

### 3.1 Approach

As set out in the Evaluation Inception Report a conventional approach was taken to carry out the evaluation using the evaluation questions. Where feasible the team also applied an approach of outcome harvesting<sup>22</sup> to capture any unplanned results (see Annex 1 for a full approach and methodology).

The risk assessment at mid-July suggested that the verification phase would be conducted fully field-based and the team prepared for such. However, by September 2021, the evaluation team in consultation with the EUTF agreed that the Iraq/KRI verification would be conducted remotely (Table 3).

### 3.2 Methodology

The methodology remains the same as that which was reported in respect of data collection, data analysis, triangulation and quality control. The evaluation questions, judgement criteria and indicators also remain the same.

However, there has been an adjustment to both the evaluation team (Table 2) and the timeline (Table 3).

Table 2 Evaluation team, composition and structure

Name	Responsibility	Country Lead
Rachel Norman KE1: Team Leader	Overall management and coordination, methodology development, report production and presentation	Provision of support to other countries and capture information from central level.
Andrew West KE2: WASH Expert	Planning and implementation of the evaluation including field work and reporting particularly related to WASH technical issues.	Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey.
Dr Egbert Sondorp KE3: Public Health Expert	Planning and implementation of the evaluation including field work and reporting particularly related to hygiene/health issues.	Technical support on hygiene and Health related topics to all countries.
Malik Alkhawaja KE4: Co-evaluator / data collector	Planning and implementation of the evaluation particularly related to data collection and analysis, including field work.	No allocation of lead country; co-evaluator for Jordan support on itinerary planning, data collection and analysis (especially QINs) to other countries.
Jasna Ljubisic KE5: WASH Expert	Planning and implementation of the evaluation including field work and reporting particularly related to WASH technical issues.	Jordan.

Table 3 Actual workplan timeline

Task	Location	Calendar
<b>Inception Phase</b>		
Kick-off meeting	Home office	14 April 2021
Submission of draft Inception Report	Home office	29 April 2021
Submission of final Inception Report	Home office	26 May 2021
Phase end	Home office	Approval of final Inception Report

<sup>22</sup> [https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/plan/approach/outcome\\_harvesting](https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/plan/approach/outcome_harvesting)

Task	Location	Calendar
		1 June 2021
<b>Desk Phase</b>		
Start of phase	Home office	1 June 2021
Submission of draft Desk Phase Report	Home office	14 July 2021
Submission of final Desk Phase Report	Home office	2 September 2021
Phase end	Home office	Approval of final Desk Phase Report 13 September 2021
<b>Verification Phase</b>		
Start of phase	Home office	30 August 2021
Turkey – Andrew West	Field-based	20-25 September 2021
Jordan – Jasna Ljubisic & Malik Alkhawaja	Field-based	26-30 September 2021
Lebanon – Andrew West	Field-based	11-20 October 2021
Kurdistan/Iraq – Andrew West & Malik Alkhawaja	Home-office / remote	17-25 October 2021
Debriefing and internal report	Home office	28 October 2021
<b>Reporting Phase</b>		
Start of phase	Home office	11 October 2021
Submission of draft Evaluation Report	Home office	15 November 2021
Submission of final Evaluation Report	Home office	14 December 2021
Phase end	Home office	Upon approval of final Evaluation Report Anticipated latest 21 December 2021
Presentation to the Board (Optional)	Home office	2 December 2021.

### 3.3 Limitations of the evaluation

Despite taking associated mitigation measures, some risks were realised during the evaluation which are presented as limitations (see Annex 1– approach and methodology)

## 4. Response to evaluation questions

This section of the report provides the response to the evaluation questions at portfolio level, drawing on specific country examples where appropriate or required within a particular evaluation question.

Within most criteria there are two notable aspects worth re-highlighting (as reported in Section 2) across the portfolio. The first is in respect to Turkey, which benefits from a greater level of access to capable and experienced contractors, as well as good quality local production of materials and equipment as compared to the other three countries. In addition, there is not WASH sector/Cluster coordination as in the other three countries. The second, is the ongoing and exacerbated socio, political and economic crisis in Lebanon, which has had a profound influence on the country and, by extension, the EUTF WASH support there.

### 4.1 Relevance<sup>23</sup>

#### *Alignment of the WASH Portfolio objectives with the EUTF-Syria priorities (EQ1)*

**All the interventions within the WASH portfolio sample are aligned with the EUTF strategic objectives, principles and approaches, including the EUTF Results Framework statements and associated indicators.**

The EUTF Syria was established in December 2014 under the Commission Decision (C(2013) 9615 final), and the framework of Article 187 of the Financial Regulation (EU, Euratom No 966/2012), as an emergency and potentially also a post-emergency tool in response to the Syrian Crisis. Its underlying guiding principles are laid out in “Constitutive Agreement” and the “Strategic Orientation Document” of December 2014 . Whilst there is no specific reference to WASH in either the EUTF Strategic Orientation document or the Operational Criteria for Concept Notes and Actions Documents, water and waste water management services are referenced in the Constitutive Agreements (2014 onwards). Furthermore, there are references to the national priorities including the UN Regional Refugee Resilience Plans which include WASH. In addition, operational criteria for Concept Notes and Action Documents were set out in 2015 that included aspects such as relevance, added value as well as design, sustainability cost-effectiveness and visibility of such actions.

As regards EUTF strategic objectives, the EUTF Syria Overarching Strategic Framework refers to “better health for Syrian refugees, IDPs and host communities” under which water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) activities fall. The EUTF Syria Results Framework (RF)<sup>24</sup> provides a more specific set of strategic objectives for the Fund, laid out sector-by-sector. For the WASH sector, the overall result statement is **“More Syrian and host communities have better health, through improved access to health (and water) services, strengthened local capacities (in health and WASH), and strengthened infrastructure (also in both sectors)”**. This is supported by one strategic outcome and four indicators (Table 4). These indicators are appropriate and relevant for the sector.

*Table 4 Results statement and indicators related to WASH sector*

	2019 Results Framework	2021 Results Framework
<b>RS</b>	<b>Improved WASH infrastructure</b>	<b>Improved WASH capacities and infrastructure</b>
<b>Indicator</b>	24. Number of individuals with access to improved drinking water source.	20. Number of people with access to safely managed drinking water.

<sup>23</sup> The associated evaluation questions are: EQ1. Is programming of WASH programmes/projects strategically aligned with the EUTF’s underlying funding principles and approaches? EQ2. How has the WASH portfolio developed since the beginning of the EUTF with regard to relevance, targeting and responsiveness? EQ3. How effectively have specific country needs, contexts and barriers to WASH services been taken into account in the programming of country-based EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects?

<sup>24</sup> 2019 and 2021 official versions of the Results Frameworks [Monitoring & Evaluation \(europa.eu\)](https://europea.eu). Minor adjustments have been made overall to the RF between 2019 and 2021, these include reducing numbers of indicators (44 to 37), aligning and harmonising where feasible.

	2019 Results Framework	2021 Results Framework
Indicator	25. Number of beneficiaries who have experienced an awareness session related to water use, sanitation or hygiene.	21. Number of people trained in WASH.
Indicator	26. Number of municipal and regional water and wastewater facilities constructed/rehabilitated.	22. Number of municipal/regional water and wastewater facilities constructed/rehabilitated and/or equipped.
Indicator	27. Kilometres of networks for water or wastewater installed or rehabilitated.	23. Metres of transmission and distribution lines rehabilitated and/or installed.
Indicator	28. Number of people trained in the WASH sector.	

For the purposes of this evaluation, these are considered to be the most relevant ‘high-level’ objectives against which all the EUTF Syria interventions in the evaluation should align and to which their results ultimately contribute. The evaluators reviewed the design documentation of all the interventions in the sample to assess the coherence of their expected results with the strategic outcome and associated indicator. For example, in the case of Iraq interventions included the objectives of promoting lasting peace, stability and security in Iraq and the region, and interventions are supporting government capacity in managing water resources. In Jordan, explicit references are made to promoting the resilience between host communities and Syrian refugees as well as including reference to vulnerable populations. For Lebanon, clearly outlined in the documentation, all interventions address WASH needs and reduce social tensions between host and Syrian populations in regions where there has been poor WASH infrastructure, and high influx of Syrian refugees. In the case of Turkey, the two EUTF WASH interventions aim to improve and secure the living conditions of SuTP and the population in host communities.

### Alignment with Country Priorities (EQ3)

**The EUTF-funded WASH interventions address fully justified needs across the 4 countries and are aligned with the relevant policies and/or strategies of the various governments.**

The overarching framework for assistance to all the countries affected by the Syrian crisis is the Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) and associated Country Response Plans. These Country Response Plans in turn set out country-specific needs.

There are also a number of additional country national policies and strategies (Table 5) to which the WASH country-level portfolios are aligned.

The EUTF-funded WASH interventions explicitly state within their programming documents having taken into account one or more of the national policies and / or strategies. Where there appears to be some variance across the countries is in respect to the extent to which identified barriers, such as staffing and recruitment challenges, capacities and capabilities (in the case of each of the countries), security (in the case of Iraq) have been integrated into intervention designs; and the extent to which relevant stakeholders have actively participated in the programming and design of interventions. For example, in the case of Iraq, IPs undertook consultations with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA), the Directorate of Water (DoW), the Directorate of Agriculture (DoA), the Directorate of Education (DoE) and civil society. For the housing reconstruction projects in Ninewa governorate, stakeholders meetings were held with the mayor, community leaders, religious leaders and beneficiaries. The process in Jordan is slightly different in that a vulnerability map, developed jointly by UNICEF, Water Authority Jordan (WAJ)/ Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MoWI) is reflected in the JRP, linked with

*Quote from Government Official Sinjar (T04.121): ‘ISIS war on Sinjar district has destroyed the area. Some houses did not have a connection to the water network. For a long time, no party, whether governmental or non-governmental, took the initiative to implement WASH projects in the region. As such, the WHH project is very much needed.’*

the business needs of Yarmouk Water Company (YWC) and WAJ. From this the WASH response is co-developed as MoWI/ Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) and donors consult on the planned sector projects, needs and finance. The map and project matrix are regularly updated including the voice from communities through their representatives. Different again, is the case in Turkey where there is no WASH sector per se, and priorities are set out in the 3RP, as well as the Masterplan of ILbank (implementer and municipalities bank) which is affiliated with the Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation. The priorities are based on population data and needs per municipality. Projects were selected by priority list of ILbank (T04.155) following the Government's First Stage Needs Assessment (March 2016), and were validated by the Consultant and through feasibility studies. In the case of T04.76 prioritisation was carried out through engagement between the IP and municipalities.

Table 5 Relevant national policies and/or strategies

Country	Other national policies and/or strategies
Iraq/KRI	EU Strategy for Iraq (2018), 3RP
Jordan	Jordan Response Plan (2018, 2020-2022, 2021 updated); EU-Jordan Compact (2016-2018); National Water Strategy 2016-2030; Jordan 2025 Vision; Jordan Executive Development Plan 2016-2018; Water Sector Green Growth National Action Plan 2021-2025 (2020).
Lebanon	3RP, National Water Sector Strategy 2020, Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
Turkey	The Integrated Urban Development Strategy and its Action Plan 2010-2023

### Design of Regional and Country Interventions

**Although there are multi-country interventions and country WASH interventions, both types have been designed at country level.**

The EUTF comprises of two main generations of contracting. The 1<sup>st</sup> generation consisting of Regional, Multi-Country interventions and the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation consisting generally of more Country level interventions. This shift in intervention type was in response to the recommendations of the Strategic Mid-Term Evaluation of the EUTF (2014-2018)<sup>25</sup> in that **“the EUTF focuses on Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan”** (Recommendation 13) and that **“...the Fund phases out in Turkey before the renewal of EUTF...”** (Recommendation 14).

There are four multi-country interventions as follows:

1. T04.34 *‘Providing Lebanese and Jordanian communities hosting Syrian refugees with improved WASH infrastructure and facilities at community, institution, and household level’.*
2. T04.40 *‘Strengthening the Resilience of Host Communities and Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (Kurdistan)’.*
3. T04.132 *‘Strengthening the Long-Term Resilience of Sub-national Authorities in Countries Affected by the Syrian and Iraqi Crisis’.*
4. T04.136 *‘Dealing with Displacement – Resilient Sub-national Government in Communities in the Region Affected by the Syrian Crisis’.*

Although the intervention T04.34 was planned as regional, it was implemented as two independent national projects for which two staff members created a link. Both in Lebanon and in Jordan the same international NGOs made the consortium but the management and implementation teams were separate, and there were two steering committees. As implemented in this case, the “regional approach” did not bring an obvious added value. For T04.40, again, despite being considered as a

<sup>25</sup> [mid-term strategic evaluation eutf in response to syrian crisis - final report en.pdf \(europa.eu\)](#)

regional intervention, there was only a WASH component related to Lebanon. In terms of T04.132 and T04.136 these were operating across two countries of Iraq and Lebanon, again operated as country interventions responding to country level needs. This is not seen as problematic however, given the specific needs differ at country level. Generally, the multi-country interventions had a smaller WASH scope in comparison to the national EUTF WASH interventions.

### *Overarching responsiveness of WASH portfolio over time (EQ2)*

**EUTF WASH portfolio interventions are considered as having been responsive over time. This is evidenced in having responded to lessons learned both in terms of original design and programming; responding to learning from one generation of intervention to the next; as well as responding to external factors such as COVID-19.**

Across each country portfolio intervention action documents clearly note responding to lessons learned and are planned in consultation with local government. For example, in the case of Iraq, intervention T04.247 (UN-Habitat) follows-up and complements intervention T04.132 (UNDP/UN-Habitat) noting lessons learned and demonstrating learning within EUTF portfolio. In the case of Jordan, predominant references to learning are those from the implementing partners' previous work in the country and/or region with a few references to learning from other interventions pilot projects and studies (T04.27; T04.34; T04.208). This is also the case for Turkey where previous experience from waste management and service delivery through municipalities was integrated into programming (T04.76).

Where evidence of change is most significant is within the case of Lebanon, not only in terms of three generations of programming. Lebanon also has the largest proportion of WASH sector interventions however, due to sensitivities Syrians were not directly targeted in Lebanon, instead, the assumption was that by supporting public infrastructure, Syrians would be included alongside the host populations.

Many of the WASH portfolio of interventions have also responded to the COVID-19 pandemic on an individual basis as opposed to a combined approach. Responses included COVID-19 awareness campaigns (T04.27; T04.121), as well as budget allocation to buy PPE and/or introduce stricter measures (T04.53; T04.76; T04.208). In the case of Jordan, intervention T04.172 formerly an Education intervention, had added a WASH component specifically in response to COVID-19.

As for the T04.208, a streamlined implementation approach in both camps and host communities adjusted project execution to allow the introduction of COVID-19 mitigation measures.

## 4.2 Effectiveness and impact<sup>26</sup>

This section of the report examines the extent to results have been achieved, and what factors have had a positive and/or negative influence on the achievement of the results. Furthermore, the evaluators examine the appropriateness of partners and their specific advantages and /or disadvantages in terms of effectiveness in achieving the EUTF WASH portfolio objectives.

<sup>26</sup> The associated evaluation questions are: EQ4. To what extent have EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects been effective in achieving their planned outcomes? What are the actually achieved outcomes in terms of what has changes, who has changes, when and how? EQ5. How well has EUTF WASH support contributed to the achievement of longer-term effects/impact? What are these actual impacts in specific terms? EQ6. What external factors (positive and negative) have had the greatest influence on the achievement of results/changes observed? EQ7. Is the level of partnership with the national/country-specific governmental partners appropriate to support the effective achievement of the EUTF WASH objectives? EQ8. What are the specific advantages/disadvantages of the various implementing partners (national/regional/multi-country, international) in terms of effectiveness?

### Outputs of WASH interventions (EQ4)

Outputs are progressing at a mixed rate across the WASH portfolio (Table 6) which will in turn have an impact on the rate of delivery of the outcomes given that outcomes are the direct results of the interventions outputs. This is not unexpected given the portfolio of interventions commenced at different times; are being implemented across a range of differing enabling environment contexts; are subject to varying internal and external factors; and comprise of an array of different activities being carried out by a range of implementing partners. For intervention level details on progress of outputs see Section 7 for the country level portfolio reports.

Table 6 Output status overview of WASH portfolio interventions

Intervention	Country	Output type	Status of output (as at 28 October 2021) <sup>27</sup>
T04.20	Lebanon	Infrastructure water – network and household level	Expected to be completed by Dec 2021 (delays with 4 x NCE).
T04.27	Jordan	Infrastructure – network and household level	Household   Network
T04.34	Multi	Jordan: Infrastructure – network and household level	
		Lebanon: Infrastructure – network; WASH in institutions (PHC, schools, detention centres); Hygiene Promotion	Fully achieved outputs - network
T04.40	Multi	Iraq: No WASH	N/A
		Jordan: No WASH	N/A
		Lebanon: Infrastructure water – network / Corona campaign	Ongoing
T04.53	Iraq	Infrastructure – irrigation water – no WASH component.	N/A
T04.76	Turkey	Infrastructure – solid waste / wastewater	Fully achieved outputs - network
T04.90	Lebanon	Infrastructure – water – network / Covid campaign / Capacity building WE / Emergency water	Ongoing (extension)
T04.98	Lebanon	Water Infrastructure – network / HH connections / capacity building WE	Ongoing (NCE to Dec 2021)
T04.100	Lebanon	Water Infrastructure – network / capacity building WE	Ongoing (NCE to Dec 2021)
T04.121	Iraq	Infrastructure – solid waste / wastewater	Fully achieved outputs - network
T04.132	Multi	Iraq: Infrastructure water/Capacity Building/Covid-19 campaign	Implementation ongoing - network
T04.136	Multi	Iraq: Infrastructure water/Capacity Building	Implementation ongoing - network
		Lebanon: Infrastructure water / wastewater	Implementation ongoing - network
T04.155	Turkey	Infrastructure – water / wastewater	Ongoing - network
T04.172	Jordan	COVID-19 emergency water and sanitation services camps level	
T04.206	Lebanon	Infrastructure – water / wastewater	Not started (planning)
T04.208	Jordan	SWM camp and municipal level	
T04.247	Iraq	Infrastructure – network and household level	Ongoing
T04.272	Lebanon	Infrastructure – water / wastewater	Not started - network
T04.92	Jordan	Infrastructure – network level	
AD.Mar21	Lebanon	Emergency O&M support water - network	Not started
AD.Mar21 (T04.208)	Jordan	Wastewater/ sludge management camp and surrounding community level	

<sup>27</sup> The status is RAG rated as follows: Red: major delays; Amber: progress delayed by likely to achieve/complete outputs within the timeframe; Green: achieved/completed outputs within timeframe; Grey: not started; No colour: cancelled or not applicable.

### Outcomes of EUTF WASH portfolio support (EQ4)

**Whilst outputs are progressing, the conversion of outputs to outcomes is less evident and although the planned outcome of improved access to water and sanitation services is predicted to being achieved, improved resilience of government departments supported through capacity development remains challenged.**

Intervention outcomes are the direct result of an interventions outputs and are, in this case, the changes that the EUTF aim to bring about to the health status of Syrian refugees and their vulnerable host populations as well as IDPs. This is through the contribution of improved WASH capacities and infrastructure. Table 7 provides an overview of the achievement or likelihood of achievement of these outcomes by intervention whereas Table 8 maps evidenced outcomes against the EUTF Strategic Framework (2021).

Table 7 Outcome status overview of WASH portfolio interventions

Intervention	Country	Outcomes	Likelihood of outcome (as at 28 October 2021)
T04.20	Lebanon	Improved Sustainable Management of Water Services and Resources through strengthening infrastructural and managerial capacities of water establishments.	Dec 2021 (4 x NCE).
T04.27	Jordan	Population benefiting from safe drinking water / Improvement of the access and the distribution of water for the host communities and Syrian refugees of Greater Irbid and Ramtha.	Mixed status per components: 1.1 very delayed; 3 completed with fully achieved outputs
T04.34	Multi	Jordan: Help women, girls, boys and men from Syria and host populations in Jordan (and Lebanon) to be better able to meet their own WASH needs and respond to future shocks and stresses; Close coordination with local authorities reported as a mitigation measure to overcome challenges and to ensure additional teams on site to complete the works in time; Building up the individual capacities on WASH related aspects.	Completed in January 2020. with fully achieved outputs
		Lebanon: In vulnerable areas build the resilience of refugees and host communities through a participatory approach that increases access to effective water and sanitation services and improves health outcomes through improved hygienic environments and practices.	Completed in January 2020. With achieved outputs
T04.40	Multi	Iraq: not applicable, no WASH component in Iraq.	N/A
		Jordan: not applicable, no WASH component in Jordan.	N/A
		Lebanon: Relatively small WASH component, 2 urban water schemes (Tripoli, South Beirut) and Corona campaign in refugee camps,	Ongoing. Aug 2021 (not known if NCE provided)
T04.53	Iraq	Large scale Rehabilitation of Al-Jazeera irrigation system in northern Nineveh (pots-conflict area). Improved food security and livelihoods conditions. Not a WASH component.	N/A
T04.76	Turkey	By Oct 2021, infrastructure projects for solid treatment and recycling, waste transfer, and wastewater treatment were constructed and are in operation. Reducing the impact on the environment, and burden on municipalities.	Completed October 2021 with outputs achieved
T04.90	Lebanon	Enhanced provision of safe drinking water services, and Improved water service management. From Dec 2020 to June 2021, additional funds to support the four WEs with O&M following crisis of Beirut Blast, Covid-19, and WE fund depletion.	Ongoing
T04.98	Lebanon	Improved access to safe water established through infrastructure projects, and reduction of NRW (reduced expenditures per household; and increase of subscriptions to BWE will not likely be achieved).	Ongoing; completion Dec 2021

<i>Intervention</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Outcomes</i>	<i>Likelihood of outcome (as at 28 October 2021)</i>
T04.100	Lebanon	Increased supply of safe water in south Lebanon from water schemes (also BML), and sanitation improved in South Beirut, with to small extent capacity building of water establishments.	Ongoing; completion Dec 2021
T04.121	Iraq	Population within newly accessible areas of Iraq to have improved access to water and sanitation by restoring the damaged infrastructure and conducted hygiene behaviour change campaign.	Completed 2020 with outputs achieved
T04.132	Multi	Iraq: Strengthened Long-Term Resilience of Subnational Authorities. Improved water and sanitation access in 5 cities of Iraq/KRI, and awareness on corona through large online corona campaign. Lebanon:	Close to completion
T04.136	Multi	Iraq: Strengthened municipalities in service delivery capacities; Improved municipal infrastructure.	Ongoing (NCE) Dec 2022
		Lebanon: Strengthened municipalities in service delivery capacities; Improved municipal infrastructure. municipal infrastructure improved/Irrigation. Hygiene awareness sessions.	Ongoing Dec 2022
T04.155	Turkey	Strengthening the capacity of host municipalities to deliver municipal services (water, sanitation and solid waste) and to improve the perspectives of hosting refugees in a sustainable manner.	Delayed. under construction; good prospects for Outputs
T04.172	Jordan	To provide essential WASH services in refugee camps to ensure that the most vulnerable children and their families living in high-risk communities are protected from the primary and secondary impacts of the COVID-19 outbreak.	Completed in July 2021 with fully achieved outputs
T04.206	Lebanon	Increase access to drinking water and wastewater services for in Arsaal, Ras Baalbeck and Fekha-Jdeydeh (Bekaa). WWTP and 110 km sewerage for 66,500 persons, and improvement of water services in Arsaal. 3 resident experts for BWE for project duration. Project scope under review.	2021 to start
T04.208	Jordan	Labour intensive and environmentally friendly collection and processing of recyclables and organic waste in refugee camps and host-communities are strengthened.	Outputs mostly timely produced
T04.247	Iraq	Enabled return of IDPS through urban recovery in post-conflict districts of Ninewa through the improvement of living and housing conditions and improved public WASH infrastructure and schools.	Ongoing construction. Sept 2022.
T04.272	Lebanon	WASH assistance to support water governance and public water and wastewater services in Lebanon for host and refugee communities	Started 2021
T04.92	Jordan	Construct new wastewater networks and connections while improving the sector operational and financial sustainability - 18 towns to benefit from being connected to the wastewater network - Reduced risk of environmental disaster and public health improved; - Creation of employment opportunities.	Very delayed initial implementation phase; construction contracts (3 lots out of 50 about to be signed)
AD.Mar21	Lebanon	Maintain water service provision through temporary O&M support to the four water establishments.	Not started
AD.Mar21 (T04.208)	Jordan		Not started – official signature needed

Table 8 Sample mapping likelihood of outcome against the EUTF Strategic Outcome Framework

Social Actor	Outcome Statement	More Syrian refugees, IDPs and host communities have access to safely managed water and WASH services	
		As reported within the Outcome Framework	As considered through this evaluation
Individuals: refugees, IDPs, host communities	Self-report of behavioural changes	Perception of people about affordability of WASH services (T04.98).	Refugees in the camps now have improved living conditions and can find work. They are able to provide for their families, gain work experience, and their self-esteem is improved. (T04.208/229)
	Change their behaviour seeking services		
	Make institutions accountable	Status of community engagement with the WASH providers / institutions.	There is a hotline for reporting network issues in Jordan. YWC has local teams that promptly respond and repair leaks. This reduces NRW, and saves water.
National Institutions: sector ministries	Promote new regulatory frameworks toward sector reform		In Jordan, in YWC there is a board introduced by WAJ to control/improve the performance of the company. In WAJ, there is a Utility Performance Management Unit.
	Establish/apply new policy instruments		
Local institutions: including Water establishments / providers	Report improved performance	Perception of the community on the responsiveness of WASH providers / institutions to the community.	Better access to / reduced costs for water (T04.27; T04.121); Better access to water for vulnerable persons (T04.132; T04.247) and considered it became worth paying (T04.34).
	Change/improve their intervention strategies	Status to WEs applying good water management practice (T04.90, T04.98, T04.100, T04.272); Status of the use of water quality monitoring plans (T04.90) Status of local WASH platform (T04.272)	DoW equipped with decision making tools (T04.136); WE capacity and improved customer relationship (T04.20; T04.34) Strengthening the capacity of hose municipalities to deliver municipal services (T04.155)

### Unplanned results of the EUTF WASH portfolio support (EQ5)

**Given the status of outputs, it is still very early in the programme lifecycle of the WASH portfolio to understand the extent of unplanned results.**

The evaluation has not identified any examples of unplanned outcomes however, given the fact that implementation is still ongoing, the potential exists for unplanned results to emerge in time. Intervention T04.92 has highlighted an unplanned output though: “EBRD has provided training to both WAJ and the General Tender Department staff working on this project and in parallel has launched the new online procurement system for Jordan projects” has occurred as a response to the cause of the

delays in intervention implementation. This may in turn have value-added beyond this specific intervention.

#### *Impact of the EUTF Syria WASH portfolio (EQ5)*

**Given the status of outputs and outcomes it is still very early in the programme lifecycle of the WASH portfolio to understand the extent of impact of the EUTF WASH portfolio.**

In order to assess the extent of impact, 3 main bodies of evidence are required: i) evidence of outcomes achieved at intervention level; ii) clarity and consistency of overall objectives of interventions; iii) measurement of impact on an intervention level basis.

Whilst some of this information is available, it is still too early to assess the overall impact of the WASH portfolio. However, the likelihood can be considered in terms of the likelihood of outcomes being achieved (Table 6) and for those interventions already completed (T04.121; T04.172; T04.76; T04.34). In the case of Iraq the interventions are having an impact to accommodate returnees although there are constraints to achieve longer-term impact linked to sustainability (see section 5.5). For Turkey intervention T04.76 is considered as reducing the environmental impact of solid waste and wastewater.

#### *External factors having a positive effect on results (EQ6)*

**A number of external factors have been identified as having a positive effect on results.**

There are only a few external factors having a positive effect on results which are specific to individual countries (see individual country assessments for more detail). For example, in the case of Iraq with security generally improved in last 2 years this has had a positive effect for field travel and returns. For Lebanon, a change in WE director seems to have a positive effect on priorities and action.

#### *External factors having a negative effect on results (EQ6)*

**A number of external factors have been identified as having a negative effect on results.**

The generic external factors having a negative effect on results are staff recruitment issues, delays in obtaining approvals from government, economic / currency devaluation. COVID-19 has negatively affected results across the entire WASH portfolio in terms of causing delays as opposed to direct health implications. These could benefit from a portfolio wide strategic approach to mitigation.

Country specific external factors also exist. For example, in the case of Jordan, the main external factors having a negative effect on results include the country experiencing a dry summer (also at the time of on-going COVID-19) coupled with a returning Jordanian population during the summer months. This has put the country under increased water stress. Lebanon has also had its own set of external factors related to the political and socio-economic crisis (fuel-electricity; financial; challenges to maintain skilled staff; hyper-inflation; public distrust; political impasse); Beirut blast (affecting suppliers and contractor). For Turkey the main negative effect has been with cumbersome administrative<sup>28</sup> procedures not working between implementing partner and government counterpart/implementer.

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<sup>28</sup> Also considered as an internal factor.

*Effectiveness of partnerships between EUTF, its implementing partners and national counterparts (EQ7)*

**Partnerships between EUTF, its implementing partners and national counterparts have been generally effective with existence of partnership agreements, planning and coordination mechanisms in place.**

Across the WASH portfolio, partnership agreements between IPs and government are signed, planning, coordination and monitoring mechanisms are in place for all partners with good cooperation leading to strong sense of ownership of national counterparts. Where some challenges exist are in terms of the sometimes, lengthy approval processes. For example, in the case of Jordan, each level of partner has to seek approval for JORISS through line ministries resulting in lots of back and forth for all concerned. A different example is in Turkey where approval delays occurred due to the requirement of the need for an environmental assessment.

These delays, largely on the part of the requirements of local administration conversely are also evidence of the extent to which they are actively involved in the planning and delivery of the WASH interventions.

*Advantages and disadvantages of the different implementing partners (EQ8)*

**There is a mix of different implementing partners across the WASH portfolio.** This is not unexpected given the different enabling environments and contexts (in terms of sub-sector needs, capacity and capability, and availability of IPs). As previous reported, the WASH portfolio results are expected to be achieved and the partnerships between implementing partners and national counterparts are appropriate and effective.

There are broadly 3 types of IP across the WASH portfolio - Agencies, Financial Institutions, and INGOs. Some reported observations in terms of advantages and disadvantages of the different implementing partners is captured in Table 9.

*Table 9 An overview of advantages and disadvantages of implementing partner type*

Implementing Partner Type	Advantages	Disadvantages
Agencies (i.e. GIZ, UN agencies)	Have in-house technical experience. Good working relations with EUDs	
Financial Institutions (i.e. EIB, EBRD)	Big infrastructure investments; Transparent financial procedures.	Don't have the micro level action to ensure infrastructure outputs can be converted into outcomes. <sup>29</sup>
INGOS	Community-based work; Good working relationships with direct partners; Good monitoring systems.	Don't necessarily have the size to complete medium or large-scale infrastructure.

In addition to national counterparts who can also be considered as sub-implementing partners (such as ILbank and WEs in Lebanon; WAJ and YWC in Jordan), there is one regional level partner in Lebanon – Arab Countries Water Utilities Association (ACWUA) that serves as a platform for sharing knowledge and conducting training in the water sector.

<sup>29</sup> For example, in Jordan, FIs manage several large interventions, sometimes with responsible staff split between the HQ and country. As a result, this can hamper their coherence, complementarity and effectiveness.

*Community engagement with the WASH providers in terms of ultimate beneficiaries' behavioural change / making service providers accountable*

The secondary evidence sourced confirms the WASH portfolio includes activities to improve community engagement (for example, T04.136; T04.247; T04.155) including within the C&V plans. One particular intervention (T04.20) showcased the two-pronged approach of building the capacity of public institutions and also engaging with communities to raise awareness (see, European

*“Willingness of people to connect was taken for granted, while planning” (EUD lesson learned, Jordan)*  
*“Consider the willingness and capabilities of the beneficiaries for receiving the services under the intervention in parallel with vulnerability assessment” (AFD’s C3 lesson learned, Jordan)*

Development Days (EED21 on 15 and 16 June 2021; with session by ‘Efficient water supply in Lebanon - service provision & resource management’). No primary evidence was able to be sourced during the evaluation. Measurement of responsiveness and improvement of public service provision and engagement with communities would be more productive once the projects are completed and infrastructure

commissioned.

*Level of responsiveness of the WASH institutions in terms of improved performance at the level of local (WASH) actors*

Across the portfolio improving performance of local WASH actors is threaded through the activities for example T04.136 where part of the design also notes that increasing responsiveness of service delivery enhances resilience in two distinct ways – improving quality of life; and allows local governments to demonstrate their ability to recover and transform their areas. Intervention T04.155 also has an activity to design and pilot a social impact monitoring system, provide capacity building to the final beneficiaries to apply it and ensure compliance of the identified projects with EIB’s social standards. However, as reported above under the section of factors having a negative influence on results (financial and institutional challenges related to O&M activities to sustain service provision), as well as under section 4.5 Sustainability, there are factors that may compromise the level of responsiveness.

### 4.3 Efficiency<sup>30</sup>

This section of the report examines the deployment of resources to deliver planned outputs. This incorporates the modality used to deliver the support, how funds have been managed and performance of IPs and the role of national counterparts.

*Overall efficiency*

**The WASH portfolio, albeit experiencing delays in implementation across several of the interventions, largely maintains efficiency through appropriate selection of implementing partners; responsiveness of the EUTF HQ and use of no-cost-extensions; and engaging with the most appropriate national counterparts.** However, there have also been challenges, implementation is still on-going for the majority of interventions and there are factors that risk affecting current efficiency levels.

<sup>30</sup> The associated evaluation questions are: EQ9. What is the currently most efficient aid modality to support the provision of WASH services under the EUTF-Syria in each of the countries of intervention? EQ10. To what extent have resources been allocated and utilised in an efficient manner and achieve value-for-money? EQ11. To what extent do the various stakeholders ensure the necessary capacity (technical institutional and financial) to promote and implement EUTF-funded WASH programmes?

### Efficiency of different aid modalities

The EUTF-funded WASH portfolio is a mix of multi-country and country interventions and are efficiently delivering responding to country needs. The aid modalities selected relating to the implementing partners (Table 10) is also appropriate given the partners relative size and ability to carry out such projects; their historic experience in the various countries and existing partnerships with national counterparts; and in most cases their previous experience in working with EU.

In the case of Lebanon, the approach of consortia operating in the same geographical and thematic areas as well as agreements overlapping in time have challenged efficiency and focus. For transparency purposes consortium partners worked on separate budgets and allocated projects with some INGO partners operating in up to three consortia.

Table 10 The various Implementing Partners across the WASH portfolio

Country	Aid modalities / Implementing Partners
Iraq/KRI	INGOs; Foreign municipality; UN-agencies
Jordan	INGOs; International Development Cooperation Agencies; Finance Institutions
Lebanon	INGO consortia, UN-agencies, Consortia of Foreign municipalities, International Development Cooperation Agency (AFD)
Turkey	Financial Institution; UN agency

Despite planned outputs being achieved the majority of interventions have experienced some delay (section 4.2)<sup>31</sup>. The issuance of no-cost extensions has been used to address these delays.

Quality of planned outputs across the WASH portfolio is evidenced as detailed within ROM reports, progress reports and observations during programme site visits. For example, in the case of Lebanon, quality control of the infrastructure projects is according to both local and EU technical standards. The supervision mechanism of infrastructure works is through: selected supervision consultant, WASH counterparts (WEs), and EUTF consortia staff. The level of expertise for oversight of contract management and engineering varies per partner with some INGOs needing to source engineers to manage the contracts externally.

Figure 6 Minyara Pumping Station NLWE, Lebanon



### Efficiency of resources allocation and utilisation

Across the WASH portfolio, interventions are being delivered to budget, contracting and procurement procedures are being followed, and monitoring and reporting is in the main being completed in a consistent and transparent manner.

There are some limitations within the detail and justification of programme budgets. However this is not unexpected as adjustments can and were made to budget estimates during initial planning in response to refining needs and specific project selections.

Despite some delays in procurement and tendering there is no evidence of any cost-overruns or deviations from the requisite procedures. Contracting and procurement procedures relating to implementation are those of the implementing partners, in line with the financing agreement of with

<sup>31</sup> For intervention T04.155 the construction phase is now only starting 2.5 years after the official start. The exception is T04.172 however, this was a COVID-19 emergency response activity.

the EU. Where delays have occurred, they have been overcome by EU responsiveness in evoking no-cost extensions.

*Box 1 Example in Iraq*

Monitoring and reporting, carried out by the EUD finance and contract units and supported by DG NEAR Contracts and Finance Department, is based on the annual technical and financial reports. Monitoring is also conducted through reviewing the QINs, a reporting practice introduced specifically for the EUTF interventions. In some cases, especially the larger infrastructure projects, audits are also required alongside each tranche/payment request. For grants relating to NGOs or development partners, audits tend to be limited to one prior to final payments. Results oriented monitoring (ROMs) missions are also held for interventions (Table 11) set against a pre-defined framework. It is at the level of the immediate contracting partner that EUDs monitor the financial aspects, they do not follow the onward payments of grantee to sub-grantee however, data related to such payments is available within the annual reports. The evidence suggests that EUTF interventions are monitored in a consistent and transparent manner throughout the reporting chain.

In the case of Iraq (T04.121) there were three budget alignments and a no-cost extension. Finance was available and staff inputs were deployed in a timely manner. There was a delay in financial reporting due to a delay for an audit with the consequence of payment delays for the consortium partners. Project monitoring and reporting at activity level was good as was reporting of QINs however, delays with interim progress reporting.

*Table 11 WASH Portfolio ROMs conducted*

Int. No.	Country	When	Int. No.	Country	When
T04.20	Lebanon	August 2018	T04.100	Lebanon	March 2021
T04.34	Jordan & Lebanon	March 2019	T04.121	Iraq	March 2021
T04.76	Turkey	September 2021	T04.132	Lebanon (&Iraq) ROM for Lebanon only	May 2021
T04.90	Lebanon	April 2020	T04.155	Turkey	July 2021
T04.98	Lebanon	March 2021	T04.208	Jordan	May 2021

However, there is a notable difference in terms of reporting by IFIs that receive a substantial initial instalment and do not report financially until the next one is due, despite this being a contracting requirement. This has been particularly evidence with T04.92 and the absence of QINs and sparse interim/progress reporting. Efforts have been made by EUD to address the situation and discussions remain on-going.

*Box 2 Example of PACT in Lebanon*

The **Policy and Advocacy Coordination Table of EUTF interventions** (PACT) mechanism, a platform for all INGO partners funded under the EUTF was created to discuss and coordinate joint evidence-based advocacy to support and shape EU policy formulation on issues relevant to the WASH sector. PACT was used for a limited time and currently is no longer active. PACT was primarily used for members to coordinate the infrastructure projects. However, the PACT coordination forum was not used for covering WE capacity building and Non-Revenue Water, which therefore had no clear coherence on themes and geographic areas.

Monitoring is also conducted by implementing partners at intervention level. For example, in the case of Lebanon quarterly project steering committees were to be held where strategic or political issues related to the authorities are discussed (Box 2). Monthly Project Management Unit meetings are also held where the NGO coordinators meet with project managers and local coordinators.

### *Role of various stakeholders to promote and implement interventions*

**The various stakeholders are all relevant and appropriate in terms of the varying intervention types. The challenges come with, in many cases, limitations in terms of institutional, technical and financial capacities of the national counterparts.** That said, one of the outcome areas of the RF is in respect of improving capacities thereby it being a recognised weakness across the sector portfolio and area needing support. The majority of interventions have recognised these challenges and barriers (see section 4.1 above), and have incorporated capacity and capability building activities within their programmes to contribute to mitigating these risks. The most prominent and widespread aspect appearing in each country is that of financial capacity, in particular linked to on-going operation and maintenance of infrastructure which is further discussed in section 5.5 below as part of sustainability. For example, in the case of Iraq, capacity of local DoWs, in charge of WASH infrastructure was sufficient in terms of skills and organisation however, they lack financial resources to cover the needs. The DoW and municipalities also lack plans and financial resources for O&M and continued asset management. In Jordan, a similar scenario whereby WAJ has limited financial capacity to operate and maintain the assets. They also have limited technical capacity and suffer from weak internal coordination. YWC weakest capacity is also financial, in part due to the huge deficit caused by an electricity bill. For the portfolio in Turkey, the main concern is whether municipalities have the financial resources, varying across municipality depending on the revenue received for services. For Lebanon, WEs albeit having capacity in terms of human resources, their expertise is not necessarily in line with the WEs needs for realising the intended sector reform. However, WEs had reasonable levels of technical in-house capacity to manage and operate the water infrastructure. This is now being compromised with resignations of engineers, technicians and other staff. As with the other countries, financial capacity already a challenge for Lebanon has been exacerbated by the currency inflation and burgeoning electricity costs.

Where implementing partners do not have in-house capability, then they recruit consultants or are addressed at contracting stage through consortium partnerships.

*EUTF or a similar EU follow-up financial instrument, in the medium-term, should continue to support both WASH and livelihoods in Iraq, as they remain highly relevant and the needs are far from tackled. The comprehensive approach to local development present in this project to include both the humanitarian and development communities should be pursued (T04.121).*

## 4.4 Coherence: coordination, complementarity and synergies<sup>32</sup>

This section of the report examines the coherence of the WASH portfolio – the interaction of the EUTF WASH portfolio internally across the portfolio, internally with other EU instruments as well as externally with other donor-led interventions. Three dimensions are explored: **coordination** - communication at sector level, with partners and other donors throughout the project cycle; **complementarity** – whether taking in to account and building from national and other donor interventions; and **synergies**.

<sup>32</sup> The associated evaluation questions are: EQ12. To what extent is the support provided by the EUTF-Syria for WASH programmes/projects coherent and complementary with other major funding mechanisms (EU also including ENI/DCI/ECHO/NDICI)? EQ13. To what extent is coordination/complementarity with other donors' (non-EU) programmes and with national/country-specific WASH programmes conducive for the achievement of the EUTF's objectives? EQ14. What is the quality and extent of coordination/complementarity/synergies between national and regional/multi-country EUTF WASH programmes?

*Coordination, complementarity and synergies with other donors/instruments (EQ12&13)*

**Coordination and complementarity with other donors (EU and non-EU) generally exists in terms of programming and implementation, but to varying extents across the WASH portfolio.**

The portfolio has a range of different donors operating within the WASH sector landscape (Table 12). The majority of interventions both explicitly reference and take into account other EU and non-EU donor interventions (Box 3). There are a few exceptions such as the Iraq portfolio in which only general references were made to coherence and complementarity with other EU funding mechanism and between EUTF interventions. However, links are noted in Iraq with non-EU donor funding (T04.247; T04.36).

*Table 12 Country WASH sector donor landscape*

Country	Main donors operating within the WASH sector	Scale of EUTF WASH support
Iraq/Kurdistan	UN agencies (UNDP, UN-Habitat), GIZ, ICRC	small
Jordan	KfW, EBRD, AFD, EU, Arab Fund, UN pooled funds for camps	Large
Lebanon	EU, USAID, AFD, KfW, SDS, IT cooperation, and EBRD	Large
Turkey	AFD, World Bank; EIB; UNDP; JICA Loans	Small (note: EU support is large)

*Box 3 Example of complementarity in Jordan and Turkey*

**Jordan:** complementarity across the sub-sectors of solid waste management (SWM) and wastewater is within the Azraq refugee camp: under the Green Economy whereby EU is raising awareness and advocating for a green economy, the EU wants to bring in new support from the NDICI regional financial instrument for further wastewater management in the camp. What started as SWM programme, under EUTF and then complemented with a small amount from EUTF for wastewater will be continued with NDICI support 2021-2025.

**Turkey:** EU coordination and complementarity exists through the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) and whilst the EUTF WASH portfolio interventions do not outline the complementarity the projects are interlinked and are planned and coordinated with the relevant authorities in country.

*Coordination, complementarity and synergies within the WASH sector (EQ14)*

**Whether through one of the functioning coordination fora, or more specifically through collaboration at intervention design phase in terms of planning and coordinating priority needs complementarity and coordination of the EUTF WASH portfolio with the WASH sector at country level is clearly evident**

Across the portfolio there is a varied national government landscape in the WASH sector (Table 13), with different priority needs, capacities and capabilities as well as sector coordination approaches.

*Table 13 Country WASH sector government landscape*

Country	Main governmental bodies responsible for the WASH sector
Iraq/Kurdistan	MoW; DoW
Jordan	MoWI; WAJ; MOPIC
Lebanon	MoEW; CDR; WEs
Turkey	No national WASH sector.....utilities....

In the case of *Iraq* donor funding is generally small in comparison with the rehabilitation needs and move to resilience programming. Coordination exists across the WASH sector partners as well as the

newly established NGO Early Recovery Forum, through the National Coordinating Committee of Iraq (NCCI)<sup>33</sup>.

In the case of **Jordan**, sector coordination exists whether at refugee camp level, across donor sector coordination or through the approval process of interventions by MoWI / WAJ. Furthermore, MOPIC is the main gateway for donor funding coordination. As noted under section 4.1 Relevance, there are references to linking to the EUTF Strategic Objectives, EUTF-RF, 3RP and JRP as well as EU-Jordan Compact. This makes a conducive environment for achieving sectoral goals as all interventions share the aim and are generally working in a coordinated way. Furthermore it is previously noted that some of the current infrastructure projects are building on existing infrastructure owned by the government and therefore may be considered complementary and/or synergistic. That said, although some coordination exists, it could be improved especially concerning the government's commitment as well as with UN agencies, who usually have their own meetings that EUD need to be more involved in. Enhanced coordination would allow some lesson learnt, visibility and synergies among complementary projects while avoiding possible duplication of support.

In the case of **Lebanon**, WASH sector coordination is active for example on the government side, the Council for Development Reconstruction (CDR) is in charge of planning and executing donor funded water and wastewater infrastructures on behalf of the concerned ministries. EUTF WASH interventions are coordinated in accordance with NWSS, LCRP, WASH sector and other humanitarian agencies and funding programmes. At national level coordination is occurring within MoEW and regional level with WEs. Furthermore there is regular information sharing through existing platforms established for the coordination of the LCRP.

In the case of **Turkey**, the coordination, including the sharing of project pipelines, for the environment sector, is with the Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation. There is no UN Cluster Coordination, the usual modality for camp coordination, for the in-country response and the last camps with SuTPs closed in March 2018 with emergency aid no longer relevant. The EU is contributing to overall donor coordination in the framework of the 3RP, that integrates humanitarian, development and macro fiscal interventions to increase coherence between humanitarian and development and national and regional priorities.

#### *Coordination, complementarity and synergies within the EUTF WASH portfolio (EQ14)*

**There is limited evidence of coordination within the broader WASH portfolio either as part of multi-country interventions or across the different countries in general.** This is not totally unexpected given the absence of a WASH expert at EUTF HQ level; due to the focus of effort at Country Level; and to adhere to the strategic objectives of ensuring responsiveness of need at country level.

## 4.5 Sustainability<sup>34</sup>

This section of the report examines the factors influencing and likelihood of sustainability of the EUTF-funded WASH interventions.

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<sup>33</sup> This also include representatives from UNDP's Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilisation (FFIS), the World Bank (WB) and other International NGOs (INGOs).

<sup>34</sup> The associated evaluation question is: EQ15. What are the main factors for sustainability of the EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects and to what extent are these factors currently ensured?

### Factors affecting sustainability

**A number of generic factors across the WASH portfolio are identified as having the potential to affect sustainability are known and where feasible, attempts are being made to address them.** Additional factors also exist related to specific country portfolios (Table 14).

DoAs do have sections on sustainability, assumptions and risks, which in turn where feasible are being mitigated. However there is less evidence in terms of the exit strategies. Cognisant that different strategies are required for different intervention types and will need to respond to the different enabling environments, it is not easy to have a portfolio-wide strategy in place.

Table 14 A selection of factors affecting sustainability

Sustainability Factor	Iraq/KRI	Jordan	Lebanon	Turkey
<b>Financial</b>	DoW & municipalities lacking financial resources for O&M.	Primary gap in terms of sustainability. Donors are in favour of tariff reform, cost and energy efficiency, and reduced water losses (non-revenue water). Could consider reduction in NRW.	Hyper-inflation. WEs are bankrupt/no funds for O&M or electricity.	Whilst still a concern, financial sustainability is most promising in Turkey.
<b>Institutional</b>	Improved dialogue with donors required.	Planning is suitable. MoWI are preparing relevant plans e.g. financial sustainability road map.	Brain drain of WE. Lack of systematic approach in WE. Government reforms not enforced. Political impasse.	New and expanded infrastructure will be run by the utility companies.
<b>Environmental</b>	Drought as water availability is decreasing.	SWM, WW management to reduce pollution of aquifers	No electricity for WWTP. Sewage burden increasing. Solid waste impact.	Reduction in environmental impact through recycling and reuse of waste and reduced pollution of waterways.
<b>Technical</b>	DoW lacking operational plans to carry out adequate O&M.	Technical aspects are suitable. Efficiency to be improved.	Electrical blackouts. WE low expertise. Water supply at great risk.	O&M for some municipalities may be at risk as modest capacities.
<b>Social</b>		Refugees are and will continue to be the responsibility of the international community, especially refugee camps. However, there is no clear sustainability plan combined with the exit strategy. As there are many players, improved coordination is essential.	Social unrest increasing (also competition on water). scarcity of commodities; extreme high cost of living. No jobs.	
<b>Other</b>	Lack of grid power in smaller towns and villages resulting in higher dependency for water systems on generators		Vulnerable persons at great risk (also camps/poor living conditions). ¼ of population in poverty. Block on fuel/gas import. Sanctions.	

As reported previously, benefits of interventions are progressing and, in some cases, completed and in place/functioning (section 4.2). However, are at risk due to factors set out in Table 14.

*Sustainability integrated into national structures, policies and budgets*

The aspect of whether there is sufficient O&M capacity and capability features as a concern across the majority of the portfolio. There are some cases however, where the interventions have influenced stakeholders to improve sustainability. For example, Iraq (T04.121) where WASH committees at schools take care of maintenance, have appropriate tools and some spare parts and they report and raise complaints to the DoW. Other examples can be seen in Jordan in terms of policy dialogue (Box 4) and where donors collectively are looking for guarantees of sustainability of big investments (whether loans or grants), MoWI are preparing the relevant plans – financial sustainability road map.

*Box 4 Example of approach to sustainability*

The majority of gaps in Jordan in terms of sustainability are related to finances where technical and planning aspects tend to be sufficient. Sustainability of WASH intervention results is premised on involving partners in the process through the entire project cycle including those being directly implemented in host communities. The EUD has tried on several occasions to have an exit strategy for each sector however, feedback from the government has been that refugee projects should be kept as such – refugees are and will be the responsibility of the international community. They also disagree with initiatives that additionally stress WASH institutions’ capacity (i.e. new O&M costs). The new approach, including the Team Europe initiative (with Member States) of policy dialogue highlighting the combined national and refugee needs, that complementing and improving the existing system to deliver increased capacity, is a message shared at all levels and synergy with different sectors is also being sought, For example, sludge for electricity generation or for composting doesn’t make sense if used in the context of refugee camps only.

In terms of Lebanon, whilst there is no evidence of pilot programmes being integrated into national structures, policies and budgets, there are a number of products that could be used in the future.

Sustainability outlook is best for Turkey where

the municipalities have strong capacity and the provided support was tailored to their needs.

## 4.6 EU Added value and visibility<sup>35</sup>

This section of the report examines what, if any, added value is resulting from EUTF-funded WASH interventions such as policy dialogue with national government for sector reforms. This also includes examining to what extent the communications and visibility actions have provided added-value.

*EU Added Value resulting from EUTF-funded WASH programmes*

**There is some evidence of added value resulting from EUTF-funded WASH programmes due in part to the alignment with national priorities, collaboration and cooperation with national counterparts, as well as engaging in policy dialogue.** For example, the EUTF WASH portfolio wide interventions, through provision of new and rehabilitated infrastructure are value adding to the existence of national WASH systems and programmes. This is particularly evident in Jordan (Box 5)

<sup>35</sup> The associated evaluation questions are: EQ16. What EU added value is resulting from the EUTF-funded WASH programmes projects? EQ17. Did the portfolio of EUTF funded WASH programmes contribute to the EU policy dialogue for reforms with national governments? EQ18. To what extent are the communication and visibility actions providing added value in terms of contributing to mainstreaming the WSH programmes/projects’ desired effects?

*Box 5 Examples of WASH portfolio added-value in Jordan*

T04.27: an intervention that is expanding and improving the networks in Greater Irbid and Ramtha as well as capacity strengthening the Yarmouk Water Company, reports (in the DoA) “the additionality of the EU contribution is to maintain an acceptable level of water services to the local communities, who are hosting a large number of Syrian refugees.

In contrast the intervention T04.208, also providing new and improved services, is doing so in refugee camps which are reported as relying entirely on international support.

T04.92: “if the MADAD grant co-financing were to be replaced by an increased loan amount, the required tariff increases would be well beyond the affordability limits for both the lowest decile and average income families” and no other affordable external financing package is available to finance the project” (DoA)

Some examples of **policy dialogue** are evident in Lebanon, Turkey and Lebanon but not in Iraq. For Lebanon, EU policy dialogue for reforms with national government is through MoEW. To-date some interventions are considered as indirectly leveraging policy reform however, more recently such added value is guided by the 3RF (December 2020), drafted after the Beirut Blast. Impact of the Lebanon Water Forum (T04.98) to date remains unknown.

For Turkey, the WASH portfolio interventions are a continuation of the EU

and Turkey policy dialogue as framed with the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (2015) as well as with the fact that WASH funding is continuing under the FFRIT programme.

Policy dialogue Jordan appears as reported under section 4.5 linked to sustainability. The reasons for this are concerted efforts on behalf of the EUDs and relationships formed over time including national counterparts seeing the evidence of tangible results of EUTF interventions.

*Added value of the WASH portfolio communication and visibility (C&V) plans in terms of mainstreaming WASH interventions desired effects*

**All interventions have associated C&V plans documented as part of their programming documentation. However, their implementation varies across the portfolio for a variety of reasons with the IPs doing the bare minimum rather than maximising the C&V potential.**

The EUTF at central programmatic level has its own plan of activities, events and between EUTF to EUD there are some basic ground rules in terms of reporting requirements. With regard to information governance, weekly meetings are held between EUTF and EUDs follow-up on C&V activities. In the event of any risk to reputation of the EU, the EUD and EAS would handle jointly through an immediate responsive process approach. To date there have not been any such events.

There are not any specific C&V indicators reported as part of the EUTF level RF KPIs, however, inputs are monitored and outputs are reported by IPs, although outcomes and impact are generally neither monitored nor reported. Whilst there are some good examples of results, in the case of Iraq and Jordan (Box 6), in Jordan feedback indicates that this the effectiveness of C&V could be improved. Some respondents feel that the value-added of partners’ activities in this area can be improved as they usually only do the minimum, lack innovative approaches and are not necessarily familiar or aware of media options or best practice.

At a central level there doesn’t seem to be a toolkit to guide and drive the attainment of C&V by IPs, with some level of resistance or capacity issues to go the extra mile.

*Box 6 Examples of effective C&V activities*

Iraq: Promotional videos on social media and websites were showcased for the Headway Programme (T04.132) in particular the 'Let's beat corona' campaign reaching around 5 million persons. EU's contribution to the project are also shown through publication of project activities, sign-boards and banners at project sites (T04.121)

Jordan: there has been an opportunity to integrate for example with the film festival ([The European Film Festival \(EUFF\) - Jordan, EU delegation to Jordan | EU Neighbours](#)) which included EU testimonials and recording of a PodCast radio programme ensured reference to EU policies such as the Green Deal to inform public on core values which builds the brand of EU as an actor. Furthermore Jordan has leveraged successful stories through larger events which would not have been run by themselves to put out the story about EUTF.

## 4.7 Gender and special needs<sup>36</sup>

This section considers how well EUTF WASH portfolio interventions have integrated gender and special needs into their designs and how they are being addressed in implementation. In the case of special needs, the evaluation has considered on the group of persons with disabilities.

### *Gender mainstreaming in programming and implementation*

**Gender aspects feature within programming and implementation to a greater or lesser extent where applicable.**

Taking into account the WASH portfolio, where interventions are large scale public water and/or sanitation and solid waste infrastructure, the interventions are considered gender neutral as will be of service to final beneficiaries regardless of their gender. Opportunity does exist however for gender mainstreaming when considering capacity and capabilities such as team staffing structure and training.

Whilst evidence of gender mainstreaming features within the design phase programming documents (included in some LFAs and ADs) there didn't appear to be a focused gender dimension to the intervention planning. In terms of implementation, gender considerations were evidenced through progress reporting and evidence sourced during the verification phase (Box 7).

*Box 7 Example of gender inclusiveness - Iraq*

Progress reports note the recruitment of women for specific roles in programming and gender sensitive approach (this was also confirmed through interviews). For example: staff recruitment to assist with certain activities with female beneficiaries; women prioritised for work placements; engaging with women with specific activities in Sinjar area where social norms are even more conservative than in other parts of Iraq; appointment of female legal officers to provide legal assistance for compensation. Furthermore, gender was streamlined in the intervention by ensuring equal opportunities to benefit from the activities. Training was organised taking into consideration women's particular needs and interests. Gender-segregated WASH facilities were also made available in schools.

No evidence exists yet in terms of gender specific effects at outcome level directly related to WASH activities, however in Jordan, WAJ has developed their policy for gender. This incorporates there to be a minimum quota of females in decision-making positions; in operation teams and recently announced the so-called "female plumbers" project. It is however unclear to what extent the EUTF has contributed to this shift in policy.

<sup>36</sup> The associated evaluation questions are: EQ19. To what extent have gender issues been taken into consideration in design and implementation? EQ20. To what extent have accessibility and inclusiveness of persons with disabilities (Syrian refugees, IDPs and host community members) been taken into consideration in design and implementation? EQ21. Which specific outcomes regarding gender and special needs can be identified from the EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects?

*Gender disaggregated data related to WASH portfolio indicators*

**Gender disaggregated data, where applicable, exists across the WASH portfolio for the majority of interventions for both outcome areas of infrastructure and capacities.**

In the case of Jordan for example, data is disaggregated by gender and age (T04.34) and yet given there are no QINs yet for T04.92 there is no disaggregated data with data from WAJ/YWC being relied upon. The interventions in Turkey are not necessarily applicable for actual accounting for gender disaggregated data related to service delivery given the intervention type being public network level as opposed to household level however, a proxy could be determined based on proportionate population data as an estimate of increased service provision.

*Measures for people with disabilities in the EUTF Syria WASH Portfolio*

**Accessibility and inclusiveness of persons with disabilities rarely appears in programme documentation across the entire portfolio whether in general terms or specifically related to WASH.** Neither does it appear in terms of disaggregated data, therefore unlikely to feature at outcome level for infrastructure or capacities.

As with gender aspects (see above), where the interventions are large scale public water and/or sanitation and solid waste infrastructure there is limited applicability. Where there is relevance is with schools and at household levels. There is some evidence in terms of implementation progress reporting where consideration has been given to persons with disabilities (Table 15) however it was also noted (T04.172) that if EUTF wanted this kind of data disaggregated reporting then they should give a clear indication/request.

*Table 15 Examples of inclusivity of persons with disabilities*

Country	Vulnerability/Special Needs/Persons with disabilities
Iraq/Kurdistan	T04.132; T04.247: design for housing units – beneficiary families can select the type of toilet with the option of high seated or squat toilet.
Jordan	T04.172: reference is made to ramps for water and wastewater networks; UNICEF is also using the vulnerability matrix, developed jointly with UNHCR where vulnerability in terms of WASH includes disability, health issues, quota related to the size of the family and details WASH specific aspects. Provided specific WASH services to disabled. However, these are reported under vulnerability data and not specifically reported within QINS.
Lebanon	No specific mention in programmed documentation however, in the more recent response to the COVID-19 situation and the Beirut explosion there is evidence of inclusivity. The work with Bourj Hammoud municipality (Beirut) focuses on a municipal hotline mechanisms through which resident can report issues around COVID-19 damaged buildings and which allows persons with disabilities to reach out to the municipality for support.
Turkey	No reported evidence - not relevant in this context as large-scale public infrastructure.

## 5. Conclusions and lessons learned

This chapter of the report presents a series of conclusions and lesson learned by the various evaluation criteria and themes reported in chapter 4 of this report. They provide a summary analysis and form the basis of the recommendations contained in the following chapter.

### 5.1 Relevance

#### *Alignment of the WASH Portfolio objectives with the EUTF-objectives and country priorities*

1. Each of the interventions within the WASH portfolio sample are aligned with the EUTF strategic objectives, principles and approaches, including the EUTF Results Framework statements and associated indicators. The EUTF-funded WASH interventions address fully justified needs across the 4 countries and are aligned with the relevant policies and/or strategies of the various governments.

#### *Design of Regional and Country Interventions*

2. Albeit there are multi-country interventions and country interventions, both types of intervention have been designed at country level, respond to individual country priorities and needs and do not have a regional approach. This is not seen as problematic however, as the specific needs of the country priorities are being met.

#### *Overarching responsiveness of WASH portfolio over time*

3. EUTF WASH portfolio interventions are considered as having been responsive to country priorities and needs over time both in terms of sector needs and responding to external factors such as COVID-19. This is evidenced in having responded to lessons learned both in terms of original design and programming, and from one generation of interventions to the next. In addition, this learning has been graduated from IP experience beyond and within the EUTF WASH portfolio.

### 5.2 Effectiveness and impact

#### *Outputs of WASH interventions*

4. Outputs are progressing at a mixed rate across the WASH portfolio with only a few interventions fully completed. However, those projects that have been completed are showing good outputs and those on-going are now making good progress despite initial delays.

#### *Outcomes of EUTF WASH portfolio support*

5. Whilst outputs are progressing, the conversion of outputs to outcomes is less evident and although the planned outcome of improved access to water and sanitation services is predicted to being achieved improved, resilience of government departments remain challenged. The evaluation has not identified any examples of unplanned outcomes however, given that implementation is on-going, the potential exists for unplanned results to emerge in time.

#### *Impact of the EUTF Syria WASH portfolio*

6. Given the status of outputs and outcomes likelihood of impact is only possible at this stage as based on the finding related to likelihood of achieving outcomes. Whilst there is some evidence that improvement in access and capacities will be achieved, the extent and longer-term impact is also related to the findings as reported under Sustainability (see section 5.5).

*External factors having a positive and/or negative effect on results*

7. There are more external factors having a negative effect as opposed to a positive effect on results. Where the effects are positive tend to be country specific whereas those factors having a negative effect are more likely to be generic. For generic factors these could benefit from a cross-cutting strategic approach to mitigation.

*Effectiveness of partnerships between EUTF, its implementing partners and national counterparts*

8. Partnerships between EUTF, its implementing partners and national counterparts have been generally effective with existence of partnership agreements, planning, coordination and monitoring mechanisms in place. Any challenges identified are conversely evidence of the extent of local administrations being actively involved in design and implementation. Furthermore the advantages of the various implementing partners contracted at intervention level outweigh any of the disadvantages raised.

*Community engagement with the WASH providers in terms of ultimate beneficiaries' behavioural change / making service providers accountable*

9. The secondary evidence sourced confirms the WASH portfolio includes activities to improve community engagement including within the C&V plans. However, reporting of such is limited. This is likely due to the majority of interventions are still on-going and therefore reported results will be evident later on.

*Level of responsiveness of the WASH institutions in terms of improved performance at the level of local (WASH) actors*

10. Across the portfolio, improving performance of local WASH stakeholders is threaded through the activities. Local level WASH stakeholders are engaged throughout the project cycle from design through implementation and monitoring. However, unless potential factors negatively influencing results are mitigated there are risks to maintaining levels achieved. This also ties in with the need appropriate sustainability and exit strategies.

## 5.3 Efficiency

*Efficiency of different aid modalities*

11. The EUTF-funded WASH portfolio is a mix of multi-country and country interventions being delivered by a range of implementing partners appropriately selected taking into account a range of criteria. However, despite planned outputs being achieved the majority of interventions have experienced some delays. The issuance of no-cost extensions has been used to address these delays. Quality of planned outputs across the WASH portfolio is evidenced therefore suggests that in general the aid modalities are efficient in terms of delivering interventions.

*Efficiency of resource allocation and utilisation*

12. Across the WASH portfolio, interventions are being delivered to budget, contracting and procurement procedures are being followed, and monitoring and reporting is, in the main, being completed in a consistent and transparent manner. This means that IPs and donors are able to track performance well and intervene where corrective actions are needed.

### *Role of various stakeholders to promote and implement interventions*

13. The various stakeholders are all relevant and appropriate in terms of the varying intervention types. There are however challenges, in many cases, limitations in terms of institutional, technical and financial capacities of the national counterparts. With one of the outcome areas of the RF being improving capacities most interventions have such activities included. However, the most prominent and widespread aspect appearing in each country is that of financial capacity, in particular linked to on-going operation and maintenance of infrastructure in which the need goes beyond that of the Portfolio and is further highlighted under the discussed in section 5.5 below as part of sustainability.

## 5.4 Coherence: coordination, complementarity and synergies

### *Coordination, complementarity and synergies with other donors/instruments and within the EUTF WASH portfolio*

14. Coordination and complementarity with other donors (EU and non-EU) generally exist, in terms of programming and implementation, but to varying extents across the WASH portfolio. There is limited evidence of coordination within the broader WASH portfolio either as part of multi-country interventions or across the different countries in general. This is potentially a missed opportunity in terms of knowledge and practice on cross-cutting aspect such as innovation, water scarcity and resilience aspects, which are faced by most of the countries.

### *Coordination, complementarity and synergies within the WASH sector*

15. Complementarity and coordination of the EUTF WASH portfolio with the WASH sector at country level is clearly evident through various stages of the project cycle.

## 5.5 Sustainability

### *Factors affecting sustainability and evidence of sustainability plans*

16. Although results in terms of infrastructure and capacity are expected to be delivered, their sustainability is precarious. Infrastructure will need maintenance and funds are scarce in all countries apart from Turkey. The inherent weaknesses of the beneficiary institutions also puts results at threat. Overall, sustainability is weak and isn't helped by the absence of exit strategies or donor commitments.

### *Sustainability integrated into national structures, policies and budgets*

17. With O&M being the main challenge, limited evidence of sustainability plans and exit strategies in place across the WASH portfolio, it is not surprising that there are not more examples where factors of sustainability are being integrated into national, policies and budgets. However, as implementation is on-going there is still time to redress this aspect.

## 5.6 EU Added value and visibility

### *EU Added Value resulting from EUTF-funded WASH programmes.*

18. There is some evidence of added value resulting from EUTF-funded WASH programmes due in part to the alignment with national priorities, collaboration and cooperation with national counterparts, as well as engaging in policy dialogue.

### *Effectiveness of the WASH portfolio communication and visibility (C&V) plans*

19. All interventions have associated C&V plans included as part of their programming documentation however, the implementation of such varies across the portfolio for a variety of reasons and there are no associated indicators within the EUTF RF. Linked to 14 above, there has also been limited sharing/learning events whether across IPs / interventions, or countries, as there has been with other portfolios (i.e. Livelihoods and Education). Therefore, WASH visibility is at best fulfilling their EUTF obligations and potential for greater benefits has not been exploited. Suggestions to improve included more collaboration between the EUD and IPs in terms of identifying opportunities for positive messaging, guiding and supporting with the selection of media best practice depending on audience.

## 5.7 Gender and special needs

### *Gender mainstreaming in programming and implementation and disaggregated data*

20. Gender aspects are dealt with adequately. Gender disaggregated data, where applicable, exists across the WASH portfolio for the majority of interventions for both outcome areas of infrastructure and capacities. More could be done however.

### *Measures for people with disabilities in the EUTF Syria WASH Portfolio*

21. Accessibility and inclusiveness of persons with disabilities rarely appears in programme documentation across the entire portfolio whether in general terms or specifically related to WASH. The few examples and references that do exist are included seemingly by chance rather than a specific directive or through national policies and strategies. This does not align with equity and inclusivity agendas and more needs to be done to rectify the situation.

## 6. Portfolio Recommendations

The four recommendations presented in this chapter directly correspond to the conclusions and main findings presented in chapter 4 and 5 of this report. All of the recommendations reported here are portfolio-level in nature. Additional specific country level recommendations, are reported within Section 7 in the Country Portfolio Reports and may or may not feature within the recommendations follow depending on whether considered relevant at portfolio level.

Each recommendation states the action to be undertaken, an addressee (or addressees) and a timeframe for its implementation by the addressee(s). For ease of reading the recommendation is explicitly linked to its associated conclusion(s).

### *Recommendation 1 – Exit strategies*

All IPs across the WASH portfolio should review/refine/develop (depending on state of existence) appropriate, feasible and pragmatic sustainability and exit strategies and review them on a regular (at least annual or ad-hoc in the case of external crisis) basis. These plans could be supportively reviewed in terms of overarching best practice, and for consistency not only at country level, but also in terms of higher-level strategic objectives and or requirements for policy dialogue.

Also falling within this Recommendation, consideration is needed for the broader sustainability and exit strategy in terms of WASH portfolio data management and how it will feed in to the new NDICI financial instrument as well as in terms of branding and visibility (linking to Recommendation 3).

Addressee	DG NEAR / EUDs and IPs
Timeframe	With immediate effect.
Related conclusion	7, 10, 13, 16, 17.

### *Recommendation 2 – NCE & timelines*

EU to ensure appropriate timelines are given to project design and planning to avoid the need for no-cost-extensions.

Addressee	DG NEAR and IPs
Timeframe	For all new interventions
Related conclusion	4, 11

### *Recommendation 3 – C&Vs indicators & tools*

EU should include a core set of recurring C&V indicators/KPIs as part of the overarching RF and ensure they feature within the DoA, IP logical framework, and reporting requirements (including QIN reporting).

Linked to this is the provision of a messaging toolkit to help guide and drive the attainment of C&V outputs and outcomes. For example, how to prepare a more robust stakeholder analysis so that the C&V plans are applying appropriate tools and strategies relevant to the range of audience and delivering the messaging requirements of the different levels of stakeholders (EU, Government Partners, IPs, beneficiaries).

Addressee	DG NEAR / EU Delegations
Timeframe	For all new interventions and where feasible newly started ones
Related conclusion	14, 19

*Recommendation 4 – gender & special needs*

EU and IPs should ensure that gender and persons with disabilities considerations are mainstreamed in all programming activities and in turn measures for monitoring and reported on.

Linked to this is the recommendation that guidance is prepared centrally within the EU to support the roll-out to EUDs and IPs.

Addressee	DG NEAR / EU Delegations
Timeframe	Immediate
Related conclusion	20, 21

*Country specific recommendations*

Within Section 7 Country Portfolio Reports there are a number of country specific references.

## 7. Country Portfolio Reports

This section of the report provides the response to the evaluation questions at country level.

### 7.1 Iraq Country Portfolio Report

#### **Relevance**

**EQ1. Is programming of WASH programmes/projects strategically aligned with the EUTF's underlying funding principles and approaches?**

*The interventions are designed in line with EUTF, EU Strategy for Iraq 2018 aligned to the 3RP, coherent with the EUTF RF, build on lessons learned and planned in consultation with local government. Interventions are planned at governorate and municipal level and are focusing on the areas of Ninewa governorate in Iraq, and Erbil and Duhok in KRI.*

The WASH portfolio interventions for Iraq are in line with the **EUTF's overall objective** by addressing the priority needs of conflict-affected individuals in Iraq, including Internally Displaced People (IDPs), returnees, and host communities, as well as the administration. Syrian refugees also benefitted from this programme in urban areas of KRI. Aspects of this alignment include:

- WASH and livelihoods were considered essential to supporting the post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction.
- Interventions included the objective of promoting lasting peace, stability and security in Iraq and the region.
- Interventions included the objective of addressing the needs of refugees from Syria in neighbouring countries, IDPs and host communities, in particular as regards to resilience and early recovery.
- Interventions are supporting government capacity in managing water resources.
- The interventions build upon previous and existing EU interventions to support sustainable returns and peacebuilding in Nineveh governorate.

All the intervention objectives are coherent with the current **EUTF Result Framework (RF)** and will contribute to the WASH objectives of the current Result Framework: target groups have better health, through improved access to health and WASH services, strengthened local capacities, and strengthened infrastructure).

Logical Framework (LF) indicators link to those in **EUTF Results Framework**, including for WASH in the three categories: Access to services (EUTF RF 24, 25); Local infrastructure (EUTF RF 26, 27); Local capacities (EUTF RF 28). For some interventions, EUTF RF 28: 'Number of persons trained in WASH Sector', was related to WASH/COVID-19 awareness sessions, or campaigns (T04.136). Not all the interventions of the reviewed portfolio were WASH only and included EUTF RF indicators of other sectors including health, social cohesion, and protection.

The document review also found that all the interventions' aims were aligned with the **Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)**, which the EUTF links to directly.

In January 2018, the EU adopted the EU strategy for Iraq. The strategy focuses on continued delivery of EU humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people and helping with stabilising areas liberated from Da'esh. It also seeks to support longer-term reform, reconstruction and reconciliation efforts in the country. Three interventions (T04.121, T04.132, T04.247) focus on these post-conflict areas by rebuilding WASH infrastructure and housing.

Implementing partners were invited to submit concept notes for review by EU and subsequently Action Documents were prepared.

The **EUTF supports** demining efforts, job creation for IDPs, refugees and host communities, rehabilitation of emergency maternal and child healthcare and selected irrigation infrastructure, provides access to higher education, mental health and psycho-social support, and increases health authority resilience and capacities of the local administration to respond to the crisis. The EUTF also actively supports Peshmergas, injured while fighting Da'esh, regain their socio-economic self-reliance.

***EQ2. How has the WASH portfolio developed since the beginning of the EUTF with regard to relevance, targeting and responsiveness?***

The EUTF strategy for Iraq was approved by its board in January 2018, which is also when the first intervention started following the end of armed conflict in the country. Action Document was prepared for subsequent interventions.

WASH interventions targeted post-conflict recovery of destroyed water and sanitation infrastructure and housing, and support to DoW and municipalities. Focus was on post-conflict/newly accessible areas in Ninewa governorate, and areas of KRI with destruction and high concentration of IDPs, Syrian refugees and vulnerable host population. Interventions were selected in areas with large needs for reconstruction or extension of WASH services. Priority was to accommodate returnees in Ninewa, which depends on security, and availability of water, schools, and housing rehabilitation efforts.

Areas of intervention and projects were selected by implementing partners in cooperation with Directorate of Water Coordination Unit (DoW) following assessments of areas and stakeholder's consultation at local level.

Response to COVID-19 pandemic was a success with a large scale online/social media campaigns for governorates of Ninewa, Erbil, Duhok, Sulaimaniyah and Halabja.

The interventions are planned to end by Sept 2022. No further follow up projects at the same scale in WASH are planned with EU-funding. Other institutional donors are scaling down as well and are requesting the government of Iraq to take over the relief and rebuilding efforts. Programmes will continue but with a focus on governance instead of rebuilding housing and infrastructure.

Action documents note lessons learned and are planned in consultation with local government. Their focus is on the newly regained areas of Ninewa governorate, Iraq. Other areas of intervention are Erbil, Dohuk and Sumel in KRI. WASH infrastructure has been damaged by conflict, which is partly responded to in selected areas of intervention, although the needs are vast across the country. WASH at household level is also being rebuilt with network connections by two interventions that have a focus on rebuilding of houses (T04.132, T0.247 by UNDP/UN Habitat). In addition, intervention T04.53 is restoring the North Al-Jazeera community irrigation infrastructure (Ninewa, Iraq), including the main canal that conveys water from Mosul dam and its pumping station. This is complementary to WASH drinking water infrastructure targeted by other interventions.

Interventions contribute to other projects being carried out including by the implementing partner (UN-Habitat) for returnees in the same geographical areas, such as districts of Sinjar, Tel Afar and Baaj in Nineva governorate for rebuilding infrastructure and houses to facilitate return of displaced persons.

Intervention T04.247 (UN Habitat) follows up and complements intervention T04.132 (UNDP/UN Habitat) on rebuilding of housing, and Housing, Land and Property rights (HLP), and small-scale WASH infrastructure in north-western Ninewa districts. In Sinjar district of Ninewa governorate there are large needs for reconstruction due to the large-scale destruction during the conflict. AD of T04.247 notes

lessons learned from T0.132 where UN-Habitat is extending its programme on the rehabilitation of 200 war-damaged houses and small-scale community water infrastructure in Sinjar City and surroundings.

***EUTF interventions have responded to the challenges posed by COVID-19 pandemic.***

Interventions with a component on hygiene promotion increased the scope for COVID-19 awareness - one in particular, responded with various online campaigns covering *governorates of Ninewa, Erbil, Duhok, Sulaimaniyah and Halabja*. Other responses to the COVID-19 pandemic included: prioritisation of rehabilitation of water infrastructure adapted planning as field travel was restricted and lock downs occurred; prevention measures during meetings. International procurement was restricted, and other ways were sought including use of warehouse to reduce to purchase in bulk (T04.53).

- T04.53: Budget reallocation for Covid-19 to buy PPE (disposable masks, gloves, hand sanitisers) for employees of the Ministry of Agriculture (for those providing veterinary services to farmers and livestock breeders).
- T04.121: The Hygiene component of the programme, BCC Behaviour Change Community Campaign, was adapted to deliver Covid-19 awareness messaging (including IEC materials) in line with WHO, WASH cluster – Covid-19 taskforce guidelines.
- Awareness sessions (Target is 30,000 beneficiaries) related to water use, sanitation or hygiene (COVID-related)“. Key public facilities were rehabilitated in Sinjar, Telafar and Baaj. Priorities given to health, water, sanitation and hygiene facilities to support preparedness. UN Habitat developed guidelines and specific instructions for field personnel, contractors and implementing partners to manage COVID-19 risks as they plan and implement activities.
- The online, the Let's Beat Corona campaign has reached 1.3 million people (T04.132). Another online and an offline component, reached over 350,000 people through social media posts on programme work and activities of Headway Programme (T04.132), which covered 5 cities where water infrastructure was rehabilitated (sewage infrastructure in one city).
- For house rehabilitation works, beneficiaries of and their local communities were provided with hygiene and personal protection procedures and IEC material. Illustrative messages through WhatsApp and Viber applications in Kurdish and Arabic based on WHO-messaging were circulated.
- Five municipalities of Erbil, Duhok, Sumel, Mosul, and Sinjar were supported through provision of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) supplies (sanitisers, gloves, PPE gowns, facemasks, shoulder sanitiser sprinklers, and touchless thermometers). Water directorates in Erbil, Duhok, and Ninewa Governorates also received PPE and water purification materials.
- In response to the covid-19 pandemic public health centres had initially been planned to rehabilitate in north-western Ninewa. However, changes to the programme were made to instead improve schools as this had a higher priority to facilitate returns by persons living in camps (T04.247).

***EQ3. How effectively have specific country needs, contexts and barriers to WASH services been taken into account into the programming of country-based EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects?***

Interventions are in line with revised 3RP Strategic Overview for 2019 & 2020 and remain relevant as Iraq continues to face a double displacement crisis and to gradually transition from an emergency context to stabilisation. The crises have stretched the existing public services, capacities of the hosting authorities and livelihoods opportunities of Iraqis and Syrians alike.

Although most interventions will not target Syrian refugees, the activities are aligned with the overall objective of the 3RP Resilience Plans for Iraq as it aims to strengthen the resilience of a wide spectrum of conflict-affected individuals. For example:

- Reinforcing the self-reliance of individuals and their communities, by improving access to WASH services, income opportunities and promoting social cohesion.
- Humanitarian Country Team and clusters in Iraq collaborated on COVID-19 response plan. EUTF interventions continued planned programming and also carried out Covid-19 awareness response programmes.

**Consultation with government and local authorities:** Implementing Partners undertook consultations with stakeholders, including the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA), the Directorate of Water (DoW), the Directorate of Agriculture (DoA), the Directorate of Education (DoE), and civil society. These consultations highlighted that the most significant WASH and Livelihoods needs to be addressed were in newly retaken areas of Iraq. In addition, programmes addressed areas with high numbers of IDPs and Syrian refugees in KRI. For instance, for WASH infrastructure, the Implementing Partners worked together with DoW to select appropriate projects in accordance with pre-identified needs, and potential projects were independently assessed in the field and local authorities were consulted.

*DoW Coordination Unit of Ninewa* has sub-branches at district level for needs identification and liaison with humanitarian agencies. DoW present the needs for water and sanitation infrastructure and share these with implementing partners. In accordance, to both DoW and implementing partners, projects are selected based on budget and package scale that can be completed. DoW state that larger scale strategic projects in western Ninewa are required for which donor financing is not available.

*Longer term strategic plans by the General Directorate of Water* at higher level are under development, without donor representation.

***Consultation for housing reconstruction projects in Ninewa governorate:***

- Stakeholder meetings with mayor, community leaders, religious leaders and beneficiaries.
- Interventions to address housing, land and property rights of the Yazidis in Sinjar have been strongly supported and fully endorsed by the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Justice. This resulted in official agreement with the Prime Minister's Office by jointly drafting legal decree which has been submitted to Prime Minister to replace the occupancy certificate and recognise as property ownership document.
- Interventions were in line with relevant government policies, including the General Framework Document of the National Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of the Provinces Affected by the Terrorist and Military Operations published by the Ministry of Planning.
- Housing Reconstruction Strategy in Governorates affected by Terrorism and Military Operations endorsed by the Council of Ministers in June 2019.
- Consistent with the aims of the National Framework for Reconstruction and Development, and the principles of the National Development Plan, particularly in relation to the Housing and Accommodation Sector.

***Barriers to intervention implementation:***

- There remains a need for larger projects however, these were beyond the scope and capacity of EUTF interventions. An exception is the irrigation scheme (T04.53).
- Presence of remnants of war mines and unexploded ordinance (UXO), and also human remains. This has prohibited IDPs to return to their place of origin. In addition, unsafe areas with UXOs first have to be cleared and deemed safe before implementing partners can select these sites for any interventions. Furthermore, areas with large amount of rubble and high destruction require significant financial resources for which neither the budget of government or humanitarian organisations was sufficient.

- Recruitment of field staff, engineers, and other programme staff with required skills, and acceptability for ethnicity, religion, and area of origin to operate in various areas. A mix of people is needed for acceptance in the programme areas.
- Actions documents (AD) and Description of Action (DoA) include risks and these are also reported in the Quarterly Information Notes (QIN) with management actions.
- For one intervention, a proposed location was not continued due to security concerns: *‘Despite the proposal to intervene in Salah Al-Din Governorate on the assumption that it would be accessible at the time of implementation, the location remained under security risk and the project cancelled this part of the plan’.*
- A new challenge presented is drought and lack of water availability due to ground water level drop for which adaptation is required.

### **Effectiveness and Impact**

***EQ4. To what extent have EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects been effective in achieving their planned outcomes? What are the actually achieved outcomes in terms of what has changed, who has changed, when and how?***

Outputs are progressing with the conversion to outcomes less evident while most interventions are still continuing. However increased resilience is expected with improved infrastructure. Planned outcome of improved access to water and sanitation services in post-conflict areas is being achieved for beneficiaries. Improved resilience of government departments is yet to be achieved and these remain challenged.

There were ***improvements in the resilience of end beneficiaries***, which were significant for both, IDPs and host communities, while with the enhancement of the related administrations was somewhat limited. Government departments, such as municipalities and DoW, are challenged by a stop on recruitment for the last 6 years, as well as a lack of equipment and funds for O&M.

Reporting of ongoing activities (QINS) were not conclusive as data was missing on progress (T04.247, T04.136, T04.40). Progress reports show that assessments and consultations have been carried out, and that preparation has been made to award contracts.

Delays are being attributed to COVID-19 with restricted field access. However, construction work and assessments do continue, and preventative measures are taken.

To date only ***one intervention has been fully completed*** (T04.121). Immediate outcome of improved access to WASH Services was reached by restoring the damaged infrastructure and hygiene behaviour change campaign. Achievement of significant improvement in resilience for beneficiaries, both IDPs and host communities, while with the related administrations the enhancements were somewhat limited.

Beneficiaries assess the gained benefits of improved access to WASH as very useful. The project has thus had a micro impact in its own right, but in terms of broader and longer-term impact, it should be seen as one of the contributions to overall assistance to Iraq, including through the EUTF.

EUTF has had an impact to improve access to WASH services to areas previously lacking infrastructure. Noted was that safe and trusted water is now available in neighbourhoods of Mosul, Sinjar, Tel Afar and villages in Ninewa that previously had to access unsafe sources or purchase from water trucking. Baseline and endline household surveys shows that for two of three intervention districts, Mosul and Tel Afar, that water access had improved while it remained the same in Sinjar (T04.121). Impact for the behaviour change campaign was mixed according to the survey with some better results achieved in schools.

Piped and constant access to water will not be achieved in all areas of intervention such for the housing component as large-scale water schemes will be needed. These beneficiaries will have to purchase from water trucking companies (T04.247, western Ninewa).

**Quote from Government Official Sinjar (T04.121):** *'ISIS war on Sinjar district has destroyed the area. Some houses did not have a connection to the water network. For a long time, no party, whether governmental or non-governmental, took the initiative to implement WASH projects in the region. As such, the WHH project is very much needed.'*

**EQ5. How well has EUTF WASH support contributed to the achievement of longer-term effects/impact? What are these actual impacts in specific terms?**

DoWs and municipalities note that the interventions are having an impact to improve WASH services to accommodate returnees and encourage more returnees. However, they also state that the needs are on a larger scale than that EUTF and other donors can cover in the short term.

Interventions are ongoing with exception of one that is completed. However, taking COVID-19 into account at planning stage and prioritising WASH interventions may have a positive effect for resilience and COVID-19 prevention.

**Unplanned outcomes** of great significance were not identified for the interventions.

**COVID-19** was an opportunity for large-scale online campaigns, which have increased visibility and use of new tools for behaviour change messaging.

**There are constraints to achieve longer-term impact.**

DoWs note that the resilience and operation of their departments is yet to be improved, although these have benefited from target support such as GiS centres (T04.136). DoW have the personnel, including engineers to manage projects but lack financial resources and equipment to adequately carry out operation and maintenance. Government departments challenged by the stop of more than 6 years on recruitment of new personnel and investment in equipment. *Intervention T04.121 (completed Nov 2020): There were improvements in the resilience of end beneficiaries, which were significant for both, IDPs and host communities, while with the enhancement of the related administrations was somewhat limited. The project has thus had a micro impact in its own right, but in terms of broader and longer-term impact, it should be seen as one of the contributions to overall assistance to Iraq, including through the EUTF.*

Intervention T04.53, *Al-Jazeera irrigation project*, when completed, will have a longer-term impact for livelihoods and income generation for the region (note that this intervention is not part of the EUTF evaluation scope in WASH). However, maintenance and governance is required in future. Water resources could become scarce (depending upstream plan of dam in Turkey), and water from Mosul dam will have to be planned for both the use of human consumption and irrigation.

In north-western Ninewa, the housing projects in some area require accompanying water and sanitation infrastructure for providing sufficient service for the longer term. Constraints are investment in larger-scale infrastructure, and some areas also the lack of consistent grid power for water pumping.

**EQ6. What external factors (positive and negative) have had the greatest influence on the achievement of results/changes observed?**

Due to **COVID-19**, delays in identifying activities and also implementation occurred including for construction. Lockdown periods during COVID-19 restricted field travel and also meetings with

government counter parts were not possible due to office closures. No-cost-extensions were required to account for delays due to the COVID-19 (T04.121) during implementation. Import of materials was delayed during periods of COVID-19 lockdown.

**Security concerns.** In general, social unrest and great security concerns did not occur in the project areas. However, security issues at local level impacted the programme. At identification stage, proposed projects for one intervention (T04.121) in the Governorate of Salah al Din were cancelled due to security concerns.

**Recruitment of staff,** such as legal officers and field engineers, was found to be time consuming (T04.247). Not only for finding persons suitable, but also taking into account appointing a mix of persons of various religions and ethnicity and locations.

**Delays occurred for obtaining approvals** from Ministry, which had been foreseen (and communicated with EUD in advance, T04.247). Most interventions noted some delays in obtaining approvals and documentation to start project activities such as from DoW but good communication allowed for this time to be reduced.

Communication network availability in rural areas was a delaying factor when telephone calls were not possible, and more travel was required or delays in meetings until network coverage improved.

Risk analysis and Contingency Plan of consortia were outlined in project documents.

**Economic situation with currency devaluation** at end of 2020 has had negative effect on purchasing power of Iraq. This in turn affects how government institutions can operate and maintain assets.

**Positive external factors.** Security situation in general has improved over the last 2 years, which has made a positive effect for field travel and returns.

***EQ7. Is the level of partnership with the national/country-specific governmental partners appropriate to support the effective achievement of the EUTF WASH objectives?***

All activities were well coordinated with the national and local authorities. Agreements are in place at Ministerial level, while activities are coordinated and approved at governorate level after consultation between district level government departments. Implementing Partners have valid registrations to operate in Iraq and KRI.

**Partnerships are appropriate and communication was effective** between government counterparts at governorate level and implementing partners. In the verification phase, interviews were held with Ninewa DoW, Erbil DoW and with implementing partners and both highlighted that there was good cooperation and communication.

For WASH infrastructure the coordination was done mostly at the governorate level with DoW, Directorate of Agriculture (DoA), and Directorate of Education (DoE) for WASH in schools.

**DoW Coordination Unit of Ninewa** has sub-branches at district level for needs identification and liaison with humanitarian agencies. DoW present the needs for water and sanitation infrastructure and share these with implementing partners. In accordance, to both DoW and implementing partners, projects are selected based on budget and feasibility. Larger scale strategic projects in western Ninewa are required for which donor financing is reportedly not available. For Erbil this works in a similar fashion.

Below are examples of coordination and collaboration between national partners and donors.

- Areas of intervention and projects were selected by implementing partners in cooperation with Directorate of Water Coordination Unit (DoW) of Ninewa following assessments of areas and stakeholder's consultation at local level.
- Erbil Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (EJCCC) assisted in coordination between government departments such as DoW of Erbil and implementing partners. Priority locations for intervention were selected by government partners. DoW also communicates the needs to EJCCC.

- Directorate of Water (DoW) capacity was stretched due to the numerous activities and high number of NGOs and UN agencies engaged in WASH. This was noted as reason for delays in obtaining permissions for activities.
- Cooperation Agreement (CA) with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) for T04.121. In addition, an Area Based Coordination Group (ABC) of the WASH Cluster ensured communication on project selection to avoid duplication (T04.132).
- For housing, land and property rights for returnees, UN Habitat is engaging at ministerial level. In particular, initiative to address housing, land and property rights of the Yazidis in Sinjar, has been strongly supported and fully endorsed by the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Justice. Resulted in official agreement with the Prime Minister's Office by jointly drafting legal decree which has been submitted to Prime Minister to replace the occupancy certificate and recognise as property ownership document).

DoW Ninewa, DoW of Erbil and municipalities stated that they would benefit from support such as staff secondment. There has been a recruiting stop for the last 6 years. DoW have in house engineers but for larger projects also use consultants. However, continuation of the programmes with extension of activities and O&M by DoWs without donor support seems presently challenging due to lack of resources of public institutions.

**Ownership is strong**, since the beneficiaries' interests (individual, community) were considered, and the project activities contributed to their community development. Activities were appropriately planned and adjusted to meet the needs of the beneficiaries. Implementation was well coordinated between implementing partners and local authorities.

**Longer term strategic plans by the General Directorate of Water** at higher level are under development, without donor representation. Conference was held on 2 November 2021 in Erbil for further coordination between government water sector, donors and humanitarian agencies for needs of Mosul, Ninewa governorate

**EQ8. What are the specific advantages/disadvantages of the various implementing partners (national, regional/multi-country, international) in terms of effectiveness?**

In accordance with the DoWs of Ninewa and Erbil and municipalities the EUTF interventions are delivering results. The EUTF interventions have a different focus and thus also different partners were selected. To be noted is that EUD Iraq selected and invited the implementing partners to prepare proposals, which subsequently were reviewed and appropriately amended, and agreements were then made with these partners. Thus, there was not a competitive process.

The first agreement (T04.121) was with a consortium of four INGOs, which used consultants and contractors for carrying out infrastructural works. The two interventions (T04.132 and T04.247) with a large housing rehabilitation component were carried out by UN-Habitat. For the intervention T04.132 there is a partnership between UNDP and UN-Habitat, which is the agency carrying out the WASH component. UN-Habitat has an inhouse engineering department and carried out all preparation and design work. The construction works are awarded by tender to national contractors that reportedly have good capacity. Finally, the intervention focusing on strengthening subnational government consist of four collectives of municipalities of the Netherlands, Catalonia, Denmark and Poland (T04.136).

For the intervention T04.121 outputs were produced as planned, quality controlled and in line with local standards. The implementing partners (INGOs) of the consortium contributed well, each in their agreed area for service delivery. The DoW was not a direct project partner but the WASH implementers worked with them. Contractors performed, and when needed were called back to carry out repairs to conform with the agreement.

The implementing partners made their inputs (staff, contracting) in a timely manner. Both, DoW and works contractors delivered their WASH infrastructure inputs as planned. The municipalities shared the data needed for the initial assessments. The Mosul Planning Department provided the information on priority infrastructure needs as well as the initial technical designs for repairs, which were later revisited by the implementing partners.

There are three *multi-country interventions* including Iraq. The two Iraq/Lebanon interventions, T04.132 and T04.136, are managed as separate and national projects. The three-country intervention of Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan does not have a WASH component in Iraq (T04.40).

### Additional outcome areas<sup>37</sup>

- *community engagement with the WASH providers in terms of ultimate beneficiaries' behavioural change / making providers accountable;*

Programme documents and progress reporting do not note any outcomes related to improve community engagement with WASH service providers, with exception of T04.136. The verification phase was limited in that interviews were with implementing partners and the government WASH service providers, DoW and municipalities. Interviews were not held with groups of beneficiaries to ascertain any community engagement.

Future programming is to address the issue of ownership and responsibility of water and sanitation infrastructure. O&M and preventative maintenance and also community awareness to value the public services is to be further stated to ensure these can be used and reach people most in need. However, in schools, committees were formed and provided with tools and spare parts to carry out repairs.

The campaigns by EUTF interventions for awareness of service provision of water and solid waste (T04.136), and the corona online campaigns (T04.247) increased exposure. However, outcomes are not clear in terms of improved community engagement between service providers and community.

- *level of responsiveness of the WASH institutions in terms of improved performance at the level of local (WASH) actors;*

The capacity of local DoWs, in charge of WASH infrastructure, was sufficient in terms of skills and organisation, including for maintenance. However, they lack financial resources to cover the needs in their sector and are not directly accountable to final users. In principle "maintenance" is perceived unnecessary for new facilities and is mostly limited to repair. The directorates have teams of engineers of different specialties that can react in case of issues reported from the field.

The responsiveness and customer service of the responsible institutions for water and sanitation infrastructure is yet to be measured. However, as not only is the infrastructure newly reinstated but the institutions in charge are also new, there is a long way to go before customer responsiveness will be achieved.

For one intervention this is part of the programme design, but progress reporting does not capture this level of engagement. Intervention (T04.136) carried out by a collective of municipalities had programmes to improve the service delivery by public institutions, which is still ongoing (interim reports not available). In particular, it notes that increasing the responsiveness of service delivery enhances resilience in two distinct ways. Firstly, it improves quality of life. Secondly, it allows local governments to demonstrate their ability to recover and transform their urban areas. Pilot projects were carried out

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<sup>37</sup> These two further outcome areas were requested to be included in the Evaluation by the client in response to the draft inception report.

for solid waste and also drinking water projects in KRI with training of DoW staff. However, results have not been reported.

Other EUTF WASH interventions have no specific improvement plans or had any effect to improve the performance of government partners in their response to communities. However, through programme design extensive consultation was held between local administration and civil society at local level such as for rebuilding of housing and public infrastructure in western Ninewa.

### **Efficiency**

#### ***EQ9. What is the currently most efficient aid modality to support the provision of WASH services under the EUTF-Syria in each of the countries of intervention?***

In Iraq, the various interventions have a different focus per theme and counterparts and in turn the type of implementing partners varied.

For the majority of WASH interventions, the consortia of INGOs with previous experience working with DoW carried out the more complex water and sanitation infrastructure works (T04.121). The UN agencies, UN-Habitat and UNDP partnered carrying out WASH infrastructure for DoW in Ninewa. However, the main advantage for UN-Habitat was for the housing projects. In addition, foreign municipalities (VNG) are also supporting municipalities and DoW in WASH infrastructure and more specifically in governance and technical capacity such as setting up GIS centre.

FAO (T04.53) was likely appropriately selected for the irrigation water scheme but was not part of the WASH evaluation.

Activities are still ongoing for most interventions. For intervention T04.121 both, DoW and works contractors delivered their WASH infrastructure inputs as planned. Overall, the way the project was implemented was suitable, based on the mandates of the implementing consortium. The partners were in regular communication in order to enable coordinated and efficient action, and proved competent to deliver, in line with the consortium agreement. There was one downside - it was quite complex to manage the implementation in the setting of four partners in the consortium, who worked on two outcomes of different fields (WASH and livelihoods).

#### ***EQ10. To what extent have resources been allocated and utilised in an efficient manner and achieve value-for-money?***

For the intervention that was completed in November 2020 (T04.121) the related documentation was available. External monitoring was carried out and outputs were delivered in cost-efficient manner.

The other interventions are ongoing and have not been completed. Implementing partners have not reported cost overrun on activities. Government counterparts have noted that implementation was on time and the quality of work has been good for infrastructure projects.

All interventions required a No-Cost-Extension. For some this was due to COVID-19 due to delays in project identification, and in particular for implementation such as for T04.121.

COVID-19 campaigns and activities were in line with the budgets, and adjustments were not made (for example for the Let's beat corona campaign of T04.132).

Implementing partners did not note any deviation from procurement plans and procedures.

#### *External monitoring reporting on T04.121:*

- Given the context in which the project was implemented, its outputs were delivered in a cost-efficient manner. The consortium respected procurement rules and tendering process for selecting contractors. The resources made available were used appropriately to tackle the targeted segment of the beneficiaries' needs in WASH and livelihoods. There were three budget alignments and a no-

cost time extension, which was a demanding project management exercise. Financial inputs of EUTF were available as contracted. The implementing partners made their inputs (staff, contracting) in a timely manner.

- Financial report was sent one year after reporting period due to delay for an audit, which caused payment delays for the consortium partners, which affected the dynamics. The quality of the information finally provided was adequate.
- Project monitoring and reporting was good at activity level and for QINs, but there was delayed interim reporting. Internal monitoring of implementing partners was a source of recommendations for further action in certain aspects.

***EQ11. To what extent do the various stakeholders ensure the necessary capacity (technical institutional and financial) to promote and implement EUTF-funded WASH programmes?***

The capacity of local DoWs, in charge of WASH infrastructure was sufficient in terms of skills and organisation, including for maintenance. However, they lack financial resources to cover the needs in their sector and are not directly accountable to final users.

The relevant institutions, DoW and municipalities, lack plans and financial resources to continue the services as maintenance and operation, and also continued asset management are not adequately addressed.

The IPs (UNDP, UN-Habitat) have in-house engineering capability and are efficient. The consortium of four INGOs performed well and also carried out the larger scale infrastructure projects, including pumping stations in Mosul requiring technical expertise, which was sought through consultants. Sinjar municipality noted that EUTF interventions had been implemented in a more efficient way than the government could do.

For future operation of the WASH services, the main concern is that government departments (DoW) lack mainly the financial resources. They have staff shortages due to a stop on recruitment for the last 6 years. However, they do have expertise and engineering knowledge in-house.

**Coordination, coherence, complementarity and synergies**

***EQ12. To what extent is the support provided by the EUTF-Syria for WASH programmes/projects coherent and complementary with other major funding mechanisms (EU also including ENI/DCI/ECHO/NDICI)?***

Complementarity and coherence with other EU funding mechanism, and between EUTF interventions, were not clearly outlined. However, DoA documents provided general references to complementarity and coordination with other mechanisms and donor interventions. These interventions have a focus on WASH in many of the same areas, including Mosul, and the districts of Sinjar and Telafar.

There was coordination with other EUTF funded programmes, and with Mining Advisory Group (MAG)/HI (T04.52 but not in portfolio) on demining of areas and information provision. For example, for Al-Jazeera irrigation (T04.53).

In Sinjar district, Western Ninewa, UN-Habitat is carrying out both T04.132 and T04.247 in for programmes in housing units and HLP. These interventions are complementary, which is clearly outlined in the programme documents.

T04.121 with focus on WASH infrastructure operated in Districts in Ninewa including Sinjar and Telafar, and nalos Mosul. However, synergy on programming was not noted for this intervention neither for the two following ones (T04.132 and T04.247).

The EU is also contributing through DCI to the UN's Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS) which is providing stabilisation and reconstruction activities to the liberated governorates including Ninewa.

EU donor support is not planned to follow the EUTF interventions in post-conflict areas in infrastructure support. The focus is to be on governance and technical assistance to government partners.

***EQ13. To what extent is coordination/complementarity with other donors' (non-EU) programmes and with national/ country-specific WASH programmes conducive for the achievement of the EUTF's objectives?***

Donor funding in Iraq is small in comparison with the rehabilitation needs as well as the move to resilience programming. In addition, the WASH infrastructure rehabilitation requires more funding to ensure it remains operational.

Coordination with WASH sector, and also with the newly established NGO Early Recovery Forum through the National Coordinating Committee of Iraq (NCCI) allows information sharing between all partners engaging in the stabilisation effort. This also includes representatives from UNDP's Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization (FFIS), the World Bank and other INGOs.

EUTF interventions noted links with donor funding (non-EU) in programme documents and in verification phase:

- Intervention T04.247 (UN Habitat) notes that it is in line with the recently adopted EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (on areas of mutual interest such as democracy and human rights, economic and trade matters, migration, security, energy, the environment).
- For post-conflict recovery in western Ninewa, UN habitat (T04.247) is receiving complementary funding from French government, and there is coordination with other donors such as from Japan. The DoW and municipality of Sinjar noted that further funding is required considering the large-scale destruction.
- T04.136 (VNG) stated coordination and complementarity with GiZ funded programme on water infrastructure in Duhok governorate (See, DoA).
- USAID's Iraq Governance and Performance Accountability (IGPA) project has been awarded on 21 March 2017 to Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI). Approximate amount of USD 170 M for subnational governance reform project of five years that targets the KRI provinces and around 7 other provinces in Iraq, but not Ninewah. Intervention T04.136 noted coordination with USAID funded activities.

*The DoW noted the following coordination with donor projects (non-EU):*

- Long term development is from the World Bank's/UNDP's Funding Facility for Economic Reform-Regional (FFER-REG).
- Water treatment plant funded by GiZ serving 150,000 persons.
- Funding for camps is ending and donors are stating that government of Iraq/KRO is to take over, which is not occurring (DoW Duhok).
- ICRC carried out needs assessment (2021) for Mosul city for the DoW, and this was to be used for the 2 Nov 2021 conference with government partners and donors.

***EQ14. What is the quality and extent of coordination/ complementarity/synergies between national and regional/multi-country EUTF WASH programmes?***

EUTF multi-country interventions do not show coordination between the country programmes.

There is complementarity with EUTF interventions within Iraq, including demining (MAG) and other WASH EUTF interventions in Ninewa governorate. Complementarity and synergy of EUTF interventions in Ninewa governorate are outlined for WASH and other sectors, such as irrigation, livelihoods, housing-land-property, and Health, and demining. However, evidence of actual contributions is lacking.

COVID-19 interventions for hygiene promotion are coordinated at WASH national level and guidelines were prepared.

There is coordination with WASH sector, and also with NGO Early Recovery Forum coordinated by the National Coordinating Committee of Iraq (NCCI).

## **Sustainability**

### ***EQ15. What are the main factors for sustainability of the EUTF-funded WASH programmes/ projects and to what extent are these factors currently ensured?***

Detailed sustainability assessments at the start of programming (in programming documents) were not conducted for the EUTF interventions.

DoW (Duhok, Erbil and Ninewa) noted that improved dialogue with donors is required on needs, challenges, priorities and strategic planning, which is not sufficiently happening. DoW note the importance of engaging with donors on this rather than gap-filling in accordance with budget of implementing partners.

Follow up support by EU is not foreseen for the programmes carried out by the EUTF in Iraq. This is a concern for continuing the services in which EUTF invested such as for operation and maintenance, and for sustained electricity to power the WASH systems. Returnees in Ninewa governorate are paying for water trucking as piped access is not available, which is concern for the economic situation and safeguarding of water supply to vulnerable persons in some villages.

***DoW and municipalities lack financial resources and also plans to carry out adequate operation and maintenance of water and sanitation infrastructure.***

***As regards operation and maintenance of WASH investments, DoW of Duhok, Erbil and Ninewa governorates*** mentioned that since 2012 appointment of new staff and purchase of tools and equipment such as excavators has not been possible due to budget stop form central government. They have human resources, including engineers, but was also benefit from training and improved systems, such as GiS centres provided by T04.136

Interventions have incorporated, to a small degree, training from DoW staff on operation and maintenance. However, in comparison this is insufficient as the main factors prohibiting adequate O&M by the beneficiaries of WASH infrastructure are lack of finance for spare parts and consumables and also for tools and machines. T04.132: DoW capacity building provided for 5 engineers in each of 5 DoWs (total 25 persons) and also provision of a manual on O&M of WASH infrastructure.

The camps of Domus 1 and 2 in KRI will require continued support after UNICEF ends its programme there for providing services such as drinking water, sanitation and solid waste management, and funding for staff. DoW lacks resources to continue this as the central government is not providing this although suggested by donors that this should be transitioned. In addition, the Yazidi population of Khanke camp in KRI are not yet returning to areas of origin in Ninewa due to water shortages there.

***Electricity supply:*** In the cities of Mosul, Erbil, and Dohuk water pumping stations have continuous electricity supply. For example, power is supplied from hydro powerplant at Mosul dam.

In smaller town and villages, the ***water systems highly depend on generators*** for water pumping as grid power is not connected or not continuously available such as for the cities. Thus, a large proportion of the DoW budget is spent on fuel to run generators rather than on O&M. For instance, in Duhok

governorate (excluding the city), an estimated two thirds of boreholes are not grid connected and thus rely on fuel powered generators.

**Solar water pumping** is being introduced by other donors and is having positive effect (GiZ). Solarisation of water systems is relatively new for DoW and requires further expansion. In Duhok, GiZ is one of the first to provide solar water pumping for 11 villages. In Ninewa in areas of Sheikha and Kharanie (Baaj district) solar projects are being implemented by UNICEF.

**Ninewa water trucking** is still the main source of water in some areas including in areas where housing project were carried out by EUTF interventions. The cost to purchase water from water truckers is approximately 3 to 4 USD per m<sup>3</sup>, which is a very high price considering the economic state of the areas and lack of income for returnees.

**Drought** is another challenge noted by DoW for which adaptation is required as water availability is decreasing.

**Sustainability lessons** can be taken from one intervention that has been completed. Factors influencing EUTF WASH intervention sustainability were not clearly outlined for the water infrastructure rehabilitation in Mosul and other towns. The need for infrastructure was clear as the services were lacking due to damage by conflict, and looting, and reinstatement was critical for health of the population. However, the documents do not show a plan for how the service will be maintained in future. This intervention was a vital building block in a greater picture.

Rehabilitated facilities were handed over to the relevant Directorate at Ninewa governorate level. The project had no direct influence beyond the completion/ hand-over stage and from then onwards it relied on the authorities to take good care of the facilities. However, the project influenced the stakeholders to a certain extent, to improve sustainability of WASH interventions. For example, WASH committees at schools take care of maintenance, have appropriate tools and some spare parts, and they report and raise complaints to the DoW. Mukhtars and other esteemed members of the communities were linked with the WASH authorities.

Relevant institutions lack plans/ finances to continue the services as maintenance or continued asset management are not adequately addressed, such as for the water infrastructure rehabilitation in Mosul with DoW, and for schools. They lack budget to carry out planned maintenance and remain reactive to carry out repairs. Intervention did provide tools and spare parts so that maintenance and repairs can be carried out.

Ownership is strong, since the beneficiaries' interests (individual, community) were considered, and the project activities contributed to their community development. Activities were appropriately planned and adjusted to meet the needs of the beneficiaries. Implementation was well coordinated between implementing partners and local authorities.

### **EU added value and visibility**

#### ***EQ16. What EU added value is resulting from the EUTF-funded WASH programmes projects?***

The EUTF WASH interventions are providing a combination of new and rehabilitated infrastructure, and value adding to the existence of the national WASH systems and programmes.

A number of interventions are still continuing but have already implemented services. Water services are to be reinstated in newly recovered areas in Ninewa Governorate to maintain a safe water supply for its population. This includes town water supply and WASH in schools and public health centres, and new or reconstructed houses for returnees. In addition, local authorities are receiving system strengthening, such as GIS centres.

Neighbourhoods with a high influx of Syrian refugees and IDPs of Erbil, Duhok, Sumel and Mosul are benefiting from extension of water networks (T04.121 and T04.132)

***EQ17. Did the portfolio of EUTF funded WASH programmes contribute to the EU policy dialogue for reforms with national governments?***

Evidence has not been identified across the majority of the EUTF WASH portfolio in terms of contributing to the EU policy dialogue for reforms with national governments. Programme documents have not made reference to this, and interviews in verification phase did not reveal this either. This tends to suggest that currently there is little policy dialogue emerging as a result of EUTF WASH interventions.

Intervention (T04.247 UN Habitat) noted that it is in line with the recently adopted EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (on areas of mutual interest such as democracy and human rights, economic and trade matters, migration, security, energy, the environment).

***EQ18. To what extent are the communication and visibility actions providing added value in terms of contributing to mainstreaming the WASH programmes/projects' desired effects?***

The EUTF interventions noted a communication and visibility plan as part of their programming documentation, which was confirmed in the verification phase.

Promotional videos on social media and websites were showcased for the Headway Programme (T04.132). In particular, the 'Let's beat corona' campaign on social media channels was extensive and reached around 5 million persons. Interventions are showcasing stories and programme achievements in brief reports that are published on their websites. Also, interventions mention visibility of signboards.

The EU's contribution to the project was shown through publication of project activities, and by sign boards and banners at project sites. Field staff wore vests and caps with EU logo and accompanying text (T04.121).

Campaigns for COVID-19 created large visibility, including the social media campaign.

**Gender and special needs**

***EQ19. To what extent have gender issues been taken into consideration in design and implementation?***

EUTF interventions note that gender issues are considered in the design phase, and in a number of interventions are included in the objectives.

Progress reports note the recruitment of women for specific roles in programming and gender sensitive approach. This was also confirmed by interviews and in progress reports that field also women staff were recruited, which also assisted for certain activities with women beneficiaries. In livelihoods, women were among those prioritised for work placements. EUTF assistance targeted women with specific activities in Sinjar area where social norms are even more conservative than in other parts of Iraq.

Gender was streamlined in the intervention by ensuring equal opportunities to benefit from the activities. Training was organised taking into consideration women's particular needs and interests. Data on beneficiaries is properly gender disaggregated.

Furthermore, gender-segregated WASH facilities were made available in schools.

The EUTF supports demining and decontamination efforts in areas liberated from Da'esh in KRI and in the Ninewa Governorate in and around Sinjar. The latter will enable particularly the return of the Yezidi population. The EUTF is furthermore supporting a female Yezidi demining team in Sinjar through the Mine Advisory Group (MAG). Following the High Representative/Vice-President's pledge to 2018 Nobel prize laureate Nadia Murad, the EUTF is discussing a contribution of around Eur 1 M to this initiative

and the Sinjar Action Fund, focusing on Iraqi Yezidis. This support would also be in line with the EU's broader commitment to gender equality and women's empowerment globally.

***EQ20. To what extent have accessibility and inclusiveness of persons with disabilities (Syrian refugees, IDPs and host community members) been taken into consideration in design and implementation?***

Programme documentation make little mention of inclusiveness of people living with disabilities. For city water supply, which is general infrastructure this is not relevant but for public institutions such as schools programming for gender and PLWD it is.

Design for housing units were discussed in consultation with various stakeholders including the location of the bathroom (T04.132, To4.247). There are two sizes of housing units where the smaller one has the bathroom inside, and the larger unit has two bathrooms of which one is accessible from the outside. The beneficiary families can select the type of toilet and have the option of high seated or squat toilet. This is in particular favourable for people that are less mobile.

***EQ21. Which specific outcomes regarding gender and special needs can be identified from the EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects?***

All related data was collected appropriately and disaggregated by gender where relevant (e.g. participation in training, beneficiaries, students in rehabilitated schools). Specific reporting for people living with disabilities was not noted. However, interviews did show that programming and implementation for the housing units took preferences of beneficiaries into account and options for toilet type were provided.

**Lessons learned**

*“What lessons can be learned / good practice can be identified from the implementation of EUTF-funded WASH programmes / projects?”*

- Operation and Maintenance by DoW for water, sanitation and solid waste systems is a shortcoming of EUTF interventions as these were often gap-filling projects of lists from DoW, and did not include a comprehensive approach to include O&M.
- Electricity for powering water systems such as boreholes and pumping stations is a problem. DoW waste their budget on fuel, oil and maintenance on generators to provide water to the population. In particular, this is the norm outside the cities that are the only places benefitting from continuous and reliable grid power. Solarisation is to be expanded, which will reduce operational costs and ensure improved water provision. Although Iraq is an oil producing nation it comes at a high cost and is draining the DoW budget, which in turn is hampering the service provision and ultimately return on EUTF investment and improved health of the population.
- DoWs (Duhok, Erbil and Ninewa) noted that improved dialogue with donors is required on needs, challenges, priorities and strategic planning, which is not sufficiently happening. DoW note the importance of engaging with donors on this rather than gap-filling in accordance with budget of implementing partners.
- Follow up programming by EU is not foreseen for the programmes carried out by the EUTF in Iraq. This is a concern for continuing the services in which EUTF invested such as for operation and maintenance, and for sustained electricity to power the WASH systems.
- Interventions are to plan WASH service provision and housing projects for returnees with other donors and government for a complete package. Returnees some villages of Ninewa governorate are paying for water trucking as piped access is not available, which is concern for

the economic situation and safeguarding of water supply to vulnerable persons in some villages.

- Condition and motivation for return to places of origin are housing, security and services such as schools and water, sanitation and solid waste, and electricity. If this is not in place people are faced with dilemmas of staying in camps, where donor support and services are dropping even during Covid-19 pandemic, or to return to areas where living conditions are poor. There are still areas where return is not possible due to presence of unexploded ordinances and remnants of war, and large-scale destruction including of infrastructure and houses, lack of schools.

## Recommendations

The following recommendations are linked to the needs specifically related to the WASH portfolio and future of WASH service delivery within Iraq. Some of these are also cross-cutting across the portfolio and have been synthesised up to portfolio level.

- The limited capacity of DoW to carry out O&M is apparent and is only partly addressed in the interventions. This requires focus for the water and sanitation infrastructure to remain operational.
- Electricity provision to be improved with sustainable options that will reduce operational costs for DoW and municipalities.
- Drought response and resilience required, which is to be taken into account in programming and strategies.
- Complementarity of EU programmes to be coordinated with other IFIs to increase combined impact. The rehabilitation needs are large, and partly addressed in the country through EUTF and other donors. To continue to accommodate returnees and allow more people to return to their place of origin the rebuilding efforts are to be continued through donor support or otherwise by political dialogue. Water and sanitation infrastructure, schools, public health centres, and houses are required. Complementarity of WASH with housing rehabilitation to be expanded.
- The north-western districts of Sinjar, Tel Afar, and Baaj, where destruction was extensive, have had support by many donors. Coordination is complicated and causes delays with many partners and therefore could be improved.
- DoW Joint Coordination Centre state that the needs remain and that there are also needs for large-scale infrastructure requiring several years (prior to 2 November 2021 coordination conference in Erbil).
- There are still areas where return is not yet possible due to presence of unexploded ordinances, and destruction of houses and public infrastructure and where schools are not open. These aspects need to be addressed.
- The camps, Domus 1 and 2 hosting Syrian refugees, in Sumel district will require future funding as the current support by donors is ending this year. DoW will be responsible but has financial constraints.

### ***Specific points for the completed Intervention T04.121 that are relevant for the EUTF WASH portfolio:***

- EUTF or a similar EU follow-up financial instrument, in the medium-term, should continue to support both WASH and livelihoods in Iraq, as they remain highly relevant and the needs are far from tackled. The comprehensive approach to local development present in this project to include both the humanitarian and development communities should be pursued (T04.121).

- The institutions (DoW) lack plans and resources, including financial, to continue the water services as maintenance or continued asset management of infrastructure are not adequately addressed. In future similar WASH interventions, EUD should, in the medium-term, clearly articulate planned maintenance as a requirement for sustainability and have it built into each project design to the extent possible.
- To improve sustainability of the reconstructed/ repaired WASH infrastructure, EUD should immediately require from the EUTF interventions, as much as its influence allows, to advise the DoW to prepare detailed maintenance plans, including budgeting. Even though Iraq's national budget is currently insufficient, funding could be sought from other sources.
- To inform on future interventions the consortia are to consolidate their findings to share with a wider audience. Intervention T04.121 compiled the needs and carried out baseline surveys, which is valuable information for follow up programming.

## 7.2 Jordan Country Portfolio Report

### **Relevance**

#### ***EQ1. Is programming of WASH programmes/projects strategically aligned with the EUTF's underlying funding principles and approaches?***

The EUTFs strategic objective to “provide a coherent and reinforced aid response to the Syrian crisis on a regional scale, responding primarily in the first instance to the needs of refugees from Syria in neighbouring countries, as well as of the communities hosting the refugees and their administrations, in particular as regards resilience and early recovery” has remained unchanged since the establishment of the fund. There is no specific reference to WASH in either the EUTF Strategic Orientation document or the Operational Criteria for Concept Notes and Action Documents, however, water and waste water management services are referenced in the Constitutive Agreements (2014 onwards).

As evidenced through the EUTF Six-Monthly Progress Reports, the EUTF Results Framework (RF) has evolved over time with amendments and refinements to the WASH related indicators seemingly responding to the changing portfolio. The most recent RF sets out 5 indicators under the Results Statement of “Improved WASH infrastructure”. This Results Statements is embedded under the “Syrian and host communities have better health, through improved access to health (and water) services, strengthened local capacities (in health and WASH); and strengthened infrastructure (also in both sectors).

The WASH sector EUTF interventions are largely aligned with the EUTFs strategic objective and underlying principles and approaches and the EUTF RF. Whilst there are often explicit references to the EUTF strategic objectives within programme documentation, there are only limited explicit references to the EUTF RF [T04.208 and T04.92]. There is no evidence of any theories of change across any of the interventions.

Linked to the EUTF, is the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) and specifically in the case of Jordan, the Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis (2018, 2020-2022; 2021 updated) as well as the EU-Jordan Compact (2016-2018). Again, the interventions are also aligned to these Plans and largely cited in programme documentation (see EQ3 for further details).

One additional noteworthy point is that intervention T04.172 (UNICEF) appears as a ‘hybrid’ intervention. The intervention was originally established as an Education sector intervention and in response to the COVID-19 pandemic a WASH component was added (see EQ2 for further details).

#### ***EQ2. How has the WASH portfolio developed since the beginning of the EUTF with regard to relevance, targeting and responsiveness?***

The relevance of the WASH portfolio has been maintained given the alignment and responsiveness to the EUTF strategic objectives, EUTF RF and national priorities and sector needs (see EQ1 and EQ3) as opposed to cross intervention lesson learning within the portfolio itself. There is one possible exception in-so-far as the timing of the ‘Lessons Learnt event: Aid delivery within the humanitarian-development nexus’ (13 September 2019) having potentially had influence of the intervention T04.208 that started December 2019<sup>38</sup>.

For the majority of the interventions, the lessons learned and previous experience, as reported in programming documentation, relate to interventions and experiences from outside of the EUTF

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<sup>38</sup> No explicit reference has been made, to this learning event, within the programming documentation.

portfolio. They are lessons from the implementing partners' previous work in the country and/or region. There are also examples of learning from other interventions, pilot projects and studies.

For example, intervention T04.27 where the DoA and Addendum mention that ACF has been working in Jordan for 10 years, is one of the two main financiers of the water sector in Jordan and has recently financed the NGOs which are implementing projects as a response to the Syrian refugees' crisis in the water sector. Its design was based on the recommendations of the Master plan, prepared by Japan International Cooperation Agency. For intervention T04.34, a multi-country intervention, the DoA mentioned that ACF, INTERSOS and ACTED have extensive experience in WASH rehabilitation at the household level in Jordan: ACF is implementing other WASH programmes in the Irbid governorate and ACTED has been the lead with NRC in drafting the WASH Shelter technical guidelines for interventions in Host Communities. For intervention T04.208 [T04.229] sludge management component for Zaatari camp / community was based on the idea coming from at that time Food and Agriculture Organization project - to combine different waste streams into a solution for waste to energy.

There is also an exception, T04.92 where little or no reference is made in the DoA, to lessons learned from other interventions and experience. It is only one minor reference in the addendum acknowledging that "the project has....been designed by international and local consultants working together to ensure that best practice and local knowledge are taken into account in the design". However, EBRD had previous investments with WAJ, of which two were for wastewater projects, and got to understand WAJ's capacity.

In terms of responsiveness to the COVID-19 pandemic, out of the four country interventions three out of four have responded<sup>39</sup>, to varying degrees. For example, intervention T04.172 formerly an Education intervention, has added a WASH component specifically in response to COVID-19. Another example, taking a different approach, the implementing partner ACF within intervention T04.27 immediately conducted additional messaging and follow-up with their past and present interventions. In terms of the two multi-country interventions, T04.34 completed prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. T04.208 [T04.229] introduced stricter health and hygiene measures but kept providing services and introduced additional ones in Covid-19 circumstances (quarantine, transit areas in the 2 camps).

***EQ3. How effectively have specific country needs, contexts and barriers to WASH services been taken into account into the programming of country-based EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects?***

All interventions explicitly state in their programming documents, having taken into account one or more of the national policies and/or strategies such as JRPSC (various years); National Water Strategy 2016-30; Jordan 2025 Vision; Jordan Executive Development Plan 2016-2018. The one notable difference is T04.172, which as previously mentioned is the hybrid intervention of primarily being an Education intervention with an added COVID-19 response WASH component.

To what extent the interventions are actually in-line with national sector priorities albeit on paper appear to be, was further assessed during the verification phase through engagement with stakeholders. A vulnerability map, which is developed jointly by UNICEF, WAJ/MoWI is reflected in JRP. WAJ/MoWI use the map as a tool to link most vulnerable areas (i.e. needs priorities) with the business needs of the YWC and WAJ. The map identifies, according to defined criteria, the areas most in need, where potential projects are then developed. WASH response is actually co-developed, as MoWI/MOPIC and donors consult on the planned sector projects, needs, and finance. This map and corresponding matrix are regularly updated. Information about the needs is also obtained through voice from the communities, through their representatives i.e. requests for services of the local communities, submitted by mayors or parliamentarians to YWC and then further to MoWI/WAJ. A

<sup>39</sup> The fourth: T04.92 has no mention of COVID-19 responsiveness in the programming documentation (DoA; or addendum); interview confirmed that COVID-19 had very little influence.

priority list of these requests is compiled and ranked by technical and vulnerability criteria. EU is in charge of consultations on synergies with other's programmes during the design-in-funding conference, where all funding agencies come to the same table and MoWI, WAJ take part. UNICEF are co-leading with the Government a WASH sector group, for refugee camps and also for host communities. They collaborate with the Government during the design phase, including for T04.172.

A strategy for COVID-19 WASH response was developed by UNICEF (April 2020). Ministry of Health is a part of the camp coordination group. Some of the distributions were guided by the Ministry.

The use of the term barriers can be understood in two ways: i) barriers leading to the need for an intervention or ii) barriers in terms of possible risks faced during implementation of an intervention. The latter scenario is what this EQ is concerned with. Notwithstanding the fact that the term barrier barely featured if at all in programme designs document, most Action Documents do contain a set of assumptions, risks and risk mitigations. Examples of risks include: "The municipalities involved do not have the capacities to manage correctly the grant projects; The influx of refugees from Syria reaches a scale which threatens to overwhelm the capacity of the intervention; The commitment of the institutional authorities is not stable" (T04.40). Intervention T04.27 addendum 1 Action Document presents their risks and assumptions by category: political; economic; financial; implementation; social; and environmental.

Part of the discourse around the extent to country needs, contexts and barriers being taken into account into programming comes from the extent to both existence of forums and participation by stakeholders in forums in the programming/design of WASH interventions. Although the forum exists, and the stakeholders were engaging it during the initial programming and design of the EUTF interventions, it is not clear if this was only formal or if the mechanism was effective. Within DoA's and Action Documents the planned use of National Steering Committees, sector coordination, and monitoring forum provide the opportunity for onward dialogue and contributions.

Most interviewed stakeholders identify as barriers, the Government partners' capacity (e.g. YWC and MoPIC) and a lengthy mandatory project registration process (in the JORISS system/database) – this is the case even though central level institutions are involved in the project design consultations/approval, due to divorced processes of sectoral collaboration and official project registration.

## **Effectiveness and Impact**

***EQ4. To what extent have EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects been effective in achieving their planned outcomes? What are the actually achieved outcomes in terms of what has changed, who has changed, when and how?***

As reported under EQ 1 the WASH interventions align with the EUTF RF, this includes the alignment of outcomes to the RF outcome of 'improved WASH infrastructure'. The extent to which the interventions contribute to the achievement of the WASH objectives remains largely undetermined given only two (T04.34, T04.172) out of six interventions have completed by the time of this report, with the remaining four being delayed for one reason or another.

Due to the limited progress in the majority of outputs across the interventions, the WASH interventions have, to date, not been particularly effective in achieving their planned outcomes.

In the case where the intervention (T04.34) has completed (in January 2020), the ROM (December 2019) reports that it is "difficult to claim, that the intervention will fully achieve its (outcome) given difficult WASH sector in both countries" (Jordan and Lebanon).

Generally the evidence sourced/available from the QINs is limited or non-existent in terms of progress against outcomes, however this is not surprising given the delays in implementation. Where there is

some level of surprise is for intervention T04.92 where there has been no QIN reporting since its commencement in 2018 and limited narrative progress reporting. In some cases where additional progress reports (annual and/or final) were available and so provided some additional evidence not provided in the QINs.

The extent to which the planned outcomes have been effectively achieved, in terms of what has changed, who has changed, when and how was further assessed during the verification phase of the assignment.

Two components of T04.27 are EU(TF) financed. The investment component 1.1, i.e. its package one (co-financed by EUTF and the remaining two packages by EU-NIP) should expand and improve the performance of the water networks in Greater Irbid and Ramtha but thus far only got to the stage of signing the contract. Component 3 (Improving access to water of the vulnerable communities, financed by EUTF) was completed in November 2020 with targets achieved. The outcome assessment report states that the main change is better access and reduced costs for water for Syrian refugees, e.g. 86% of the beneficiaries who got first time access to water from the network reported that they are not buying water from vendors anymore. 74% of the beneficiaries who got first time access to water from the network reported that their expenditure for water is reduced. Based on households' total monthly water expenditure before and after the connection, their bills are reduced 54% on average.

T04.34 ACTED completed 11 infrastructural projects successfully and handed them over to the Yarmouk Water Company (YWC): one pumping station in Kuraimeh (Irbid), one borehole in Turra (Irbid), and the rest are local water networks; rehabilitated WASH facilities and promoted hygiene and water conservation in 31 public schools were all handed over to the Ministry of Education; 1224 households benefitted from in-house WASH rehabilitation and/or upgrade of their shelters. It contributed to improvements in WASH at all three addressed levels. Despite somewhat delayed delivery, targets were achieved, and the effects on target groups – Syrian, resident population, institutions – were favourable. However, for real impact WASH counterparts need allies and further support.

In T04.172 the COVID-19 WASH response component lasted for one year and helped prevent a major outbreak in the refugee camps. EUTF funds came at the right time (July 2020) and appropriate supplies (hygiene kits distribution, additional for quarantine) suitably accompanied the messages on hygiene and prevention. Water quantities also had to be increased – it was both summer and an epidemic. In Azraq camp there was rehabilitation/ installation of 100 toilets in shelter in quarantine area; in the hospital additional WASH units were also installed.

In T04.92 EBRD tangible outputs are not delivered yet, but the preparations are completed. The planned change is to build the first wastewater network services to serve people in 18 towns in West Irbid area (once they are connected). Also the treatment plant needs to be timely completed to take the load from WW network. Water supply network is done in parallel. All these outputs (of which WW network is under EBRD implementation) will enable improved services in West Irbid area, if/when end users access it as planned (target 121000 host +19000 Syrian refugee users benefiting from improved sanitation services).

In T04.208 [T04.229] GIZ there are no tangible outputs in R4 – sludge management (to which our evaluation focuses). Consultations/agreements with the national stakeholders are about to be finalised, which puts the actual R4 in feasibility stage. The solid waste management and short-term job opportunities components are giving their immediate effects.

MoWI look at the macro-level, e.g. can make certain judgment on overall improvements on non-revenue water in Irbid, but can't determine specific projects' contributions. A project can plan to install e.g. 1000 new connections – but there is no mechanism for checking the actual number of new connections a few years later.

**EQ5. How well has EUTF WASH support contributed to the achievement of longer-term effects/impact? What are these actual impacts in specific terms?**

No unplanned outcomes have been identified. However, intervention T04.92 has highlighted that an unplanned output: “EBRD has provided training to both WAJ and the General Tender Department staff working on this project and in parallel has launched the new online procurement system for Jordan projects” has occurred as a response to the cause of the delays in intervention implementation. This may in turn have value-added beyond this specific intervention.

**EQ6. What external factors (positive and negative) have had the greatest influence on the achievement of results/changes observed?**

During the desk phase, COVID-19 was identified as a cause of implementation delays due to lockdown and prevention of work in turn having negative influence on the achievement of results, for example in T04.27 (AFD). In the verification phase, T04.27 AFD added other negative influences, e.g. reduced availability of WASH materials in the local market due to the cancellation of the trade agreement between Jordan and Turkey.

In the verification phase, most of the interventions confirmed that COVID-19 but also a very dry summer, both highly influenced the delayed achievement of intervention outputs and/or outcomes. T04.92 EBRD can be excepted as it is still in preparatory phase. Other stakeholders agreed that COVID-19 and drought have taken already limited resources and capacity of the sector just to ensure that the country has water - crisis management has exhausted water sector resources (including emergency repairs of canal for water supply from Israel to Jordan). In such circumstances e.g. T04.208 [T04.229] GIZ argue it difficult to discuss a wastewater focused project, which then delays its preparations.

In the camps both factors (COVID-19 and drought) highlighted uncertainty of water supply. Related risk assessment is developed, as a part of procurement processes.

Yarmouk Water Company voiced another negative point: around 1.5 million Jordanians who work abroad come back home during summer which puts water supply under additional pressure, e.g. quantities are tripled in the distribution plan. Combined with COVID-19 and the dry season, this made summer 2021 one of the most complicated for YWC/water sector. Climate change makes winters unpredictable so getting ready for the next summer becomes more complicated.

**EQ7. Is the level of partnership with the national/country-specific governmental partners appropriate to support the effective achievement of the EUTF WASH objectives?**

Whilst there are no apparent stakeholder maps/analysis available for any of the interventions, in the majority of the intervention DoA/Action Documents document the relevant stakeholders to the interventions. Most often these are Ministry of Water (MoWI), Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ), Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) and Ministry of Municipal Affairs (MoMA), others such as Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) are also referenced.

In the verification stage it was established that written partnership agreements exist, forums for planning/coordination and monitoring exist and to what extent these government partners are actively involved. To be noted that the water donors’ coordination is not very active and has been further hindered by COVID. There is a need for the government to restart this dialogue platform and ensure coordination and synergies among the several donors and projects in the sector. This would also reduce the risk of overlaps and promote learning from past lessons.

UNICEF (implementing T04.172) are leading WASH sector group, which holds monthly meetings to discuss WASH-related issues however, EUD is not involved or informed about these meetings. This group is active, there are meeting minutes, and follow ups. UNICEF co-lead with the Government WASH

coordination for the camps, while all agencies that are active in WASH are a part of this group. Work is closely coordinated with the MoWI and WAJ, e.g. water trucking is agreed and increased for COVID-19 response etc. At (camps and national level) coordination meetings they discuss who's doing what (4Ws: Who, What, When, Where) to avoid overlaps but the effectiveness of these mechanisms is mixed, as some agencies don't engage in it. Collaboration/coordination extends to the Ministry of Health for WASH supplies e.g. in schools.

Other than for camps (for host communities too), there is overall sector coordination, also UNICEF-lead. UNICEF coordinate closely with the MoWI and WAJ. There is also an annual appraisal of work plan for WASH which has to be reviewed and approved by MoWI. Again, the EUD is not involved or informed of this coordination arrangements, which is an evident shortcoming. All work that contributes to the JRP goes through extensive reviews of the line ministries, whether it is for the camps or out of them. On JRP, there's a section on achievements, and there is a discussion with the partners.

On sector level there is an annual review - towards the end of the year, one of regular WASH coordination meetings is devoted to reviewing of the achievements, internally in the sector. The reports are not published but there are presentations for the meeting, and achievements are shared with the sector.

Partnership agreements between the implementing partners and the Government are signed, e.g. between AFD and the Government prior to the start of AFD's operation in Jordan. For T04.208 [T04.229] GIZ Solid Waste Management component has an implementation agreement with MoLA, and sludge management component with MoWI/WAJ. For significant changes e.g. extensions, top-ups, the agreements have to be updated, through another process of signing, which is a lengthy, but standard procedure.

GIZ get the approval for JORISS through line ministries, but then e.g. their sub-grantees have to do the same process again. Sometimes there is a lot of back and forth, e.g. with tax exemption, and sometimes the German embassy intervenes to answer MOPIC's questions. There is room for improvement as it is obviously hard for MOPIC to follow all the activities, and in this aspect line ministries could help. In terms of intervention T04.92, EBRD refer to the water sector structural benchmark action plan in which priorities include connections to the wastewater mains. Those priorities feed into the JRP therefore it is the line ministries that inform the JRP and coordinate, while MOPIC is in charge of registering interventions.

***EQ8. What are the specific advantages/disadvantages of the various implementing partners (national, regional/multi-country, international) in terms of effectiveness?***

Various implementing partners show specific advantages/disadvantages in terms of effectiveness of WASH interventions in Jordan. For example, YWC considers NGOs very suitable for direct work in the area, as they are leaving YWC to provide the services of their own scope and doing extra project-related work. For infrastructure investments, IFIs are a natural choice. When several levels are planned to be addressed with WASH interventions, combining the partners that demonstrate strengths at different levels, appears to be giving good effects.

In EUTF there is close tracking of the implementation of a quite large portfolio by the devoted team, but still the EUD experienced some issues in working with financing institutions under delegation agreements. For example, they had belated warnings on problems in the implementation, as there was no good/timely feedback (with (bi)annual reporting). The banks/financing institutions stick to their procedures and reporting setup, to internal structure. This is allowed by contract but not suitable for follow up and makes monitoring difficult. Reports are not frequent enough nor offer good project related content. Even though banks' procedures are contrary to EU's development approach IFIs' advantage is in making big investments possible with large budgets availability. This is suitable for macro level interventions, for engaging with structures in charge for infrastructure development, working in

line with transparent financial procedures to deliver infrastructure outputs. On the other hand IFIs are not suitable for community level action. For example T04.27 (AFD) had difficulties with household connections, which were tackled through partner NGO action. In other words infrastructure outputs needed micro level action to be converted to outcome – improvement of services. If the implementing partner is specialised for infrastructure delivery, they will not deal with community acceptance of constructed outputs. For example in T04.92 EBRD plans the connections as responsibility of households in cooperation with YWC. YWC plans connections to WW network as obligatory for the new serviced areas with end-user borne cost. As some of potential users need support in this matter and YWC won't be involved in that, they consider this assistance suitable for NGO work.

With international development cooperation agencies, such as GIZ, EUD has good working relation, even when management is delegated, as in T04.208 [T04.229]. The implementing partners - GIZ, the sub-grantees and their partner community based organisations (CBO) have duties suitably divided to cover various activities. CBOs have close relationship with the municipalities in which they are active, which enables the overall project to better reach local level. CBOs also convey voice of end beneficiaries. In terms of effectiveness, the project includes creating livelihood opportunities for both Syrian refugees and vulnerable host communities, which in turn helps the municipalities to provide higher quality services. In SWM component there was an organisational improvement which contributed to streamlining the waste chain in the two targeted camps, with one INGO in charge per camp SWM.

T04.34 was implemented by a consortium of international NGOs: ACTED, Action Against Hunger (ACF) and Intersos, which brought some positive aspects: sharing methodologies, synergies with other and own NGO's projects/ teams, coherent relation with the authorities, synergies with other projects in e.g. activities that tackle a wider scope of needs (not only WASH) at household level. Local NGOs are particularly strong at community level, while weaker when in implementation medium or large scale infrastructure. In terms of their effectiveness at local level, the beneficiaries are very grateful for received assistance. Those are the most vulnerable, and the NGOs working in their area refer them to other teams, to cater for aspects of assistance other than WASH. Also vulnerable children attend schools that may get WASH upgrades. At the same time their host municipality may get assistance from the project. This is an added value of the NGO work in the communities. The NGO partners' internal outcome-focused monitoring mechanisms are in place and appropriately used to trace the progress.

In the camps UN agencies are in charge, WASH lead UNICEF work closely with the MoWI and WAJ, e.g. water trucking is agreed and increased for COVID-19 response. NGOs have positive and good working relationships with direct partners e.g. GIZ, they are quite good in implementation, in monitoring and in follow-up. They are maintaining positive and balanced relations with the donors, and with UN agencies in charge of the camps. Nevertheless, there is still scope to improve their engagement with the EUD, which is a key partner for EUTF WASH support. This includes better communication from the IPs towards the EUD, facilitating greater engagement of the EUD in IP-led project/programme coordination as well as in the planning and delivery of C&V activities/events.

### Additional outcome areas

- community engagement with the WASH providers in terms of ultimate beneficiaries' behavioural change / making providers accountable;

No primary evidence sourced.

- level of responsiveness of the WASH institutions in terms of improved performance at the level of local (WASH) actors.

No primary evidence sourced.

## **Efficiency**

### ***EQ9. What is the currently most efficient aid modality to support the provision of WASH services under the EUTF-Syria in each of the countries of intervention?***

All except one EUTF WASH intervention in Jordan faced some delays. The notable exception is T04.172 for WASH COVID-19 response in refugee camps. However, this was purely an emergency intervention, implemented in the camps where WASH assistance was ongoing, with suitable funds made promptly available to scale up already running hygiene activities and introduce new disease prevention ones.

NGOs, are also considered efficient whether alone or working in partnership with international development cooperation agencies or with finance institutions.

The longest initial delays are noted with financial institutions – until they sign implementation contracts. They all take time to set up their operation. Once their system gets established they are capable of being efficient i.e. of swiftly converting inputs to outputs, all on a large scale.

Generally more than one implementation modality is needed: IFI level of financing for large projects, but also more targeted / specific approach for e.g. WASH in schools, municipalities etc. However, their complementarity and flexibility are important in order to tackle WASH needs at different levels. Modalities depend on the intervention objectives and all have pros and cons. For example, T04.27 (AFD) combines working with government structures at country/governorate level and with NGOs at community level. WAJ was picked as most suitable partner for infrastructure and NGOs for social assistance, thus utilising their respective strong points.

Regarding the financing models, in principle the government prefer budget support and are reluctant to take more loans. WASH sector is among the few that are still allowed to get loans due to the need for water services. The government represented by the Ministry of Planning and Finance review the debt ratio (vs GDP and revenues) which is quite high. Loans are considered “a necessary evil” as Jordanian government funds are insufficient for capital investments. For example YWC considers loans least desirable, as related obligations are an extra burden for their company. The combination of IFIs loans with EU grant is thus a more attractive proposition to Jordanian partners, primarily as it reduces the loan repayment along with its associated interest.

### ***EQ10. To what extent have resources been allocated and utilised in an efficient manner and achieve value-for-money?***

This question has five judgement criteria associated with it: whether interventions activities are delivered in line with their approved budgets; whether resources have been contracted and procured in line with procedures; whether interventions’ resources are available and deployed in a timely manner; whether intervention budgets are clearly justified in programme documents and whether intervention resources are monitored and reported in a consistent and transparent manner.

The majority of interventions have been delayed and only partial financial progress reporting is available. In some cases budget data is not detailed, whereas in other cases no expenditure has been made yet. There are delays and related no-cost-extensions in all projects. All implementing partners report administrative barriers in the initial stage and most of them have some sort of adjustments of the scope/budget/target. Also there is a general issue for construction in Jordan - due to lower than expected capacity for procurement there are delays in tendering.

WAJ has to operate under a mix of procedures – in addition to Jordanian procedures, they are obliged to respect also AFD or EBRD procedures. For EUD it’s a delegation agreement for AFD or EBRD, so they apply both their organisations’ procedures and the EC’s, but for e.g. WAJ this further complicates work. YWC considers training for EBRD procurement helpful for transparency, with clear and fair counter

corruption procedures. Different procurement rules are “not a problem for YWC” – if there is a conflict, EBRD rules prevail.

Applied procedures for contracting and procurement are those of the implementing partners and in line with the financing agreement with the EU. In the EU Delegation monitoring of the utilisation of resources is based on the technical and financial reports, mostly annual, including overall planning. This is the main tool to monitor expenses and is governed by the contract. There is a good follow-up by EUD finance and contracts unit - appraisal from the perspective of utilising the resources in the contracted way. The implementing partners have their own financial appraisals. EUD and IPs check the finances instalment by instalment – when an instalment is due, the expenditure on the previous one is reviewed. Depending on the type of project, financial audit can be planned and defined by contracts. Big infrastructure projects usually have audits for each payment request, while for grants to NGOs or development partners there is usually only one, prior to the final payment. EUD is not following the onward payments (grantee to sub-grantees) directly, but the information on that is available in the (annual) reports. In principle there should be a financial report with each technical report but there is a difference with IFIs who get substantial first instalment and do not report until the next one is due. In between, they submit technical reports, but not financial ones, in some cases only a financial statement.

IFI monitoring and reporting is transparent however primarily as per their internal rules. NGO consortia and development agencies respect reporting obligations, including financial, more consistently. Procedures for funds utilisation are in place – all projects apply transparent procedures, as per specific guidelines, but the beneficiary institutions have to adjust to those.

In T04.27 (AFD) project costs do not correspond with those laid out in DoA, as those are based on the master plan from 2015. The financial bids were actually lower so there were savings due to, apparently, overestimation of the prices during the master plan stage. AFD applies international competition and their procurement guidelines are always part of the financing documents. The standard bidding documents are based on those developed by multilateral development banks. AFD received the full funds under the EUTF dedicated for this project (21M€) out of which 13.2 M€ were disbursed to the implementing partners. For component 3 as per AFD guidelines and the financing agreement, ACF had to perform an annual financial audit.

T04.34 ACTED was completed with direct cost of 12,359,385 € out of total 13,224,542 € for both Jordan (5,706,406 €) and Lebanon (6,652,979 €). The project collaborated with WAJ and YWC to contribute to their plans for smaller interventions, fully appropriate for the given resources. The designers and contractors were chosen in line with transparent procedures that contribute to cost-efficiency.

In T04.172 COVID-19 WASH response a contribution of 10.6 M€ from the EUTF was pooled with those of other donors to total of 17 M€. Standard procurement procedures were followed (starting from tendering - open procedure, independent review committee etc.) that enable transparency and obtaining value for money. Financial procedures are all in line with Harmonised Approach for Cash Transfer (HACT) i.e. common principles and process for managing cash transfers among UN agencies that have adopted the approach across all countries and operational contexts.

In T04.92 EBRD the contracts (3 lots out of 5) are about to be signed. The project is experiencing serious delays. There are 7 LOTs with a number of projects - EBRD did not provide more specific information as of yet and they never submitted a QIN so far. The EUD is insisting to receive additional feedback. WAJ staff are required to implement EBRD / best international practice procurement procedures, which is favourable for the EU as a donor. Relevant support was not foreseen at the very start of planning but is now planned to be provided to WAJ. Skills training for “inclusive procurement” is yet to start, along with the contracts for construction, as on-the-job training.

In T04.208 [T04.229] GIZ there are no tangible outputs in R4 – sludge management (to which our evaluation focuses). Consultations/agreements with the national stakeholders are about to be finalised,

which puts the actual R4 in feasibility stage. GIZ has internal transparent procedures, as a federally owned institution by the German government that is in line with EU procurers, checks and balances. These rules and regulation apply to sub-grantees, and are audited by GIZ too. In the ongoing solid waste management component the expenditure is in line with the timeline. Financial data is transparently available, checked at two instances internally by GIZ. BMZ and EUTF funds are distinguishable, also when submitting payment requests etc.

***EQ11. To what extent do the various stakeholders ensure the necessary capacity (technical institutional and financial) to promote and implement EUTF-funded WASH programmes?***

Evidence available highlights that no intervention has seemingly completed a stakeholder analysis as part of programme design (DoA/AD). Only limited references exist within programme documents in terms of implementing partners (whether NGOs or government partners) experience and roles and responsibilities. For intervention T04.34 the ROM (Mar 2019) highlights that “there are significant gaps in technical, operational and management capacities of the water sector at various levels” and that “a sector-wide capacity development plan is needed”. Another intervention (T04.92) highlights that the “wastewater sector is characterised by a lack of technical and financial capacity...”. Further information was collected during the verification phase on specific stakeholder’s technical, financial and institutional capacities to participate in implementing and promoting EUTF WASH interventions.

In T04.27 (AFD) the incapability of national operator to provide water meters required at the pace of the activities as well as limited capacity of the national operator in the area to process the house connection requests were noted as barriers. As WAJ has limited technical and financial capacity to operate and maintain (O&M) the assets, technical assistance is included in the intervention. Regarding the financial capacity KfW/AFD tackle policy i.e. plan clear methodology for O&M financing to devise a model for its budgeting. In YWC weakest capacity aspect is financial – they have a huge deficit, e.g. massive electricity bill. AFD learned a lesson in component 1: at the beginning there was a Project management unit within WAJ but was dissolved as the capacity was not sufficient to manage complex projects, therefore they would plan a dedicated TA with resident experts at the WAJ for future to support WAJ in: i) Overall planning of the project defining key dates and milestones corresponding to deadlines under the different Financing agreements; ii) Preparation of the tender documents; iii) Review of the designs and technical reports submitted; iv) Support WAJ in the preparation of the periodic reports required under the Financing Agreements; v) Support WAJ in the preparation of the C&V action plan.

T04.34 ACTED had some capacity building at local community/institution level, with WASH committees tasked with operating and maintaining the facilities. It is interesting that some of the resources planned for training the YWC staff were re-allocated to build the capacity of other beneficiaries, as YWC benefitted from several capacity-building interventions from other NGO actors while the intervention was ongoing and YWC expressed being no longer in need of further training.

In T04.92 EBRD had some lessons learned on WAJ, i.e. understanding their capacity. Thus EBRD now design the preparation phases differently in terms of front-loading the preparatory activities (due diligence, preparation of technical specifications, tender documents, launch of the tender) so that there is not a long delay between preparing the documents and implementation. This will be applied to further interventions. In T04.92 TA consultant are supporting WAJ in preparation of the project documents, contracted directly by MoWI/ WAJ, financed by a grant that EBRD manages. EBRD identified insufficient capacity of the institutions as a barrier, as staff are burdened by big funds for Syrian crisis – therefore considerable TA was organised to support them, to share the burden and transfer skills/knowledge. YWC capacity is much stressed, their management contract failed, and they were brought back under the WAJ. The responsibility for O&M lies on WAJ. EBRD consider that O&M capacity of YWC will sufficiently increase until the network becomes operational.

GIZ implemented interventions to tackle institutional aspect of sustainability starting with project technical/steering sector/donor committee, coordination mechanisms. Also most of the projects have TA component - if not EU supported, then implementing partners have in-house expertise or can procure for the extra needed capacity building measures. For sludge component of T04.208 [T04.229] they are keeping relevant key stakeholders involved to maintain quality discussion at different levels, which is considered a foundation to sustainability. They are careful to not add stress to WASH sector in Jordan - whatever gets implemented has to be in light of the framework of the sector, which is underfunded so it must not have very high operational costs or require higher expertise that are not available, where then the government can't keep operating. That links with (yet to be started in T04.229) capacity building measures, which will ensure that the relevant departments are competent to take over, as a result of continuous multi-year work (TA along with hard component).

As multiple projects/ implementing partners are active in the northern governorates, many are working on building the capacity of the YWC. In YWC there is a board to control the performance of the company. In WAJ there is a Utility Performance Management Unit (UPMU). In MoWI there is a Training department which takes records of all training programmes. There is staff certification processes, training levels are specified. WAJ / MoWI are fully aware of all aspects of YWC capacity and the related plans are fully systematised. MoWI points to very weak capacity of local utilities customer relation / commercial services who do not follow up on e.g. household connections as they should. Due to very limited capacity local utilities have to prioritise tasks, so water supply and related networks repair come first.

### **Coordination, coherence, complementarity and synergies**

***EQ12. To what extent is the support provided by the EUTF-Syria for WASH programmes/projects coherent and complementary with other major funding mechanisms (EU also including ENI/DCI/ECHO/NDICI)?***

The majority of interventions (exception T04.34) provided general references and in a few cases explicit references (T04.27 – Wadi Al Arab II – co-financed by EIB, NIF and AFD; T04.172 – the WASH programme supported by a number of other donors including ECHO) to other EU funded interventions/mechanisms. Further evidence of how these interventions complement the EUTF WASH interventions were collected during the verification phase.

We have an example of huge capital investment in the northern governorates, in YWC responsibility area, in the next three years:

- 54 M€ EBRD West Irbid project (T04.92)
- ~100 M€ AFD Sahel Horan sewer project (to expand Ramtha WWTP)
- 66 M\$ Al Junaid wastewater project (Arab Fund)
- 50 M€ rehabilitation of water network in Irbid city and surrounding area (EU, KfW)
- ~32 M€ ongoing (KfW) project for rehabilitation and expansion of Wadi Al Arab WWTP in central Irbid

These interventions are compatible by technical process, e.g. T04.92 EBRD West Irbid WW network project will serve around 17 villages in West Irbid area. Generated wastewater will go to Wadi Al Arab WWTP - under rehabilitation and expansion project to be able to deal with additional wastewater. Wastewater will be treated (in line with Jordanian and international standards) to be used in e.g. agriculture. In addition there is a pipeline for treated water from Ramtha WWTP through Shalala to Wadi Al Arab WWTP to get the best use of it.

Another example is complementing the two sectors (SWM and WW) and two EU financial instruments in T04.208 [T04.229] GIZ. EU is complementing an ongoing EUTF solid waste management programme in Azraq refugee camp with wastewater project to upgrade wastewater management in the camp. Now with The green economy, EU wants to bring in new support from NDICI regional financial instrument

for further wastewater management in the camp. So, what started as SWM programme under the EUTF is complemented with a small amount from EUTF for wastewater and continued with NDICI support towards 2021-25.

**EQ13. To what extent is coordination/complementarity with other donors' (non-EU) programmes and with national/ country-specific WASH programmes conducive for the achievement of the EUTF's objectives?**

A similar picture to that under EQ12 exists within EQ13. The majority of EUTF WASH interventions provide references to existence of other major funding mechanisms directly and/or indirectly by way of explicit reference to other donor interventions. During the verification phase the extent to which EUTF WASH interventions take into account those other relevant non-EU interventions was checked. This is linked with forums that ensure coordination/complementarity between interventions (see EQ 14 for further insight to existence of sector coordination mechanisms).

As noted under EQ1 the EUTF Results Framework sets out the Result "Improved WASH infrastructure" and there are often explicit references in programming documentation to the EUTF strategic objective. Linked to the EUTF, is the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) and the Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis as well as the EU-Jordan Compact (2016-2018). EUTF WASH interventions are aligned to these Plans, as are also other donors' programmes. All interventions in WASH sector in Jordan are reviewed and approved by MoWI / WAJ. In addition MOPIC is main gateway for funding coordination. There is a master sheet of all projects, e.g. investments KfW, AFD, UNICEF have to go through it. Alignment with WASH plans makes a conducive environment for achieving the sectoral goals, as all interventions share the aim, and are generally working in a coordinated way.

In big infrastructure investments, EU is working with financing institutions. Jordan is ready to receive some loans in water sector, and EU is complementing this with grants (blending model). As well in EUTF they tackle the needs of both host communities and refugees (like in case of T04.92 EBRD, T04.27 (AFD) AFD).

Some of the current infrastructure projects in WASH build on the existing infrastructure, owned by the government e.g. improvement of water networks/services. EU (or other donors') WASH projects that build wastewater networks and connect to the existing wastewater treatment plants, may be considered synergetic or complementary. Similarly, complementary water supply networks bring water from the existing pumping stations.

In T04.172 COVID-19 WASH response EUTF contribution was pooled with those of other donors.

**EQ14. What is the quality and extent of coordination/ complementarity/synergies between national and regional/multi-country EUTF WASH programmes?**

In several interventions it is acknowledged and reported that sector coordination exists in Jordan whether at refugee camp level or across donor sector coordination, or in the case of MoPIC being responsible for the majority of international involvement in government entities in Jordan, to include municipalities' responsible water and sanitation services (T04. 092).

As noted under EQ3 all interventions take into account JRP and the related vulnerability map - a tool to link needs priorities with the plans of the YWC and WAJ. WASH response is actually co-developed by MoWI/MOPIC and donors - they collaborate with the Government during the design phase. Vulnerability map and corresponding matrix are regularly updated and influence both programming and implementation of EUTF WASH and of other donor/national interventions.

As noted under EQ7, WASH sector group is active. There is overall sector coordination, UNICEF-lead, and coordinated closely with the MoWI and WAJ. There is also an annual appraisal of work plan for

WASH which has to be reviewed and approved by MoWI. However, as noted elsewhere The EUD is not involved or informed about these activities, which is a shortcoming.

### **Sustainability**

#### ***EQ15. What are the main factors for sustainability of the EUTF-funded WASH programmes/ projects and to what extent are these factors currently ensured?***

The EUTF intervention programming documents do not contain a sustainability assessment however, some of the Action Documents and DoAs do have sections on sustainability as well as assumptions, risks and risk mitigation that are also integrated into the logical frameworks. The extent to which management and planning measure are likely to prove effective in ensuring the proposed intervention sustainability is still to be assessed.

As previously reported, implementation has been delayed in most interventions and so the extent to which benefits are evident is limited. In turn this provides a challenge to assess the extent to which target groups are willing and able to continue utilising the benefits which are not necessarily currently available.

No evidence has been found of measures to replicate intervention results at national level with national resources or where IPs are integrating via national funds in to their own national structures.

EU programming includes sustainability measures of policy dialogue, alignment with national plans and technical assistance. Jordanian gaps for ensuring sustainability in WASH are mostly in the financial part – it is a big and hungry sector, eager for enhancement. Its technical and planning aspects are suitable but financial is not. Sustainability of WASH interventions results is based on involving partners in the process, throughout the project cycle. EUD tried on different occasions to have an exit strategy for each sector but feedback from the government was that refugee projects should be kept as such. The government holds a clear stance that refugees are and will be responsibility of the international community, especially the refugee camps. They also disagree with initiatives that additionally stress WASH institutions' capacity (by new O&M cost etc.). The new approach - combining both national and refugee needs would allow for more natural development process and sustainable end results. The facilities would complement and improve the existing system, would increase their capacity.

The Team Europe initiative (with member states) is focusing on certain sectors - sharing the same approach, concerns, support; tackling policy driven elements, reforms, development. Also for humanitarian support the programming starts with tackling local needs and priorities as well as refugees, factoring in the national plans for a win-win support. With regular policy dialogue this is a message shared at all levels and also synergy with different sectors is sought.

For example sludge for electricity generation or for composting doesn't make sense if used for camps only. Some of these measures show sustainability by themselves: conversion of sludge to electricity reduces the cost of wastewater treatment. When wastewater is treated it can be sold and there is a market for that.

Regarding the institutional aspect of sustainability, support starts by involving government institutions, managers of water sector in project technical/steering sector/donor committee, coordination mechanisms but also most of the projects have technical assistance component. Asset management is not widely known in the sector. TA along with hard component should ensure that the relevant departments are competent to take over, as a result of continuous multi-year work.

Donors would like to see guarantees of sustainability of big investments (whether by loans or grants) e.g. a new WWTP should be operated properly, there should be money for maintenance, spare parts etc. Regarding loans, their extra burden of paying interest is reduced when combined with EU grants. The MoWI is preparing the relevant plans e.g. financial sustainability road map — minimising the costs

and increasing the revenues. Donors are in favour of tariff reform. Another way is to reduce non-revenue water etc.

Developing and implementing an exit strategy is not easy — it's critical to WAJ/water utilities in terms of operation and maintenance. The minister asked to increase the operation period for contractors/operators to 10 years (currently 2 years is usual = DNP) before fully handing it over to WAJ. Lesson learned: O&M should be taken more seriously. The customer relationships, commercial aspect of utility companies can be improved to increase awareness on networks.

Exit strategy for the camps is at concept note stage: UNICEF prepared a concept note and shared with the government who are hesitant to take responsibility. There is a question of taking over of the donor pooled fund but the government are not ready for that. The proposal was to link the government (WASH institutions) with the main donors so that they can take over WASH operations in the camps, with TA provided, as necessary. The government in a way relies on UNICEF to deal with that. There is a need for a holistic exit strategy, not only for WASH sector (livelihoods, cash for work etc) - UN exist strategy. UNICEF exit has to be in line with UNHCR's, they discuss on technical section level (WASH).

### **EU added value and visibility**

#### ***EQ16. What EU added value is resulting from the EUTF-funded WASH programmes projects?***

The majority of EUTF WASH interventions are providing a combination of new and rehabilitated infrastructure, and value adding to the existence of national WASH systems/programmes and/or facilities. For example, in the case of T04.27, an intervention that is expanding and improving the networks in Greater Irbid and Ramtha as well as capacity strengthening the Yarmouk Water Company, reports (in the DoA) "the additionality of the EU contribution is to maintain an acceptable level of water services to the local communities, who are hosting a large number of Syrian refugees". In contrast the intervention T04.208, also providing new and improved services, is doing so in refugee camps which are reported as relying entirely on international support. Yet another case exists with the intervention T04.92 where, "if the MADAD grant co-financing were to be replaced by an increased loan amount, the required tariff increases would be well beyond the affordability limits for both the lowest decile and average income families" and no other affordable external financing package is available to finance the project" (DoA).

The stakeholders clearly identify value added of EUTF as improving life and wellbeing — there are good tangible measures, improvements in line with EU standards, best practices are introduced. For example in environment, there is technology transfer with treatment plants, using treated water, renewable energy. Since EU projects are being implemented for a decade, also local capacities /performance (e.g. contractors) are improved. Similarly, the international best practice in procurement rules are adopted through the projects.

EU funds enable overall good improvements in the WASH sector. The capacity of WASH institutions will be increased to higher standards. Jordan now collects some revenues from services based on EU funded WASH infrastructure (e.g. upgraded networks). Collection rate is 60-70%.

#### ***EQ17. Did the portfolio of EUTF funded WASH programmes contribute to the EU policy dialogue for reforms with national governments?***

Little evidence has been identified across the majority of the EUTF WASH portfolio in terms of contributing to the EU policy dialogue for reforms with national governments. The two nuggets of information that do exist (T04.208 AD March 2021; T04.092) are theoretical and don't clarify actual implementation.

As noted in EQ15 sustainability measures include policy dialogue and alignment with national plans. The approach of combining both national and refugee needs, e.g. adding facilities that complement and improve the existing system get good response from WASH institutions. Moving to development approach i.e. resilience perspective is now the modus operandi in Jordan. However, this shift to large infrastructure activities should not leave out the vulnerable. General improvement of WASH services should be inclusive.

Regarding policy in the camps we can note the strategy for COVID-19 WASH response, and involvement of key stakeholders in discussion to work out a sustainable solution e.g. for sludge management in T04.208 [T04.229] GIZ. In the camps, a humanitarian approach prevails but there are also initiatives for resilience, e.g. benefits for the camps but also for surrounding communities (SWM, sludge management, using grey water). A specific example of this would be the consensus building process as an advocacy tool alongside preparation of pre-feasibility studies looking at different options in terms of what makes sense to implement in Zaatari. The government will support the implementation in Zaatari albeit debating ownership and discussions about operation maintenance, environmental and social impact. In addition to regular basic humanitarian assistance there should be more replicating and upscaling of pilots proven feasible.

***EQ18. To what extent are the communication and visibility actions providing added value in terms of contributing to mainstreaming the WASH programmes/projects' desired effects?***

Each EUTF WASH intervention has documented a communication and visibility plan as part of their programming documentation. In addition to the examples within the final report of intervention T04.34 and progress report of T04.92, the extent of actual implementation was checked in the verification phase.

EUD considers that communication and visibility can be improved as currently they see very little added value of partners' activity in this area. Delegation agreements include a visibility clause, and the implementing partners are obliged and do comply with it, however usually to the minimum. EUD managers consider that they can be assertive with the partners to engage in visibility.

There are some good models for visibility work, e.g. with EBRD there is a preparatory setup for any event. Nevertheless, feedback from the EUD strongly suggests there is a need for much stronger collaboration between it and the implementing partners (e.g. UN agencies) on visibility. Without this, the opportunities for positive messages related to EU are likely to be missed, and the overall impact of work is thus reduced. A positive example will be in Irbid - there will be ground-breaking ceremony when the contracts will be signed, with high level presence (EU Ambassador).

Typically the implementing partner's name is associated with a project, but the fact that funds come from the EU usually goes unnoticed. It is important that a delegated partner spells out properly that funds come from the EU on all promo material. If it is co-financed, the logos of financing parties should appropriately illustrate the partnership relation.

In T04.92 EBRD Visibility activities will be implemented once the construction is implemented. Currently there are many challenges and delays, which is not a suitable context to mention donors - yet. The communication and visibility plan is prepared to serve two main purposes: i) to make the general public in Jordan and in the region aware of the EU's, EBRD's and other donors' support to the Action; and ii) to demonstrate how the partnership between the EU and the EBRD helps improve people's lives and the environment through better municipal services.

In T04.208 [T04.229] GIZ SWM component for the camps promo video is available. EU logo is visible on back of project vests, and video finishes with EU financing statement/logo. The available C&V plan is in line with the visibility requirements of EUTF/EU and of BMZ. Visibility material clearly shows the funds origin.

## Gender and special needs

### ***EQ19. To what extent have gender issues been taken into consideration in design and implementation?***

Gender challenges and gender mainstreaming is occasionally referred to in programme documentation (T04.27; T04.40; T04.172 and T04.208) however, not specifically related to WASH and also limited in content. Where appropriate and feasible the majority (exception: T04.40 despite the references to gender-based violence and gender equity) of interventions have the potential to report disaggregated data (as per logframes).

Where data is disaggregated and results are evident, there has been some progress achieved toward reaching gender specific results.

WASH services are planned so to be widely available to both male and female beneficiaries. EU projects by design consider cross cutting issues, including gender, special needs, and environment so EUTF WASH projects were done by this usual standard. In reporting, wherever relevant, data must be disaggregated. In WASH activities data for training are disaggregated by gender, while for household connections vulnerability i.e. criteria regarding gender and special needs are used so data should reflect it. The implementing partners' reports should provide data for m/f but also for special needs/ disabled beneficiaries, even if the delegation agreement does not require that specifically. In cash for work women should be encouraged to apply. For improving networks data would not be disaggregated – potential users will be noted as per latest census.

WAJ developed their policy for gender e.g. minimum quota in decision making positions; in operation teams; recently announced the so-called “female plumbers” project (government funds). 30-40% of decision layer in MoWI are female. They consider that community starts to understand gender, it is a gradual process.

In T04.27 (AFD) component 3, which was completed, had a special focus on the most vulnerable households and public buildings. The economic vulnerability of households, especially regarding their capacity to cover basic needs (WASH, but also food, health, education, etc.) was considered.

In T04.34 ACTED data disaggregated by gender and age. Reference made to vulnerability assessment framework; also to disaggregated data for persons with special needs. The project promoted gender equality through the WASH Committees, diffusion of key WASH messages in schools, Female Plumber Clubs.

T04.172 UNICEF is using the vulnerability matrix developed jointly with UNHCR — vulnerability in terms of WASH: disability, health issues, quota related to the size of family, details and WASH specific. Provided specific WASH services to disabled. However, these are not reported by the QINS; disabled fall under vulnerable category and are not specifically reported on. UNICEF consider that if EU is interested in such data – it should be clearly required from the implementing partners.

T04.92 EBRD There are no QINS, no disaggregated data. The project will not target specifically - without vulnerable/ disabled/ gender criteria. For household connections the information that is available in WAJ / YWC would be relied on. Training data will be disaggregated. There is a drive to understand the roles that women would be interested to undertake (regarding job creation under consultancy contract). Training is not tailored for men/women but EBRD expect the cultural norms to influence.

### ***EQ20. To what extent have accessibility and inclusiveness of persons with disabilities (Syrian refugees, IDPs and host community members) been taken into consideration in design and implementation?***

The term disability only features in one intervention (T04.172) in the context of “ramps for water and wastewater networks, tap-stands and ramps”. The term does not however feature in any of the intervention documentation in terms of reporting results and disaggregated data. However, there are a few references to the phrase ‘persons with special needs’ (T04.34 and T04.208) and even more

references to vulnerable persons, which if related to the VAF (UNHCR) which relates to vulnerability in refugee camps, by definition includes persons with disabilities (T04.34; T04.172).

That said, only one intervention (T04.34) provides any disaggregated data for persons with special needs. See also EQ19.

This is a significant oversight and major weakness in the design of all of the on-going interventions whether relating to any of the WASH indicators from water and sanitation access, through to people being trained in the WASH sector.

***EQ21. Which specific outcomes regarding gender and special needs can be identified from the EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects?***

As reported under EQ19 and EQ20 the limited extent to which gender and inclusivity of persons with disabilities is considered at output level is endemic up the chain to outcome level.

There is an outcome assessment report for T04.27 (AFD) component 3, in which data is disaggregated by gender and age.

For completed T04.34 ACTED final report states some gender related concerns at household level: "...challenges during the Female Plumber Clubs activity, due to the sensitivity of the local cultural context with respect to women's access to livelihood opportunities outside the household... gender-related challenges under this activity: 1) two drop-outs due to pregnancy 2) opposition from certain beneficiaries' household members to their participation in the training. "

Another completed intervention is T04.172 UNICEF, who provide specific WASH services to disabled but related data was not required by the EU and not included in QINs.

**Lessons learned/Recommendations**

*"What lessons can be learned / good practice can be identified from the implementation of EUTF-funded WASH programmes / projects?"*

With most interventions still at early implementation stage or ongoing, there is a limit on what country-portfolio lessons can be learned across the intervention cycle of 'cradle to grave'. However some general observations to date include:

- Design of actions may benefit from more time on planning and coordination to make expectations clearer. This would also include a complete stakeholder analysis and landscape map of on-going and planned interventions from other donors and national government.
- Sustainability assessments to be considered as part of programming. The capacity for operation and maintenance is critical to WAI/water utilities. MoWI recently requested that the contractors/operators responsibility for O&M be extended substantially before fully handing it over to WAI.
- Gender mainstreaming more consistently and explicitly included in programming and re-programming in on-going interventions.
- Vulnerability related to disability / people with special needs to be more consistently and explicitly included in programming and re-programming in on-going interventions.
- EUTF WASH sector portfolio wide and cross sector learning more systematically included during programming and design as well as during implementation, especially considering the cross-cutting nature of WASH (Education, Health, Livelihoods, etc.).
- Work with institutional capacity limitations – by understanding it and by timely and continuously supporting it.

- When working on macro level investments still consider the conditionality at micro/community level to the intended outcome achievement. For example willingness of people to connect was taken for granted (while planning) and there were difficulties with household connections later. Willingness and capabilities of the beneficiaries for receiving the services could have been done along with vulnerability assessment. The customer relations/ commercial aspect of utility companies should be improved to increase awareness on networks - related support could cushion the increased workload, e.g. regarding the house connections.
- When working with financing institutions EUD learned that it needs to be more involved (even with delegated management) so that issues are timely detected and corrective measures applied. IFI's annual reporting is not a sufficient basis for monitoring.
- As there are frequent changes in top management of WASH institutions the negotiations efforts on future projects get duplicated – however, facilitating meetings to make sure everyone is on the same page is crucial, especially for introducing new concepts, replicating/upscaling pilots.
- For the camps, the UN agencies have their responsibilities as long as there are refugees in the country - they will stay in the camps but the intention is to maximise the use of finance to increase effectiveness and sustainability. Multi-year modality of funds would enable better efficiency and planning. The services must be provided in the camps, but the ways of delivering them could in part shift from purely humanitarian to development mode.
- Reducing cost of WASH in the camps could come from more effective/sustainable solutions (instead of e.g. increased trucking) as demonstrated by pilots for sludge management or for use of grey water. Also instead of drilling additional boreholes, improvements of the existing ones could cover the water gap. In other words, some technical solutions could reduce the cost while keeping or even increasing the level of services in the camps.
- EU visibility could be improved by establishing a stronger and more structured engagement between the EUD and implementing partners on visibility – to use the opportunities for positive messages related to the EU. The implementing partners should be encouraged to do more than merely minimum compliance with the visibility clause, in which the EU goes unnoticed while the implementing partner is visible on the ground.
- Finally, resilience approach suits both EU and Jordan WASH plans. Emergency response is not required anymore. The intention of the government is to develop a concept and share it with donors, i.e. EU would have to fit into that concept.

## 7.3 Lebanon Country Portfolio Report

### Relevance

#### *Headlines*

- The portfolio relevance has been mixed with water infrastructure improvements (pillar 1 –named stabilisation) maintained and reducing non-revenue water (pillar 2) losing traction. Recently commenced interventions are being adapted to respond to the deepening crisis.
- National stakeholders (recently WEs more so than MoEW) have been engaged in the programming of interventions alongside other factors such as IP criteria, budget fit.
- Provision of operation and maintenance (O&M) support to the four WEs is relevant for the crisis but short term.
- Focus on increasing WE capacity, stability and resilience to be improved.
- Areas with Syrian refugees are included but not clearly measurable.

#### ***EQ1. Is programming of WASH programmes/projects strategically aligned with the EUTF's underlying funding principles and approaches?***

The interventions are designed in line with EUTF's objectives, and coherent with the EUTF Results Framework.

*The EUTFs strategic objective to “provide a coherent and reinforced aid response to the Syrian crisis on a regional scale, responding primarily in the first instance to the needs of refugees from Syria in neighbouring countries, as well as of the communities hosting the refugees and their administrations, in particular as regards resilience and early recovery” has remained unchanged since the establishment of the fund. There is no specific reference to WASH in either the EUTF Strategic Orientation document or the Operational Criteria for Concept Notes and Action Documents, however, water and wastewater management services are referenced in the Constitutive Agreements (2014 onwards).*

***EUTF principles/objectives*** are clearly outlined in the documentation of all interventions. Interventions address WASH needs and reduce social tensions between host and Syrian populations in regions where there has been poor WASH infrastructure, and high influx of Syrian refugees.

***Reference to EUTF Results Framework*** (EUTF-RF) Indicators (Logframe) are made in programme documents and interventions align with EUTF-RF. For most interventions the indicators of the logframe correspond, and at least one of the EUTF indicators is adapted. Access and improved water and sanitation (EUTF 24, 26, 27) are major components of 8 out of the 10 interventions. Hygiene promotion (EUTF 25) is not an element in all interventions. Number of people trained in the WASH Sector (EUTF 28) is a major component of most interventions.

- There are six EUTF interventions that are interlinked on supporting the four Water Establishments in Lebanon (WEs) with water infrastructure projects and WE capacity strengthening, including Non-Revenue Water reduction, customer service, culture change (T04.20; T04.90; T04.98; T04.100, T04.34 and T04.272). These interventions have relevance to EUTF and indicators, although the hygiene awareness component is not as pronounced.
- Three multi-country interventions (T04.40, T04.132, T04.136) have a more limited WASH component compared to Lebanon (one-country) interventions.

In some interventions the Results statements match: *‘Syrian and host communities have better health through improved access to health (and water) services, strengthened local capacities (in health and WASH) and infrastructure (also in both sectors)’. The Indicators 24 to 26 under Improved WASH*

infrastructure are applicable, and also refer to the respective SDG indicator 6: Clean water and sanitation and specifically SDG 6.1.1 Proportion of population using safely managed drinking water services.

**EQ2. How has the WASH portfolio developed since the beginning of the EUTF with regard to relevance, targeting and responsiveness?**

The portfolio relevance has been mixed with water infrastructure improvements (pillar 1 –named stabilisation) maintained and reducing non-revenue water (pillar 2) losing traction. Recently commenced interventions (2021) are being adapted to respond to the deepening crisis. Programmes for areas with Syrian refugees are included but not clearly measurable.

National stakeholders (recently WEs more so than MoEW) have been engaged in the programming of interventions. Programming was reactive to needs and specific project support requests outlined by Water Establishments and MoEW, which was primarily selected in accordance to Implementing Partners budget. In later stage of EUTF WASH portfolio, project selection was carried out more in cooperation with government counterparts and also included selection criteria such as population numbers benefitting from projects.

Interventions are planned in consultation with the government and align with the LCRP, National Water Sector Strategy and 3RP. However, an EU WASH strategy for Lebanon is not available, and lessons learned are not explicitly noted in programme documents.

As regards targeting and relevance, the assumption made for the WASH portfolio in Lebanon was that supporting the country's WASH infrastructure would indirectly favour the Syrian refugees where some 80% live in urban areas. In practice, this hypothesis has excluded Syrian refugees and vulnerable host population that cannot reach public services. Thus, the objective to primarily respond to needs of Syrian refugees is not effectively targeted through this WASH portfolio.

Interventions respond to **WASH sector strategy** including: 'The human, financial and technical resources of the Water Establishments (WEs) should be strengthened'. Programme Documents state that WASH portfolio also builds on ongoing programmes in the Sector supporting Syrian refugees by focusing on areas with high number of Syrians and vulnerable Lebanese. Priority locations are set in coordination with WEs and MoEW. ***In practice areas with high numbers of Syrian refugees were not always reached and were not clearly verified.*** This was certainly the case with the earlier funded EUTF programmes where projects were selected by government counterparts. However, later programmes included selection criteria but areas with high numbers of Syrians were not necessarily reached.

**Coordination of EUTF funded programmes:** Programme documentation note challenges/lessons learned from previous interventions and those from the Water Sector, and water authorities. In particular, the shortcoming and challenges of the Lebanese Water and Sanitation Sector are being targeted in the programmes. However, what is ***lacking is the strategy and coherence of EUTF interventions, and programming in accordance with the actual lessons learned.***

**EUTF portfolio objectives** were to support access to water services as a priority through strengthened local capacities and improved infrastructures. Six EUTF interventions aimed to contribute to the cost-recovery of the WEs. EUTF funding was awarded in three subsequent 'rounds' or generations to pre-selected and invited implementing partners (2017, 2018, 2021).

**Donor coordination:** Programme Documentation of EUTF interventions noted lessons from a Programme funded by USAID 'Lebanon Water and Wastewater Sector Support (LWWSS)' to improve revenue generating capabilities of the WEs/ Water authorities. Through this programme, existing GIS

and water quality programmes currently being piloted in the Qoubayat sub office (NLWE) will be expanded to other NLWE sub offices. In addition, experience from past interventions such as Volumetric Water Tariff and water meters by GiZ is incorporated. Interventions are also complementary to previous EU and other donor projects such as the Lebanon Water Project (LWP) funded by USAID, and Water Quality Monitoring in the Bekaa Valley funded by Swiss Cooperation.

EU in cooperation with AFD is carrying out a 5 years Technical Assistance Programme for WASH national counterparts, which is not funded by EUTF. EUTF programme documentation make no direct reference to this. The Emergency O&M support to the four WEs is carried out by EUTF intervention T04.90 by UNICEF, which is also co-funded by KfW.

***The financial crisis and Covid-19 reversed and challenged the ambition of the interventions to increase cost recovery, and severely impacted the financial viability of the WEs.*** Although fee collection and number of water subscribers had increased since 2017, during covid-19 the revenue collection of WEs dramatically decreased due to lockdowns, covid-19 imposed restrictions, and the socio-economic crisis. Subscribers had more distrust in the government and also not financial means to pay (*current level of collected revenues is at national level around 20% against 50% before the crisis due to the currency devaluation*). Also, contractors on maintenance and operation contracts were no longer willing to operate due to the currency devaluation.

***EUTF Emergency funding for O&M of water provision during Covid-19/Beirut Blast/Financial crisis:*** Water is vital for hygiene purposes during the Covid-19 pandemic. EUTF provided the funds for the four WEs to continue to operate and to carry out repairs to allow for continuity of water services (repairs for pumping and pumping and chlorination systems).

An EUTF intervention (T04.90, UNICEF) was extended at the end of 2020 to provide ***operational and maintenance costs***, including repair kits and parts, to maintain service for the four WEs, and including BMLWE (previously not covered) during the financial crisis. In addition, in June 2021 another programme was being prepared (follow up of T04.90, UNICEF) named '***Top Up for Beirut Blast/Covid-19/Financial Crisis***' for continuing support of the country's four WEs by providing critical equipment for maintenance and operation as these have been greatly affected by the crisis and have suffered a reduced revenue. In particular during Covid-19 pandemic it is vital that water service provision continues as greater quantities of water are required for hygiene purposes.

In addition, the 'Top Up' (additional funding UNICEF) was for the ***Beirut Blast*** of 4 August 2021 to support Beirut and Mount Lebanon Water Establishment (BMLWE) in rehabilitation of infrastructure and technical assistance and support to Operation for the area affected (interventions identified in 3RF). This new EUTF intervention is anticipated to be agreed between EUTF and UNICEF by December 2021.

***The Lebanon Reform, Recovery & Reconstruction Framework (3RF)***, by Worldbank, UN, and EU was established after Beirut Blast of 4 August 2020, and was published in *November 2020 (see Box 8)*. It is a recovery and reconstruction framework focusing on a period of 18 months that will bridge the immediate humanitarian response and the medium-term recovery and reconstruction efforts to put Lebanon on a path of sustainable development. EU stated that following EUTF interventions were to be based on 3RF, which has a WASH component for rehabilitation of water and sanitation infrastructure and crisis response.

**EUTF WASH Programmes 2021-**

**2024:** Planned project for water and wastewater infrastructure in Aarsal is currently being reviewed considering low forecast for revenue to pay for O&M. Decisions on changing the scope of this intervention were ongoing and could not be verified during this evaluation.

The planned scope of the new intervention T04.2o6 was to 'Improve the living conditions of host communities and Syrian refugees in Aarsal, Ras Baalbeck and Fekha-Jdeydeh (Bekaa)'. In Aarsal a WWTP (for 65,000 PE) will be constructed and both a water and sanitation network.

In Aarsal in particular the

number refugees was double that of the host population at the start of the influx (currently, 52,400 displaced but about 100,000 a few years ago). Aarsal had also been on the front line of numerous battles between the Lebanese armed forces and armed terrorist militias from Syria between 2014 and 2017. There is contamination of water resources due to the absence of wastewater collection and treatment systems, leading also to tensions between local communities of Aarsal and the downstream villages, as well as shortage of network water.

The Municipal Empowerment and Resilience Project (MERP, T04.132, period 2019-2021) noted that relevance to the emergent needs of subnational governments, vulnerable refugees and host populations is still high. However, recent country developments have created a more challenging context for the implementation of the developmental aspects of the project. Policy advocacy and system reforms are challenging under a caretaker government, economic development and job creation are very challenging under the current economic recession, and the financial crisis will increase any investment risks.

**Power crisis: Electricity cuts affect water provision operation of WWTPs.** The EU and other donors have greatly invested in infrastructure, including boreholes (wells), pumping stations, and wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs), and sewage networks), which all require electricity to operate. Some systems are connected to power plants by 'service lines' similar to hospitals and get priority.

EUTF Water projects include connections to the *electrical national grid required for water pumping from wells and pumping stations*. This has its weaknesses with unreliable continuous supply of electricity from the grid, which has even worsened during the current crisis. In addition, programmes have been delayed due to electrical grid connections not being established as approvals were not granted by Electricité du Liban (EDL). **Solar Water pumping** is limited in the WASH EUTF portfolio (T04.34 and T04.98). Programmes were installing solar water pumping infrastructure in Bekaa, and Solar water pumping training for MoEW, WE's, and humanitarian organisations. Also, promoting the use of solar and renewable energy in Lebanon. To date only two solar water pumping schemes were introduced by EUTF (T04.34 and T04.98). However, **follow-up and bringing EUTF learning of Solar Water Pumping into practice is not evident**.

*Box 8: Summary of 3RF Reforms and Policy Actions (Dec 2020)*

- **Institutional Strengthening:** Ratify the updated National Water Sector Strategy. Ratify the revised Water Code, which was approved in 2018, and its related decrees; restructure the water tariff.
- Provide technical assistance to the water utility most impacted by the blast, the Beirut Mount Lebanon Water Establishment (BMLWE), especially on operations and maintenance costs of the main infrastructure.
- Establish the Water Executive Committee to pilot transparent implementation of the updated water sector strategy and strengthen the role of municipalities within its framework.
- Upgrade the customer database at BMLWE and incentivise households to register their connections officially.
- Rebuild customer-centric communication and dialogue between the BMLWE and civil society organisations.
- **Investments/Programmes:** Undertake in-depth damage assessments of water and wastewater assets; rehabilitate and strengthen damaged facilities, applying modern standards for operation and climate proofing considerations.

**Current electricity crisis** with grid power on most day days only for 1 to 2 hours (2021). The financial crisis has crippled Lebanon's government that does not have reserves to purchase fuel to power the electricity plants. The power stations are not running on a schedule, have reduced operation hours, and even have shut down for days due to lack of fuel. In October 2021, a quarter of the country's power production capacity was halted as two power barges stopped delivering grid power and departed. The two floating power stations from Turkish company Karpower/Karadenis were stationed near Beirut and provided 370 MW over the last 10 years. Since then, *MoEW (2021) announced a three-pillar electricity recovery plan, which has uncertainties* as it's based on gas/fuel swap deals with surrounding countries. 1. Iraq fuel deal (swap); 2. gas swap deal with a multi-country approach (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon). gas delivery through a pipeline to Deir Al Mar power station (near Tripoli), which requires the pipeline to be rehabilitated (10-years not in use); 3. Excess electricity directly provided from Jordan. This recovery plan to get power back to pre-crisis level by early 2022 is labelled as volatile by media and experts.

The renewable energy projects in Lebanon from the last 3 years are on hold, which had included of wind energy farms in Akkar, and solar energy parks (<https://lcec.org.lb/our-work/MEW>). Wind farm round 1 of 226 MW agreed in 2018 with three companies, and MoEW in 2020 requested bids for Wind farm round 2 of 400 MW. Also, 12 solar PV farms with combined 180 MW went out for bid in the private sector in 2017. Land expropriation and/or the financial crisis are likely stagnating the projects.

*The Energy crisis is directly impacting water provision and cannot be separated by EU and multi-donor strategy.* Adaptation to strongly reduce dependence on grid electricity supply and generators (fuel dependence) is currently not being considered by EUTF and other donors. Introduction of Solar Water Pumping to replace or as hybrid option with generators was limited. There is also unfamiliarity by some WEs to adapt new technology whereas other WEs are making contingency plans.

Electricity generation has always been poor in Lebanon, and pre-crisis most systems were operating on a combination of grid power and generators owned by the WEs. Donors also invest in generators as this is part of the complete package. In the current crisis, the power generation is even more unreliable and greatly affected the water provision as grid power is rarely available. WEs and municipalities are still spending their scarce funds (or greater debt) on fuel to power the generators. WWTPs are no longer operating as electricity is not available and untreated sewage passes through. Water provision from networks has drastically dropped but data is not provided to quantify this decline.

Feedback from discussions with beneficiaries revealed the following insights:

- *SLWE states crisis adaptation by transformation: (1) reduce electricity consumption by use of more surface water, and (2) automatization, and (3) invest in renewable energy focusing on solar. Staff and knowledge losses to be made up by digitalisation and systematic approach (DG of SLWE).*
- *BWE note priorities of (1) maintain service level, (2) maintain staff, and (3) protect assets. Theft of assets and fuel is occurring, which cannot be stored safely (municipalities are now administering fuel).*

### **EUTF interventions response to the challenges posed by COVID-19 pandemic.**

EUTF WASH interventions did not carry out a combined approach for COVID-19 prevention and awareness, and large-scale programmes or campaigns were not carried out. Strategy for coordination between EUTF WASH interventions was not made as it was agreed that the Health portfolio will have addressed this aspect. However, a number of interventions were updated to include some Covid-19 specific activities.

- The programmes concern water, and this is in itself a vital factor for combating Covid-19 by increasing hygiene level.

- Water conservation awareness sessions were held online as schools were operating with remote teaching. Some interventions were completed before Covid-19 pandemic. Follow up activities were affected such as hygiene messages in prisons were stopped.
- PPE for WEs was purchased and campaigns and messaging were supported.
- Interventions did adapt to Covid-19 for implementing activities. Measures were made for Covid-19 by using and promoting PPE, social distancing and remote working.
- The organisation (AICA) distributed 50,000 masks in the community of Jabal Mohsen (Tripoli, Lebanon) and provided COVID-19 prevention and awareness sessions including for refugee camps in and around Tripoli and Zgharta.
- Mental health (PSS outreach) activities were provided online and through social media channels, and WhatsApp for prevention against COVID-19 but also awareness about the impact of Covid-19 on mental health.
- A new EUTF intervention by UNICEF (anticipated to be approved by Dec 2021): COVID-19 component) - supports the continuity of water services in for the four WEs by providing critical equipment for maintenance and operation.

***EQ3. How effectively have specific country needs, contexts and barriers to WASH services been taken into account into the programming of country-based EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects?***

***Alignment with national WASH priorities***

- EUTF objectives are in line with the Lebanese WASH Sector objectives and focus on improving water governance, and improved infrastructure. EUTF Interventions note in programme documents the aim to address the needs of refugees and host communities to access a consistent supply of clean water, while also meeting the WEs needs to improve their payment collection systems.
- EUTF interventions are in line with the LCRP and 3RP's focus on increasing access to clean, safe drinking water, and also respond to mitigation interventions outlined in the National Water Sector Strategy (MoEW, March 2012).
- EUTF WASH interventions are in line with the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP 2017-2020), and National Water Sector Strategy (NWSS 2000), contributing to the water sector reforms to allow WEs to perform mandated roles and realise sustainable solution for water and sanitation.
- The consortia worked directly with WEs. Until date investment planning, capital spending and service provision responsibilities are scattered among various government authorities: MoEW, WEs, and unions of municipalities and municipalities. Interventions aimed assist WEs to become autonomous.

***EUTF-funded interventions take account of WASH barriers in their designs.***

Barriers were considered in the design. However, circumstances dramatically changed over the last two years with worsening political and socio-economic crisis, protests (from Oct 2019), Beirut Port blast (4 Aug 2020), and Covid-19 (2020/2021) with inflation and import challenges.

The worsened socio-economic crisis has increased the unwillingness and/or inability of water subscribers to pay fees to WEs. WEs' financially already weak are now to all intents and purposes bankrupt. Even with revenue in Lebanese currency the WEs have no purchasing power due the currency devaluation (more than 90% by mid-2021) versus the costs in foreign currency for spare parts for O&M and other investments.

Promotion of Solar Water Pumping, and Lebanon Water Forum (T04.98) are activities aimed at connecting and engaging water governance at multi-level and were to remove barriers. However, due to context change the momentum of these activities and relevance decreased.

Relevance of WASH Sector (NWSS, LCRP) for WEs to increase its income from water subscribers, reduce non-revenue water, capacity building and social communication has changed with the current crisis and low achievements of previous EUTF interventions. For instance, during Covid-19 Implementing partners were challenged with activities for objective of increasing trust between citizens and water authorities, and to promote subscription with the WE (2020). These outreach activities were cancelled. Reports noted risk mitigation to a perceived barrier, which was community acceptance during to social outreach activities. WEs also faced mistrust by the population in the government, and this resentment was observed in project areas in South Lebanon.

***Relevant National/Regional/Local Stakeholders have been actively involved in the programming of EUTF WASH interventions.***

EUTF WASH interventions are coordinated in accordance with NWSS, LCRP, WASH Sector and other humanitarian agencies and funding programmes. coordinated with non-EU donors, and EUTF action, and at national level with MoEW, and regional level with WEs to maximise inputs.

Coordination with WASH Sector, and dialogue with MoEW, and directly with others INGOS and NGOs has ensured the impact of the interventions supporting the WEs. For WASH the lead ministry is MoEW and coordinating agency is UNICEF.

The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR): is in charge of planning and executing donor funded water and wastewater infrastructures on behalf of the concerned ministries, and often overlap with other government authorities.

Interventions involving water and sanitation infrastructure and Water Tariff implementation/Revenue were coordinated and setup with the WEs that are beneficiaries of the programmes, and The MoEW.

Project of assessing the institutional capacity of government partners were coordinated with the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) and the Directorate General of Local Administration and Councils (DGLAC). Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA).

One EUTF intervention (T04.34) covered WASH programmes in Schools, PHC, and detention centres. The relevant ministries were engaged: Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, and Internal Security Forces (ISF) using its prioritisation lists.

***Challenges***

Motivation and ability of WE staff to actively participate and support the new activities is fragile. WE Staff were on short term contracts and salaries decreased. However, in 2021, the WEs were facing staff resignation and staff not coming to work due to the financial crisis. Salaries of WE staff often do not even cover the transportation cost in particular with high fuel prices, inflation. Salaries of public workers are below EUR 200 per month (mid-2021), which is the highest salary scale (excluding the general director). Capacity building for WEs, the objective of EUTF interventions at the start of the fund, lost impact due to staff departing and WE operating in crisis mode.

All EUTF Interventions were challenged at design phase with delays in obtaining approvals and overlapping mandates of authorities. The appointment of new directors at WEs in 2018 caused changes

in strategies and priorities, such as for SLWE with an update Water Master Plan. Measures were taken such as engaging the Minister (MoEW) to support when activities were not running smoothly.

MoEW has reservations over international NGOs implementing water infrastructure but is aware of the project plans and would like to be informed of the works progress. The Minister is explicit about four ways in which donors can in future engage with WASH infrastructure: bi-laterally (which can be to WEs), through CDR, through UNDP in irrigation and through UNICEF in water projects. Current, Technical Assistance Programme for Reform by EU/AFD is continuing the dialogue with MoEW.

Regarding NRW reduction, the Ministry is generally aware that it is in line with the water strategy and has no objections of NGO involvement in this. It approved semi-volumetric tariffing in some pilot areas. Although the Ministry is de-facto only an “observer” in the project, its decisions can be very important for project effectiveness and WE’s sustainability.

In practice, the coordination between the central level (MoEW) and the regional level (WEs) and the community (municipal/union of municipalities) is deficient. The communication is mostly one-way: from central to local level, without regular updates or a feedback mechanism. A project experienced potential duplication with an infrastructure sub-project, for which clashing approvals came from central and regional level.

## **Effectiveness and Impact**

***EQ4. To what extent have EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects been effective in achieving their planned outcomes? What are the actually achieved outcomes in terms of what has changed, who has changed, when and how?***

EUTF interventions’ planned outputs continue to be delivered with outcomes less clear and at risk with the deepening crisis in Lebanon. At the start of the EUTF fund the scope of work was relevant conform Water and Wastewater Strategy of Lebanon (also LCRP). The combined approach was through Infrastructure improvement, Capacity Building, and Community Engagement, to restore user-utility mutual accountability by strengthening infrastructural and managerial capacities of local WEs.

Effectively, the EUTF WASH portfolio had two pillars: 1. water infrastructure improvements (named ‘Stabilisation’). 2. Reduce Non-Revenue Water to increase financial viability of WEs and improve service provider-customer relation.

***For pillar 1***, planned infrastructure outputs are progressing. However due to delays, the conversion from outputs to outcomes is less clear.

Examples of a large-scale water scheme that is being completed by combined effort of a number of EUTF WASH interventions for SLWE is the Ouadi Jilo pumping station no.2 was connected to the newly constructed Maroub reservoir.

There are also numerous stand-alone components of wash infrastructure projects that EUTF interventions contributed to.

For BWE, projects were also selected to contribute to the completion of a full systems, which was successful with the exception of 3 projects. Three medium sized water projects, in Dakwe (70m water transmission line), Kfardenis (Reservoir not connected to Ain al Zirke system), Niha (reservoir), were not completed as BWE was financially not able to complete an agreed portion of the works (intervention T04.34 ended Jan 2020).

Needs exceed the available resources but with careful planning and good collaboration with WEs the EUTF makes useful contributions. Community infrastructure is operational, and beneficiaries are benefitting from this, including increased water delivery, cost reduction, and improved sanitation. In addition, a number of WASH services in public institutions were improved (T04.34) although at a small scale.

**For the second pillar**, although relevant at the start of EUTF, the impact is limited and has now lost momentum, and is at risk of losing gained efforts. This was due to lack of coherence of EUTF interventions and complementarity of outputs. Finally, outputs have also been affected by the current crisis and changes in the country.

The objective of EUTF of contributing to building financial viability and independence of WEs and its capacity to sustainably manage water service delivery cannot be achieved solely by EUTF WASH interventions. However, selected outputs were delivered, and had some positive impact although at local scale, across the Water Establishments including: Geo- referenced customer database, Call Centres with web portals and trained teams for customer service, communication department, and media and social communication campaigns to increased exposure.

EUTF interventions did not benefit from clear plan to complement each other in themes, geographic areas, and per WEs. This resulted in a 'patchwork' for activities to build capacity of WEs and community engagement, including lobbying and influencing the culture changes for reducing NRW, and public engagement.

Campaigns to increase the number of water subscribers were successful when these were combined with new water infrastructure projects. This output is being achieved although at a micro-scale compared to on a larger scale, which was the objective of the EUTF WASH portfolio.

An EUTF intervention did not gain Ministerial permission to carry out a pilot for volumetric tariff adoption in Bekaa (BWE), through meters and awareness campaigns.

Finally, the higher-level results of WEs cost recovery, and knowledge sharing across WEs and national awareness was not continued.

**Ongoing EUTF interventions.** Two recently commenced (2021) EUTF interventions are being adapted to respond to the deepening crisis (T04.272, T04.206). These '3rd generation EUTF-interventions' also follow up in WSH infrastructure, but with adaptation for the 'soft component' on WE capacity building and non-revenue water.

**Current crisis in Lebanon.** The need far outweighs the available resources of the government and donors. Whilst progress of outputs is evident the financial crisis is risking the longer-term outcomes of interventions. The recent and ongoing O&M emergency support to the four Water Establishments is proving to be effective in responding to immediate needs but is a short-term cash injection only.

### **Alignment with EUTF Results Framework**

The planned outcomes match those of EUTF Results Framework and there are common indicators. However, as noted above for this EQ4, the achievement of planned outcomes varied with better results for the infrastructure component (Pillar 1), and achievements not being fulfilled for the improvement of multilevel water governance, WE capacity building and social component to reduce non-revenue water (Pillar 2).

The planned output to primarily respond to needs of Syrian refugees is not effectively met by the EUTF WASH portfolio. The WASH portfolio in Lebanon assumption was that supporting the country's WASH

infrastructure would indirectly favour the Syrian refugees. In contrast, a number of selected infrastructure projects had limited coverage for areas with Syrian refugees. Syrian refugees and vulnerable host population that cannot reach public services were not effectively targeted.

***EQ5. How well has EUTF WASH support contributed to the achievement of longer-term effects/impact? What are these actual impacts in specific terms?***

The benefits of improved water and sanitation infrastructure are getting in place due to EUTF interventions. However, a number of projects do require completion or upgrades, by EUTF or other funds. For the longer term, the infrastructure requires continued operation and maintenance, which WEs cannot provide as these have become completely dependent on outside support (See, EQ 15 on sustainability).

Achieving an improved and effective WEs that are financially viable and autonomous from MoEW is an objective that cannot be achieved by EUTF interventions alone. This is partly due to sector reforms not being enforced by the government (See, 3RP), but also mismanagement of WEs. The capacity building outputs by EUTF WASH interventions had a limited effect.

Support to WEs is being followed up through new EUTF interventions (starting mid-2021) of which one is focusing on longer term changes (T04.272) and the other on proving operational and maintenance assistance for the four WEs during the crisis.

Longer term impact was planned under an EUTF intervention to commence in 2021 for Aarsal, Bekaa (T04.206) and was promising as it aimed at sustainable water and sanitation provision and management capacity for the longer term of an area that has been deprived and challenged by conflict. However, due to the current crisis, it is currently being reviewed considering low forecast for revenue to pay for O&M. Sustainable solutions are required considering the history of Aarsal, socio-political-confessional situation in the area, and population of Syrian refugees being equal to original host population.

***Effects not fully achievable for the Water Establishment Capacity Building and cost recovery.***

Full cost-recovery of WEs within the lifetime of the programmes cannot be achieved due to the centralised nature of the budgetary allocation from the MoEW, and the proliferation of the illegal connections to the water network in the target areas. The O&M plans will require resources to ensure they are fully adopted and implemented, which in turn depends on the centrally allocated funds. These interventions were supporting the development of O&M within the resource limits of the WEs.

***COVID-19 and unplanned outcomes:*** Sustainable water provision was planned but also greatly needed in times of the Covid-19 pandemic, and recent economic crisis. Increased water provision to areas previously deprived was achieved. WASH in schools, PHC, and detention centres was also established, just as the Covid-19 pandemic started.

Interventions have used new methods for community outreach, and communication strategies through mass media, which may have a wider effect. Communication Unit and Call Centres are to provide easier access for subscribers to services and resolve water disruption concerns, and fee payment help.

***EQ6. What external factors (positive and negative) have had the greatest influence on the achievement of results/changes observed?***

Delivery of planned results was impacted by the political and socio-economic crisis (from Oct 2019), Beirut Port blast (4 Aug 2020), COVID-19 with lockdown restrictions, and the subsequent high inflation. Many interventions required non cost extensions by EUTF.

Since the end of 2020, EUTF funds have been allocated to emergency activities to support WEs, which is a crisis response. EUTF WASH interventions objective was to increase the capacity of water

establishments, but with the current crisis these are now bankrupt and can not maintain water service. EUTF T04.90 was expanded (Dec 2020 -June 2021) with funds for the four WEs to continue providing water by carrying out operation and maintenance.

A number of effects of the crisis are:

- *Fuel and electricity crisis* are directly impacting water provision. There are continuous power black outs from the national EDL grid, and the parallel electricity market of generators is impacted by the fuel scarcity. Fuel cost is continuously increasing, and in particular since the government fuel subsidies were lifted in October 2021. Lebanon power sector is failing, and government recovery plan is volatile, as it's based on gas and fuel swap deals that are uncertain.
- *Financial implications.* Contractors were not able to implement or complete the works with payment in LBP at the official exchange rate since the parallel market rate was dropping.
- *WEs are challenged to maintain their skilled staff,* due to economic crisis which is jeopardizing and impact of EUTF capacity building efforts. This uncertainty impacts the motivation and engagement of staff, and overall effectiveness of the public institution. In addition to the long recruitment process that is influenced by sectarian balance among Lebanese religious sects. Salaries have decreased based on the latest law for salary adjustment and new salary scheme in public sector.
- Hyper-inflation has decreased purchasing power by 13 x fold (October 2021 the parallel market exchange rate to the USD is LBP 20,000 versus the official rate of LBP 1500).
- *Increased public distrust* are further challenging activities to increase water subscriber subscription and payment of bills. Social outreach activities with consumers/potential water subscribers were cancelled as risk mitigation measure. WEs are reluctant to cut-off subscribers or remove illegal connections considering the socio-economic crisis.

**Beirut blast** had severe impacts on suppliers and contractors as the Beirut port became almost non-operational. Beirut blast damaged the warehouse of BMLWE, and the rebuilding of it was included in one of the interventions.

The change of WE general directors in 2018 and updated strategies were reasons for revising prepared interventions. For SLWE this also had a **positive effect** with prioritising actions and ensuring the EUTF interventions were complementary. For example, the Ouadi Jill pumping station no.2 was connected to the newly constructed Maroub reservoir.

***Causes for delays and interruptions of EUTF interventions include***

- Roadblocks during protests delayed progress on infrastructure construction projects since 2019.
- Closure of public offices during the Covid-19 lockdowns.
- Lengthy negotiation processes with WEs and MoEW to get official approval for interventions. Also, MoEW redefinition of the list of the 251 most vulnerable municipalities.
- Delays in launching activities in some schools and health centres in order to wait for an approval from the ISF as well as approval from landlords of the lands surrounding the school (T04.34). The unexpected request of the Internal Security Force of Lebanon (ISF) for an additional approval from the Governor halted works (Ali Al Nahri, delay of 53 days).
- Establishing connections to the national electric grid of EDL were delayed for pumping stations in North Lebanon and Akkar (Majdlaya, Bsatine and Qatlabeh).

**EQ7. Is the level of partnership with the national/country-specific governmental partners appropriate to support the effective achievement of the EUTF WASH objectives?**

Working directly with the four Water Establishments (WEs) is the correct modality as these are the institutions that are to manage, maintain, and extend the water and sanitation services for the communities. EUTF consortia have agreements with MoEW, which is the ministry in charge of setting policy and strategy. There are challenges with this cooperation between MoEW, WEs and municipalities, which are partly been addressed by EUTF interventions.

Infrastructural projects were identified and assessed by the consortia partners of EUTF interventions in collaboration with WEs and these were approved by the MoEW and the respective WEs. The infrastructure projects selected were priority interventions according to lists of WEs. However, a number of the projects were components of larger regional projects and not all projects constitute complete systems from water source to household connection. Since 2018, the newly appointed WE directors updated the water plans of SLWE and BMLWE with cooperation of EUTF consortia.

*Secondment of staff to WEs*, is being financed by EUTF interventions, and other donors, which is proving to be effective. For a new action in Aarsal with BWE, the EUTF is planning to recruit three senior engineers for the full duration of the project to carry out the water and sanitation project and improve capacity of employees in the future management and operation.

Other forms of coordination of EUTF interventions with government counterparts are:

- WEs in conjunction with the MoEW and the Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). These however do not have a pool of well-established technical projects. As a result, major modifications to original designs sites or scope are frequent and the required data provided proved to be outdated, incomplete or faulty. This caused delays for making changes and subsequently to gain new approvals.
- Consortia signed with each WE an Act of Agreement (AoA) for collaboration in the implementation of the project. This represents the formal commitment of the WEs to the Action. Article 7 specifies the Work Commitments and Responsibilities of the WEs - however these are rather general and do not focus on providing decisions and approvals and keeping agreed timelines.
- Projects were also **coordinated with municipalities**, such as the installation of rainwater harvesting systems (Akkar), the provision of a water truck for Beirut urban water supply, and the rehabilitation of the storm water network in Tripoli.
- EUTF consortia coordinated and partnered with MEHE, MoPH and ISF for improving WASH in institutions (T04.34). The projects were successfully rehabilitated and handed over.
- WEs and Municipalities require a MoU to formalise agreement on cooperation on water system, tariff collection, and removal of illegal connections and provision of alternatives.
- Earlier in the EUTF portfolio, there was cooperation between WEs and Municipalities to form volunteer groups to carry out local subscription campaign in addition to community engagement campaigns.
- Municipalities and Union of Municipalities, as important stakeholders and intermediaries, were included to connect the WE to their customers such as in South Beirut (T04.100).

**WASH sector coordination** system is active but also has deficiencies in coordinating from central to the local level. The WASH sector has a lead ministry (MoEW), a coordinating (UN) agency (UNICEF), strategic steering and supporting working groups, and recently an NGO as co-coordinator (Lebanon Relief). The communication is predominantly one way, from central to local level and an effective mechanism for feedback in practice is missing. Potential problems with complementarity are avoided by coordinating

both, planning and implementation of interventions, with the beneficiary authority (where WASH counterparts have a central role in communicating their needs) and with other stakeholders (through the WASH coordination groups).

**EQ8. What are the specific advantages/disadvantages of the various implementing partners (national, regional/multi-country, international) in terms of effectiveness?**

The partnerships of EUTF implementing partners with the national counterparts may not be greatly effective but the objectives are to improve these institutions to provide WASH services. The majority of the projects are with MoEW, the four Water Establishments, and for some projects also the municipalities.

EUTF portfolio objectives were to support WEs to provide access to water services as a priority through in-house capacity building, and community engagement. EUTF funding was awarded in three subsequent 'rounds' or generations to pre-selected and invited implementing partners (2017, 2018, 2021).

The INGOs and UNICEF were invited to submit concept notes. However, forming of consortia was done by EUD and not the implementing organisations. Some INGOs noted that for the second round of EUTF funding the time provided by EUD was too short for submitting a concept note.

First generation EUTF interventions comprised two consortia (T04.20, T04.34) each consisting of 4 INGOs, and the second generation also consisted of two consortia with each 4 INGOs (T04.98, T04.100), and UNICEF (T04.90). The third generation is for a consortium of 4 INGOs, and 2 NGOs (T04.272).

T04.272 follows-up on the support to all four WEs piloting a modality of Establishment-Led Service Improvement & Cost Recovery (EL-SICR) for which infrastructure projects are identified. In addition, there is a recent intervention (T04.206), which is a EUD and AFD cooperation, which initially had also proposed to include an INGO (GVC), and VNG (cooperation of municipalities).

The EUTF chose key international non-governmental organisations (INGO) that demonstrated substantial capacity in the water sector in Lebanon, with whom the EU already had an existing partnership. *Work in the consortium* brings some positive aspects: sharing methodologies, synergies with other and own NGO's projects/ teams, coherent relation with the authorities, building on previous/ shared experience. However, coordination within consortia as well as between consortia was not optimal and eventually also affected the effectiveness of coordination with the four WEs and MoEW.

The four WEs are delivering results through implementation of the WASH interventions with EUTF implementing partners. However, the impact during the current crisis has been diminished as WEs are shifting priorities from the newly enforced service improvement to surviving as they are financially severely compromised, and also losing key personnel. The implemented water infrastructure has increased water delivery to the people in vulnerable municipalities.

INGOs have advantages of experience in working in Lebanon and liaising with government counterparts and also community outreach programmes. However, some INGOs do not have the engineering capability or expertise to manage larger and complex infrastructural works. INGOs work as intermediaries between the client which is the WE and managing contacts that INGOs have with engineering consultants and construction contractors. The INGOs outsource the feasibility studies, engineering design, tendering and construction site supervision. The capacity of INGOs to manage these contracts varies, and some INGOs have qualified and experienced personnel, while other INGOs do not, which increases project risks.

**Emergency O&M support to WEs (since Nov 2020):** UNICEF was chosen because of its agility for logistics for provision of consumables, spare parts, and contractors. UNICEF has Long Term Agreements (LTA)

with set prices with a pool of suppliers and contractors. For instance, EBML noted to have very good cooperation with UNICEF and can only sustain water operation with this O&M support.

**Regional level:** Cooperation through ACWUA with Jordan on NRW reduction and Tariff Systems was planned but did not eventuate, partly due to COVID-19 restrictions.

ACWUA (Arab Countries Water Utilities Association), as a regional association composed of members from 18 Arab countries, including Lebanon serves as a platform for sharing knowledge and conducting trainings in the water sector. ACWUA is spreading the results of the project at regional level with the public and private sector (through the ACWUA network and annual regional conferences).

The experience of collaboration and dialogue between local institutions (Water Utilities and Municipalities), citizens and NGOs for promoting improvement of public services, sustainability of interventions and reinforcement of local capacities is shared at regional level through the ACWUA network.

ACWUA facilitated training of WEs staff on water meter reading, invoicing by volumetric tariff, and creating systems for more active customer relation services. Conducted the trainings for WEs managerial and local staff. This ensured coordination of the field activities implemented by the NGOs partners in terms of application of NRW strategy.

**Multi-country interventions** planned as regional, are often implemented as independent national projects. However, these do have staff members to create a link. The management and implementation teams in Lebanon and in Jordan are separate, and there are two steering committees. As implemented in this case, the “regional approach” does not bring an obvious added value. If a true regional perspective was to be emphasised, then some of the following should have been included: joint planning, discussions on shared issues, defining of regionally significant topics, regional campaigning (on water conservation/ provision of services etc), exchange of staff, joint discussions on target achievement and on future direction. Both in Lebanon and in Jordan the same INGOs make the consortium.

For Lebanon, the multi country interventions had a smaller WASH scope in comparison to the national EUTF WASH interventions.

- Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq (T04.40), includes 2 water infrastructure projects for Lebanon; Italian Cooperation and ACTED:
- Lebanon/Iraq (T04.132), *Municipal Empowerment and Resilience Project (MERP)* involves strengthening municipalities, including in procurement such as tenders, and also effective donor coordination around municipal engagement and capacity development; UNDP.
- Iraq and Lebanon (T04.136) *Maintaining Strength and Resilience for Local Governments (MASAR)*. Hygiene awareness sessions are incorporated in other activities. These include Akkar (NLWE) water irrigation channels. Also included are solid waste interventions, improving municipal infrastructure, local administration strengthening, decreasing social tensions, and economic growth; VNG (cooperation of municipalities from the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, and Catalan Cooperation).

### Additional outcome areas

- community engagement with the WASH providers in terms of ultimate beneficiaries’ behavioural change / making providers accountable;**

EUTF interventions draw on social communication and community engagement to restore user-utility mutual accountability. EUTF interventions objective was to contribute to reducing Non-Revenue Water by strengthening infrastructural and managerial capacities of local WEs. More is still to be achieved to reverse the breakdown of trust between users and utilities, and the rise of alternative, expensive, and often illegal and/or unregulated water sources keep Lebanon in a vicious circle of unsustainable water

management. Whilst this was output was not fully achieved and certainly with the current crisis momentum was lost, EUTF did contribute to improve community engagement in certain areas. EUTF now has to capitalise on lessons learned and in the future, use a strategic approach.

Visibility of WEs is somewhat increased and new infrastructure coverage is communicated with its future consumers and increases connectedness (service provider-consumer). However, the culture change and motivation of WE staff to respond to the public remains low. WE staff motivation is low and many are resigning.

The current challenge in Lebanon is the consumer purchasing power during the economic crisis and the ability to pay for water service as well as the willingness considering the distrust of in the government. The flat subscription rate of LBP 350,000 per year is with the current parallel market exchange is 13 times less and amounts to USD 17 per year.

The public relations and visibility measures of WEs still are not adequate to provide the population with the information that the water system is progressing. The strategy of the WEs is to get out of the vicious cycle of substandard water provision, huge technical losses and consumers who do not pay their water bills. However, reforming and improving the water system will take longer and with constant efforts, but progress made is observable.

An EUTF intervention (T04.20) showcased the two-pronged approach of building the capacity of public institutions and also engaging with community to raise awareness (See, European Development Days (EED21 on 15 and 16 June 2021; with session by 'Efficient water supply in Lebanon - service provision & resource management').

**□ *level of responsiveness of the WASH institutions in terms of improved performance at the level of local (WASH) actors.***

The role of the municipalities to contribute to the reform process will need to be more recognised and their engagement to be achieved to build up a trust relationship that consumers can rely on safe water provision. There is a need to break the current vicious cycle through a participatory approach as water is not a standard commercial commodity but a basic livelihood need and its safeguard and quality security a task for all governmental levels. EUTF interventions put this back on the WASH sector agenda and were a major driving force for this topic but output has been limited.

The EUTF coordination forum PACT (Policy and Advocacy Coordination Table) was planned to produce valuable reform approaches and methods to stabilise the water sector and to provide proposals to WEs, MoEW and donors and to scale up sharing of knowledge to all actors of the Lebanese Water Sector. However, this did not eventuate, and the platform was used for coordinating infrastructure only and the PACT platform was discontinued.

EUTF Interventions address infrastructure bottlenecks (improved water access) and strengthen the WEs to provide service provision, and customer communication. Geo- referenced customer database, call centres and trained teams for customer service web portals were activities, were relevant activities but only partially materialised. Bekaa, North and South WEs participated but Beirut Mount Lebanon was not willing. Before the crisis, BMLWE was the best operating with revenue from the metropolitan areas. However with the current crisis all four WEs are in need, and programmes reach all.

## **Efficiency**

***EQ9. What is the currently most efficient aid modality to support the provision of WASH services under the EUTF-Syria in each of the countries of intervention?***

***Partnerships:*** The choice for implementing partners with 6 consortia consisting of 4 INGOs operating in the same geographical areas and thematic areas as well as agreements overlapping in time had challenges for efficiency and focus. Although EUTF interventions were awarded to a consortium of 4 INGOs these effectively worked independently on separate budgets and allocated projects.

Partnerships are not sufficiently efficient and value for money. For projects of WEs there are a multiple of EUTF interventions, consultants and contractors with lack of oversight. EUTF consortia act as agents in between WEs (beneficiary) and consulting engineering companies and construction contractors. A number of INGOs have the engineering and contracting expertise required for infrastructure contracts. However, there are also INGOs that did not, and this poses large project risks with contract values of up to approximately EUR 800,000.

Simultaneously, some INGOs are partners of up to three consortia of EUTF interventions, with overlapping themes and geographical areas, including for the same WEs. This does not enforce efficiency of programmes. This is due to selection of INGOs and also agreements starting before the previous ones have ended, and is not always due to non-cost extensions.

The ***Policy and Advocacy Coordination Table of EUTF interventions*** (PACT) mechanism, a platform for all INGO partners funded under the EUTF was created to discuss and coordinate joint evidence-based advocacy to support and shape EU policy formulation on issues relevant to the WASH sector. PACT was used for a limited time and currently is no longer active. PACT was primarily used for members to coordinate the infrastructure projects. However, the PACT coordination forum was not used for covering WE capacity building and Non-Revenue Water.

***Water Establishments:*** Working directly with WEs was required as these are the beneficiaries and are the eventual owners of infrastructure and benefit from improve service provision. Challenges at Ministry level were directly managed through WEs, WASH Sector influence, and also with EUD intervention. The INGOs operating in the different regions in Lebanon are very familiar with the local conditions and knowledgeable of the institutional weaknesses of the WEs as principal regional service provider and as key beneficiaries of the projects.

In Lebanon, WASH interventions give better effects with beneficiary institutions that have a clear vision of their needs and plans for addressing the needs – not only WEs. The Union of the Municipalities in Beirut is an example of a beneficiary that supports the effects, mainly due to their determination to develop themselves in an organised and planned way. The detention centre administration, Internal Security Forces, is another beneficiary with whom the assistance is effective.

***Quality control*** of the infrastructure projects is according to both local and EU technical standards. The supervision mechanism of infrastructure works is through: selected supervision consultant, WASH counterparts (WEs), EUTF consortia staff. The level of expertise for oversight of contract management and engineering varied per partner. Some INGOs did not have engineers to manage the contracts.

Lebanon has a market with numerous construction companies and consulting engineering companies, which were used for the EUTF projects.

The quality of training courses to be delivered is ensured by hiring skilled trainers for the chosen topics. However, there were also capacity building sessions by EUTF consortia staff, for which the quality could not be verified.

***Efficiency*** was sub-optimal for a number of interventions and largely attributable to external factors outside of control of the implementing consortia. For many interventions during the first year, extensive

re-planning of the infrastructure projects was done with changes of the target villages, alternative transmission route and repeated revision of previous designs in line with the new Water Master Plans of WEs resulting in delays and lack of progress. Consortia often had to wait for necessary technical data and approvals.

The delays have been managed through the approach of Non-Cost Extensions. Delays and challenges faced by EUTF implementing partners have included:

- Interventions often faced delays from the start with project identification. Proposed locations were sometimes changed on direction of both WEs and MoEW, which caused delays ranging from 5-months up to one-year.
- In Lebanon, the WEs, in conjunction with the MoEW and the Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), did not have an updated list of prioritised infrastructure projects to be undertaken (instead a paper that lists the needs is handed to several interested parties, who then engage in assessments). In certain areas, it took a year to reach the official approval of the sites. This delayed the start of the infrastructure works, but their implementation is efficient. Since 2018, SLWE had a strategic plan and this improved efficiency.
- NCE were required and related to delays in starting up of the projects, and delays due to protests, and Covid-19 lockdowns, delay in procurement (import and currency related). Approval process for extensions were adequately followed up by the consortia and EUD.
- The Municipal Empowerment and Resilience Project's (MERP; T04.132, limited WASH scope), achievements on output level were delayed. Due to the on-going country financial crisis, MERPs' plans to partner with selected Union of Municipalities (UoMs) and municipalities through a cooperative agreement modality, and directly transfer the funds for the procurement of the basic services, economic and LED projects, were no longer viable. This is mainly due to Central Bank regulations that required withdrawal of foreign currencies at the official rate of LBP 1,500 to the US Dollar, when its actual black-market rate is more than tenfold. The project is now compelled to shift back to direct management of all planned municipal procurement. This corrective action provided a viable solution to the Lebanese exchange rates currency issues, but also entailed an increased workload on the project to issue and process all related procurement (originally planned to be covered under the municipal cooperative agreements), which makes the need for an efficient internal project procurement essential.

***EUTF Emergency funding for O&M for the four WEs*** (UNICEF, T04.90 and Top Up): Funds for the four WEs to continue to operate and to carry out repairs to allow for continuity of water services (repairs for pumping and pumping and chlorination systems). The crisis response modality is short-term only and high cost. Requires clearer donor coordination, commitment and direct WE involvement seeking performance outcome (Also, See EQ8).

***EQ10. To what extent have resources been allocated and utilised in an efficient manner and achieve value-for-money?***

This cannot be fully ascertained as only one intervention (T04.34) has been completed, whereas other EUTF interventions are ongoing, including of the first generation. EUTF interventions were also started in 2021 and will continue until the end of the fund.

Detailed project budgets and thorough assessments of project costs have not been provided for the interventions. Non-cost extensions were provided for most EUTF interventions.

Covid-19 was a contributing factor for delays in project selection, tender process, and also during implementation of activities.

At the start of the EUTF programme for Lebanon, the interventions were a promising step and pilot to build the capacity of WEs, improved customer service, and increase revenue for WEs, and volumetric tariff setting for consumers (Pillar 2 of WASH portfolio). This was required to gain independence for WEs and a move to be financially viable. However, more recently (since 2019), Lebanon has faced multiple challenges, including the Beirut blast, Covid-19, and the political, socio-economic crisis. These factors have challenged the EUTF WASH portfolio but despite it was needed to start changes to gain a sustainable water sector following agreed policy change and implementing the water code.

Increased resilience and extension of services was and is continuing to be achieved by increasing the supply through repair, rehabilitation, upgrading and extension of water and sanitation infrastructure. To improve sustainability, the capacity of water authorities to operate and maintain networks and potentially to implement cost-recovery schemes was to be improved, but this is now at risk with the current crisis and weak WEs. Investments for institutional strengthening were partly lost due to WEs not enforcing this, staff loss, and lack of coherence and strategy of EUTF interventions in implementing this component.

EUTF is now having to increase its support to continue the level of service, as water authorities do not have financial resources to do so and are struggling to maintain their staff.

There was a major change for one of the first EUTF interventions (T04.20) where an INGO was withdrawn from the EUTF consortium after 8 months and had incurred overhead costs (approximately EUR 56,000). This is an inefficiency and not cost effective. It seems that the reasons for withdrawal were known beforehand and that risk management was not carried out by EUD.

***EUTF WASH interventions activities are generally delivered in line with their approved budgets, although designs are sometimes revised to avoid cost overruns.***

Budget estimates at planning phase were underestimated and the scope could only become clear during the actual design and planning phase. Eventually projects are anticipated to be delivered within the budgets. For example, 'Batouliyah Pumping Station, SLWE' the design and tender preparation were completed but construction did not fit in the budget and was not carried out. A water transmission line had to be rerouted and thus the cost doubled (Ouadi Jilo Pumping station to the reservoir at Maroub, SLWE).

*Justification of Budgets:* Detailed Budget and explanation are mostly provided. At start of interventions, the project budgets were indicative with estimates, which later proved to not be in correct order of magnitude. For NCE and contract amendment the budgets were clearer but remained more at top level.

***EUTF resources have been contracted and procured in line with prevailing procedures.***

UNICEF as implementing agency has a long experience with the four WEs. UNICEF follows the UN procedures in procurement and works contracting and is experienced in the Lebanese market conditions. There are work contracts with local sub-contractors for the drilling and equipping of wells and the procurement of network repair machinery to be made available to each WE. The EU has delegated implementation arrangements under the overall EU-UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA).

INGOs have their own logistic procedures for contracting. Evaluation team was not able to carry out verification whether contracts were carried out in accordance with procedures, and whether any deviations were required or carried out.

***EUTF WASH interventions' resources are available and deployed in a timely and predictable manner.***

Delays at start of the projects caused by approval processes and changes requested by MoEW, which were dealt with adequately and NCE was provided. Implementation was generally not delayed, and

resources were mobilised to carry out specialised tasks, such as engaging consultants and tenders for construction works. Exceptions for projects during Covid-19 and impacted by protests and roadblocks.

EUTF interventions overall have engaged consultants and contractors in a timely manner. However, tenders through municipalities have taken up to 6-months to be awarded, which impacts efficiency as the interventions are greatly delayed. For some interventions the NCE are up to two years, which raises questions of cost-efficiency of partners rather than that of EUTF. NCE are requested on time. Funds seem to be provided on time to the EUTF interventions.

### **Monitoring.**

Interim (annual) reports provide insights into all project activities and also covers the risks and prospects for achieving the outputs and outcomes.

A number of EUTF interventions had ROM evaluation. These have been generally well utilised. EUTF interventions hold monthly Project Management Unit meetings where the NGO coordinators meet with project managers and with local coordinators.

**Reporting to EUTF** is through quarterly (QINs), and annual/interim reports, and final report. The reports of implementing partners when produced by consortia of INGOs often lack clarity as these are compiled by the inputs of its partners.

### ***EQ11. To what extent do the various stakeholders ensure the necessary capacity (technical, institutional and financial) to promote and implement EUTF-funded WASH programmes?***

In Lebanon, WEs do not have an efficient structure. Their human resources are nearly sufficient in number, but their expertise is not in line with WEs' needs for realising the intended reform. The national institutions requires more professionals with good understanding of the reform process.

The Lebanese public sector still needs to create legal and institutional conditions to effectively facilitate a WASH reform as outlined in the NWSS 2020 (also, see 3RP). WEs still need external project support to become able to manage their water systems. EUTF is helping in this matter by contributing to the WEs' master plans. EUTF is engaged in reviewing those plans and engaged in delivering results.

For future operation of the WASH infrastructure the main concern is that WEs do not have the capacity in terms of technical, institutional or financial, which has further deteriorated with the recent crisis.

### ***Extent to which stakeholders have the technical capacities to participate in implementing and promoting EUTF WASH interventions.***

WEs had reasonable technical in-house capacity to manage and operate the water infrastructure, and at the start of the EUTF this capacity was to be further developed with more dedicated professionals. The technical capacity is now compromised with resignation of engineers, technicians and other key staff.

EUTF interventions did carry out activities to increase capacity of WEs staff and supported in setting up customer database, water metering and follow up. WE staff was also trained on water meter reading, invoicing by volumetric tariff, and customer relation service. In addition, small scale and tangible capacity building of the WEs is directly reinforcing the project inputs, such as equipment (chlorination units), software (WaterCAD), and GIS. However, this gained expertise was not widely and consistently shared across WEs. During the verification phase, the management of NLWE stated that training would not be needed as staff could not be retained.

EUTF intervention engaged expertise for Solar Water Pumping (T04.98) for training of MoEW, WEs and humanitarian organisations. This included assessment of suitable sites, and design and tender preparation by LSES (Lebanon solar). Evaluation could not ascertain if this expertise was being shared and capitalised on.

Currently, WEs are operating on a quarter of its staff level compared to the planned number of staff pre-crisis. The staff is not motivated and resigning as currency has devaluated (top engineer salary is USD 200, and junior engineer USD 100 while cost of living has increased, and fuel is scarce and highly expensive). There is a public sector stop on employing new staff since 2018. Staff secondment is possible and there are successful examples, such as deputy director/chief engineer at BMLWE. Many previous trained employees have left the WEs. For instance, BWE has no engineers or managers at middle level, and there is a high number of unskilled staff. In SLWE, the senior engineers resigned, and through secondment junior engineers were employed.

***As regards the extent to which stakeholders have the institutional capacities to participate in implementing and promoting EUTF WASH interventions,*** the interventions were developed with WEs and MoEW, to improve the institutional capacities, which were weak. External factors unfolding over the last years have further challenged the institutions, such as WEs, MoEW and municipalities. Staff retention is a major concern as brain drain has been ongoing with loss of key positions.

Achieving improved and effective WEs that are financially viable and autonomous from MoEW is an objective that cannot be achieved by EUTF interventions alone (See, EQ5). This is partly due to sector reforms not being enforced by the government, but also weak management within the WEs. The capacity building outputs by EUTF WASH interventions had a limited effect.

Lebanon water Forum organised through AUB/IFI (university), financed by EUTF, was to contribute to coordination, sector strategy, and setting priorities.

***Extent to which stakeholders have the financial capacities to participate in implementing and promoting EUTF WASH interventions.***

The WEs were already financially weak at start of EUTF WASH portfolio in 2016. Currently, water and wastewater sector are now bankrupt where WEs only can operate by not paying for electricity bills and receiving donor funds (institutional donors and from various countries). Therefore, WEs are operating in crisis mode.

Due to currency inflation, the revenue income of WEs is currently 10% compared to that a year ago (for BWE it was USD 5.3 million in June 2020, and in June 2021 USD 450,000).

Water subscription is a flat rate at LBP 350,000 per year, which in pre-inflation times was USD 233 per year (1 USD was fixed at LBP 1,500). However, in October 2021, this amounts to approximately USD 17 (1 USD is LBP 20,000 on the parallel market). However, since the start of EUTF, there has been a slight increase in number of water subscribers, such as for areas with new water infrastructure where campaigns were conducted.

The EUTF project objective was to improve the financial position of the WEs through volumetric water tariff and metering, improved capacity of WEs, and improved service provide-customer relationship. Improved and expanded water infrastructure also helped to achieve this. The current economic crisis in the country is severely challenging the objective and the capacity of WEs to achieve this.

WEs have debts with the national electricity provider (EDL). However, WEs also remain reliant on fuel powered generators to power the infrastructure and ensure water delivery. WEs and donors did not adequately adapt to the energy crisis in recent years and take measures to decrease dependence on national grid, and fuel powered generators either owned by WEs or subscriber fees to this parallel market.

Electricity costs are increasing, while reliability is plummeting with frequent black outs. EUTF programme documents have not shown a longer-term strategy to increase the decentralised approach

of water and sanitation infrastructure and sustainability, in terms of operational cost, reduced O&M, and independence of fuel and electricity suppliers.

For BWE water infrastructure was not commissioned due to components not being completed as initially agreed (Dakwe, Kfardenis, Niha). Future follow up is required by EUTF to ensure that

*Box 9 Statements from stakeholders*

- “Staff losses to be made up by digitalisation and systematic approach (DG of SLWE)”
- “We need a mentality change and urgently get motivated, committed and qualified staff to get us through this crisis (BMLWE)”
- SLWE states crisis adaptation by transformation: (1) reduce electricity consumption by use of more surface water, and (2) automatization, and (3) invest in renewable energy focusing on solar. Staff and knowledge losses to be made up by digitalisation and systematic approach (DG of SLWE).
- BWE note priorities of (1) maintain service level, (2) maintain staff, and (3) protect

these investments are not lost and that the remaining gaps are filled. However, EUTF intervention did achieve to close the gaps by selecting projects that contributed to the completion of a full system, which was the strategy.

### **Coordination, coherence, complementarity and synergies**

**EQ12. To what extent is the support provided by the EUTF-Syria for WASH programmes/projects coherent and complementary with other major funding mechanisms (EU also including ENI/DCI/ECHO/NDICI)?**

EUTF and EUD noted there is donor coordination including with Italian Cooperation, AFD, KfW, Swiss Cooperation, and EBRD. In particular the EU and AFD have co-funded programmes. In addition, EUD noted that on a quarterly basis meeting is held between European donors, and also USAID.

EUTF Interventions were built on previous programmes of consortium members carried out by EU funding (EuropeAid), including for infrastructure projects and capacity-building activities. EUTF did not set out a WASH strategy and action plan, and programme documents do not note complementarity with other donor funded programmes. At the beginning of the EUTF, the projects were selected from a list and chosen by WEs and MoEW. In later years, EUTF implementing partners selected projects in consultation with WEs and their priority lists but use their own selection criteria. This approach seems to have been followed for other donors, and thus a common strategy was not available.

**In response to the ongoing crisis in Lebanon, the EUTF has provided funding that is complementary to the AFD Technical Assistance Delegation Agreement provided through ENI funds, by coordinating the sector follow-up for the implementation of the 3RF and, in general, the whole water sector reform process. This EUTF project funding will cover approx. 15,6% of the total sector needs identified with the 3RF.**

Other examples include the Emergency O&M support to the four WEs is carried out by EUTF intervention T04.90 by UNICEF. This programme will be co-funded by KfW with EUR 15 million. In addition, UNICEF is to receive other funds.

Also, EU in cooperation with AFD is carrying out a 5 years Technical Assistance Programme for WASH national counterparts, which is not funded by EUTF. EUTF programme documentation make no direct reference to this.

**EQ13. To what extent is coordination/complementarity with other donors' (non-EU) programmes and with national/ country-specific WASH programmes conducive for the achievement of the EUTF's objectives?**

It can be stated that WASH Sector coordination is active in Lebanon.

EUTF WASH interventions are coordinated in accordance with NWSS, LCRP, WASH Sector and other humanitarian agencies and funding programmes. At national level these are coordinated with MoEW, and regional level with WEs. In general, there is regular information sharing through existing platforms established for the coordination of the LCRP. EUTF interventions were coordinated with other INGOs and donors intervening in the water sector in Lebanon and presented also to the National and Regional WASH coordination groups.

On the government side, the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) is in charge of planning and executing donor funded water and wastewater infrastructures on behalf of the concerned ministries, and often link with other government authorities.

Examples of coordination with national partners include Projects of assessing the institutional capacity of government partners were coordinated with the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) and the Directorate General of Local Administration and Councils (DGLAC). Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA).

EUTF Consortia with MoEW have jointly coordinated multi-stakeholder team, including regional and local authorities, civil society and local communities, to prepare a River Basin management plan. Solar Water Pumping trainings were held, which engaged MoEW, RWEs and humanitarian organisations, and improved dialogue (T04.98).

As regards inter-donor coordination, currently, there is quarterly meeting between donors on policy dialogue. However, the MoEW and also the water establishments carry out coordination separately with EU and USAID on programme interventions. Examples of this coordination include:

EUTF interventions have sought a coordinated approach with USAID, which is a major donor to the sector. These interventions coordinate and complement capacity building programmes to WEs. One of EUTF's implementing partner ACWUA also received funding from USAID. WEs' capacity building activities are also partly funded by SDC and GIZ on installing water meters, and with focus on customer centres. Mapping of water quality data at production points is coordinated with USAID and the Swiss Development Cooperation, which plans to measure water quality at specific water points.

Programme Documentation of EUTF interventions also noted lessons from a Programme funded by USAID 'Lebanon Water and Wastewater Sector Support (LWWSS)' to improve revenue generating capabilities of the WEs/ Water authorities. Through this programme, existing GIS and water quality programmes currently being piloted in the Qoubayat sub office (NLWE) will be expanded to other NLWE sub offices. Interventions are also complementary to previous EU and other donor projects such as the Lebanon Water Project (LWP) funded by USAID, and Water Quality Monitoring in the Bekaa Valley funded by Swiss Cooperation.

***EQ14. What is the quality and extent of coordination/ complementarity/synergies between national and regional/multi-country EUTF WASH programmes?***

Coordination between EUTF interventions is conducted within the forums mentioned in EQ13 and also on an ad-hoc basis between the respective IPs. Examples of this coordination include:

Technical coordination of EUTF interventions was temporarily through Policy and Advocacy Coordination Table (PACT). This platform for partners funded under the EUTF was founded to discuss and coordinate joint evidence-based advocacy on issues relevant to the WASH sector. In practice the infrastructure projects were discussed but no other topics, and PACT was short lived. One EUTF review (ROM) noted that, WASH Sector coordination was not always open for NGOs to provide an input, and partners used the PACT.

Complementarity should have been at the core of EUTF WASH portfolio to reduce non-revenue water, and increase capacity of WEs. However, this synergy, coordination and complementarity was not well outlined in EUTF programme documents. It lacks overview. These all seem to be separate building blocks.

## **Sustainability**

### ***EQ15. What are the main factors for sustainability of the EUTF-funded WASH programmes/ projects and to what extent are these factors currently ensured?***

Sustainability of interventions is at risk in terms of ongoing O&M given the water and wastewater sector is bankrupt, WEs are operating on a quarter of its staffing level as compared to the planned staffing pre-crisis and key persons are missing.

Stakeholders are aware of this and are taking steps to address these as best possible. Sustainability plans are evident. However, risks and gaps to ensuring sustainability exists (these are financial; O&M).

The sustainability of EUTF support to and via WEs is subject to several significant risks. The current crisis has changed the modus operandi of WEs that are now having to operate in crisis mode to sustain services with donor assistance.

The viability of WEs, like other public institutions and businesses in Lebanon, have been severely challenged during the crisis. Hyper-inflation and socio-economic crisis, and covid-19 were factors that influenced the sustainability of EUTF WASH interventions (building since 2019).

***Sustainability cannot be achieved and follow up will be required, as capacity of WEs has dropped.*** WEs are responsible for water infrastructure and work hard on its repairs (reactive maintenance) in the given Lebanese circumstances. The customers' awareness on cost recovery is tackled in the right way (campaigning, collaboration with municipalities). However, payments can be kept at high level only if WEs provide decent service, which in turn depends on some external factors. WEs are financed from subscriptions and externally funded projects; also the Ministry's help fund and contribution funds are sometimes available. WEs are effectively subsidised by not paying for electricity. Their position is dependent on external assistance, be it from central level government funds or from donor grants. Without further support, WEs will not become able to continue the benefits after the end of the EUTF.

***Benefits of EUTF WASH interventions are in place and likely to continue once EUTF support is over.***

***WASH Pillar 1:*** *The benefits of improved water and sanitation infrastructure are in place due to EUTF interventions. However, a number of projects do require completion or upgrades, by EUTF or other funds.*

***WEs are now severely challenged*** and not able to provide ***electricity and continued operation and maintenance*** to sustain the water and sanitation services. The capacity improvements of the WEs have not been achieved. Continued donor support will be required and the EUTF funded assets are at risk. Currently, EUTF with other donors is only committed to provide O&M in the short term with remaining EUTF funding.

Electricity requirements for water and sanitation systems are to be integrated in planning in future. EDL was not cooperative on ensuring the electrical connections for new water pumping stations financed by EUTF and there were delays and lengthy negotiations. National grid power is not reliable. It is not clear how these interventions will benefit in future on decentralised power provision, such as solar power. EUTF invested in solar water pumping training for WASH Sector and implemented a few small-scale projects and were termed a pilot project (see below).

EU is to take the lead to rapidly develop a sustainable solution for the WASH infrastructure and power demand. To date this had not been in relation to the order of magnitude of investment in WASH sector, such as infrastructure. This impacts service delivery and immediately the wellbeing of people. Cost-

efficiency, and independence from fuel and market fluctuation, are great benefits in times of electricity and economic crisis (environmental benefits aside).

**WASH Pillar 2:** *Considering the capacity building of WEs, customer service, and decreasing Nonrevenue water, and volumetric water tariff, the achievements were not as successful as initially planned.*

WEs will remain financially vulnerable unless they solve persistent water supply problems to the public and become credible (for example by announcing and introducing sanctions for non-payment of bills). The EUTF interventions provided an opportunity to create an improved communication between the WEs and their customers and gives the management a new information base to better address the claimed needs. The water sector reform on the regional and local level need to include all major stakeholders and this includes the recognition of the role of municipalities as intermediary between population and water service provider.

Interventions collected evidence which can be used for lobbying at regional and national level. The longer-term viability is yet to be measured. In addition, the WEs motivation, skilled staff retention, and capacity to continue the programme have been challenged during the crisis

**WASH committees were established in the schools** that received the WASH facilities rehabilitation (T04.34). These committees were reportedly trained on regular, minor maintenance and care of the WASH facilities. Each school principal received a tool kit for the school guards to be able to conduct minor maintenance on the facilities in the future. Additionally, the WASH committees will become responsible for hygiene promotion in their respective schools after the end of the project.

**Results and approaches of EUTF (pilot) WASH interventions are, where appropriate, being integrated into national structures, policies and budgets.**

Although, EUTF interventions did not carry out the pilot programme, a number of products were produced that can be used in future. The Volumetric Tariff System is a model for further interventions in the Lebanese water sector and perhaps beyond in the region. Non-Revenue-Water Toolkit at WEs and for wider use in the Lebanese context are prepared and through ACWUA this is to be shared in the region.

## **EU added value and visibility**

### ***EQ16. What EU added value is resulting from the EUTF-funded WASH programmes projects?***

There is clear EU added value in the WASH sector in Lebanon.

The host community and refugee population are benefitting from support by EUTF interventions for increased and sustainable water provision, and sanitation in targeted areas. However, targeting of priority areas for Syrian refugees could have been better.

In the WASH Sector and at national level, EUTF was a driving force to improve WEs and its service provision, service provider-customer relationship, and fee collection, which has been in crisis for decades and long awaiting policy reforms and implementation of the water code. EUTF Interventions aimed at directly complementing and enforcing the work of the National water authorities, by building capacity of WEs and making these accountable to provide water and sanitation services to both host and refugee communities. In practice, the EUTF WASH portfolio made valuable contribution to infrastructure component (although verifying the quality and working condition of the numerous

infrastructural works was not scope of this evaluation). However, the achievements in the other component (improve WEs and its service provision, service provider-customer relationship, and fee collection) were limited due to lack of implementing these with a coherent EUTF strategy. In addition, due to the crisis this latter component has lost traction.

The needed increase in WE capacity cannot be achieved through EUTF WASH interventions alone and a national contribution through imposed regulations and fund is also needed (See, EQ17 and 3RF).

Preventative maintenance in Lebanon remains weak and is mostly reactive on repairs. EUTF interventions were making a difference to change this (noted in RoMs pre-crisis).

Customers' awareness on cost recovery is tackled but payments can only be expected if the provided services rise to a decent standard, and service provision is maintained. This is further compromised with the economic crisis.

***EQ17. Did the portfolio of EUTF funded WASH programmes contribute to the EU policy dialogue for reforms with national governments?***

EU policy dialogue for reforms with national governments is through MoEW.

EU member states have a coordination table. EU and AFD are collaborating in the Technical Assistance Reform Programme, which includes dialogue with MoEW for WASH Sector reforms such as outlined in the 3RF (Dec 2020), which was drafted after the Beirut Blast and called for reforms. These reforms of the 3RF (Also, see EQ2):

The EU and other donors are not necessarily supportive of new large-scale water and sanitation infrastructure projects, which is being noted by the MoEW. However, the EUTF intervention for short term support to Operation and Maintenance is also strategic point of dialogue. UNICEF carried out a programme with EUR 10 million for O&M (started end of 2020), which is yet to be continued with EUR 22 million (the last to be committed EUTF funds). The energy sector and gridlock on electricity provision in combination with the Lebanon's controlled and closed fuel market by 14 oil trading companies, was not noted as part of the EU policy dialogue.

The impact of Lebanon Water Forum (T04.98) on policy dialogues with government was not noted. It could not be verified whether there was a noticeable contribution or impact of EUTF intervention (T04.98) on promoting Solar Water Pumping in Lebanon through working with LSES (Lebanon Solar Energy Society). LSES worked with the MoEW to set up the Lebanon Centre of Energy Conservation (LCEC at the MoEW, <https://lcec.org.lb>).

***EQ18. To what extent are the communication and visibility actions providing added value in terms of contributing to mainstreaming the WASH programmes/projects' desired effects?***

Communication materials were developed and disseminated through different platforms. Social media (Facebook and Instagram) were used for: the newsletter, the non-revenue water video and the end of project brochure (once developed), puppet show.

EUTF interventions appeared in the national media: Radio, newspapers, website and social media. Beirut marathon to promote water management.

Manuals were produced in Arabic and in English (Social communication approach manual, Citizen Perception Research Manual, Customer Database Manual). Pending are: Non-Revenue Water animated video, Citizens Survey Report; Capitalization report on the experience with municipalities, End of project brochure, Final newsletter.

Visibility of some of the EUTF interventions followed the guidelines but did not pursue an innovative approach to let subscribers and potential customers actually be able to follow the substantial development of the water supply provision within their region. The websites of WEs could become more accessible to subscribers if links to information of current infrastructure projects would be included with objectives, scope and implementation period and expected results.

### Gender and special needs

#### ***EQ19. To what extent have gender issues been taken into consideration in design and implementation?***

Gender issues have been adequately addressed. In logframes, targets for gender are disaggregated. The programme documents make no specific reference to gender-related issues. EUTF WASH portfolio is focused on water infrastructure and governance. Water and sanitation are public infrastructure and thus gender neutral. Communication and outreach work were adapted and gender focused where appropriate.

Gender has been incorporated in WASH projects in institutions such as Schools, PHC, detention centres (for example T04.34).

#### ***EQ20. To what extent have accessibility and inclusiveness of persons with disabilities (Syrian refugees, IDPs and host community members) been taken into consideration in design and implementation?***

No specific mention in programmed documents. However, a reference was found:

In response to the COVID-19 situation and the Beirut explosion, MERP (T04.132) is closely working with Bourj Hammoud municipality and has fast-tracked some of its activities around social stability and basic services. The work with Bourj Hammoud municipality (Beirut) focuses on a municipal hotline mechanism through which residents can report issues around COVID-19, damaged buildings and which allows **people with disabilities** to reach out to the municipality for support. Due to the lockdown, however, the launch of the hotline was delayed to early Q2, 2021 – in part due to the inability to acquire a designated phoneline from the Ministry of Telecommunications and in part because the hotline launch required several outreach activities with communities that could not take place due to the strict lock-down.

#### ***EQ21. Which specific outcomes regarding gender and special needs can be identified from the EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects?***

Where relevant, gender mainstreaming is considered and disaggregated data is being tracked however, very limited evidence of data related to special needs.

#### ***Lessons learned: “What lessons can be learned / good practice can be identified from the implementation of EUTF-funded WASH programmes / projects?”***

Below is a list of lessons learned by category/thematic area.

#### ***Project selection:***

- Initially, MoEW had more influence on project selection, but recently WEs have more independence. At the beginning of the EUTF, the projects were selected from a list and chosen by WEs and MoEW. In later years, IPs selected projects in consultation with WEs and their priority lists

but use their own selection criteria. Also, the EUD proposes projects. Projects are selected based on size that fits budget. Larger scale projects are done by other donors (exceptions are in the South). EUTF did not have strategy for certain projects. WEs are more agile to change than MoEW (limiting factor).

- Design of EUTF interventions in hindsight required more time and better planning. A few more weeks of planning and coordinating the interventions would have saved time and resources on the long run and made expectations clearer (according to RoM reports, particularly commenting on projects selected at beginning of EUTF. In one instance there was duplication as the same project was selected by two IPs).

In particular for the first two rounds of EUTF funding, IPs did not always have pre-identified projects from the start of the grant. The IPs had to assess, select and agree with CDR, MoEW and WEs on the projects which took up to one year. EUTF and INGOs could have better coordinated the planned interventions from the start with MoEW and CDR to get a clearer picture of infrastructure needs. This may involve cost and time as infrastructure projects were not clearly defined and lacked scope definition. This is the risk of this type of programming that not until actively engaging with WEs, MoEW and CDR it becomes clear what priorities are and what the projects involve. This is dealing with uncertainty and the situation of data being outdated and also dealing with weakened public institutions. At the beginning of the EUTF, IPs had to manoeuvre between priorities set by CDR, MoEW and WEs that did not coordinate well and also had different agendas. In addition, there was a project list from MoEW and CDR from which IPs had to select projects, in consultation with WEs and subsequently obtain approval from MoEW. In some cases project selection was challenging. In later stages of the EUTF this project selection based on criteria set by IPs improved, because there was closer collaboration with WEs that could operate more independently from the MoEW. In 2018, new WE directors were appointed. For instance, in South Lebanon a WASH strategy was prepared by the SLWE and projects were no longer selected from the earlier priority list from MoEW and CDR. IPs selected projects according to priorities outlined by WEs and after their own assessment coupled with using their own selection criteria.

Act of Agreements with WEs and local authorities should include commitments and indicators to support partners to increase subscription rates in targeted areas after demonstrated improvement of services. These should also support partners to communicate to the local population that to ensure the sustainable operation and maintenance of services, the population will be required to pay for the service.

#### ***EUTF WASH portfolio:***

- At start of the fund the scope of work was relevant conform Water and Wastewater Strategy of Lebanon (also LCRP). Two pillars: 1. water infrastructure improvements (named 'Stabilisation'). 2. Reduce Non-Revenue Water to increase financial viability of WEs and improve service provider-customer relation (a far smaller component by comparison).
- The second pillar, although relevant at the start of EUTF, has now lost momentum, impact is limited, and at risk is of losing gained efforts. Two recently started projects (3rd generation EUTF) aim to continue the strategy but its scope is to be adapted considering the deepening crisis. Call Centres, communication department, media and social communication campaign increased exposure and had some positive impact. Although crisis has changed the context.
- Infrastructure projects not always chosen to reach for areas with high number Syrian refugees. A number of projects reached areas with low number of Syrian refugees.
- EUTF strategy and action plan for WEs support for longer term is required to ensure sustainability of the interventions. EUTF interventions would have benefitted from a clear plan to complement each other in themes, geographic areas, and per water establishments. There

was a 'patchwork' for activities to build capacity of WEs and community engagement, including lobbying and influencing the culture changes for reducing NRW, and public engagement.

- EUTF and other donors have struggled to adapt their programming to the energy crisis in last years and take measures to decrease national grid and fuel power generators dependence.
- EUTF lessons learned by implementing partners are to be shared and documented. This involves capitalising on projects, such as, rainwater harvesting (RWH) systems in the institutional and residential buildings; Solar Water Pumping; Volumetric water Tariff; Social media campaigns, and community engagement.
- Partners should share the training content of each course at water sector, and with other Regional WEs to ensure upcoming programmes build on the content that was developed.
- Future grant funding should support the ISF administration department to upgrade facilities and support technical capacity building and modernisation. Ongoing maintenance of ISF facilities is essential to ensure better support for the large number of detainees from the migrant and refugee community and the host community that are held in detention for long periods before trial.

The EUTF coordination forum PACT (Policy and Advocacy Coordination Table) had a limited use and was not continued, despite its potential benefits.

### **Recommendations**

The following recommendations are linked to the needs specifically related to the WASH portfolio and future of WASH service delivery within Lebanon. Some of these are also cross-cutting across the portfolio and have been synthesised up to portfolio level.

#### ***Recommendations for EU and other donors - immediate:***

- EU in collaboration with other donors to actively and directly engage with WEs to seek cost reduction and governance reforms (crisis adaptation, accountability and transparency). WEs can operate more efficiently and require managerial support to reorganise and optimise. In addition, engineering support remains relevant in particular due to the current brain drain. Modernisation and systems are to be put in place to reduce reliance on personnel and high turnover.
- A multi-donor approach is required for the current crisis for operation and maintenance support of water and sanitation infrastructure for the four water establishments. Transparency of spending and asset management is to be accounted for. Targets are to be set and measured.
- Provide secondment of a pool of key positions to WEs including chief engineers, programme and finance managers. Consider partnerships with combination of international private and governmental organisations to support WEs.
- Decentralised non-fossil fuel electricity generation is to be promoted and implemented to increase resilience and reduce donor spending. Solar Water Pumping is priority to reduce the non-sustainable, scarce and very high cost of fuel operated generators with short life span and high O&M costs.

#### ***Recommendations - mid-term:***

- EU to follow a consistent strategic approach for WASH in Lebanon.
- EU to continue collaborating with other donor countries on governance reforms for Water Establishments to become independent (3RP, NWSS2020) are both short and long-term objectives.

- EU to take lead, invest and advocate for decentralised and sustainable power for water and sanitation infrastructure. In parallel, seek other non-carbon fuel reliant options such as Hydrogen Powered Generators, and wind power. Donor spending on fuel generators, either by direct purchase or O&M of Water Establishments is not sustainable and a very high proportion of budget that could be allocated more effectively on sustainable projects. Solar water pumping to reduce reliance on power from WE owned generators from the parallel electricity market used for pumping stations. In addition, medium-scale utility solar PV farms are to be introduced for water pumping stations and WWTPs that have limited land availability. Other renewable energy solutions of hydrogen powered generators and wind power are to be stimulated or introduced where possible.
- Future EU agreements to be based on technical capacity, in-country experience and ability to comply with donor monitoring and reporting mechanisms.
- EUD reporting requirements from IPs to be improved and strengthened. Results reporting (impact and outcome), and also clear and concise information on activities is to be provided. Current reports are not clear and lack information while IPs are receiving budgets to carry out adequate project management including reporting.
- EU to coordinate with other donors (USAID, KfW) for adaptation of strategy for crisis management (seeking adaptation by WEs, Electricity, O&M budget, partnerships). USAID is starting new WASH programme of USD 100 million for 5 years, which it is adapting to the changing context. EU has not effectively engaged with these donors that are now liaising separately with MoEW and WEs.
- There is a Reform project (Technical Assistance) of EUR 12 M for 5 years funded by EU and AFD. The TA project is to be integrated with EUTF WASH interventions and coordinated. A clear EU strategy document is to be prepared and coordination by EU partners is to be established.

## 7.4 Turkey Country Portfolio Report

### Relevance

#### ***EQ1. Is programming of WASH programmes/projects strategically aligned with the EUTF's underlying funding principles and approaches?***

The main objective of the two interventions for Turkey is in line with the "Strategic orientation document for the European Union Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis". Overall Objective is to strengthen the economic and social resilience of Syrians under Temporary Protection (SuTP).

The two EUTF WASH interventions, T04.76 and T04.155, aim to improve and secure the living conditions of SuTP and the population in host communities in Turkey. The activities include support to the municipalities and institutions in provinces most affected by the presence of SuTP or have the potential to absorb an additional Syrian labour force to strengthen the recovery from the impact of displacement.

Specific objective of T04.76: to increase the resilience of Syrian refugees and host communities, to strengthen the capacity of host municipalities to deliver municipal services, and to improve the perspectives of hosting refugees in a sustainable manner.

T04.155: Specific objective 1. Strengthen the long-term resilience of priority Turkish communities neighbouring the Syrian border affected by the influx of SuTPs, through improved access to municipal water supply/ waste/water services.

T04.155: Specific objective 2. Eliminate/reduce capacity gaps of municipal water supply wastewater infrastructure in priority communities.

Infrastructure projects are usually based on long-term planning and preparation but in this particular case the needs got multiplied in short-term, and in crisis, which required a rapid emergency response. The interventions address these needs through infrastructure developed with municipalities. However, the emergency aspect for a number of reasons, is not happening accordingly. Although one intervention (T04.76) was adapted to include a Covid-19 response aspect.

The indicators that can obviously be linked to the EUTF Syria Results Framework are the number of SuTPs and local population that are: connected to public water supply; and connected to urban wastewater collecting systems.

Theory of Change approach is outlined in the documentation expressly for one of two interventions (T04.76), whereas both EUTF interventions have a common approach. To enhance the resilience for individuals (SuTP and host community members) and Government institutions, particularly municipalities, in the longer term. The assumption is that resilience is strengthened when individuals, communities and institutions are better able to cope with and recover from the impact of the crisis and can sustain their development efforts.

#### ***EQ2. How has the WASH portfolio developed since the beginning of the EUTF with regard to relevance, targeting and responsiveness?***

For Turkey, the ***relevance of the EUTF WASH portfolio*** is maintained considering the correspondence with the EUTF objective. The EUTF portfolio responds to the needs of each governorate where infrastructure had reached its capacity with SuTPs. Municipal infrastructure was initially in many places to capacity but due to influx of SuTPs this required an upgrade to which EUTF adequately responded.

The portfolio includes municipal water and sanitation, including wastewater treatment plants, and solid waste management projects. All projects follow tenders for design and construction, of which a number of planned and under construction. Projects were identified and selected by ILbank HQ according to highest need for each governorate. Both EIB and UNDP put forward a proposal.

In five provinces in the south and southeast, of which 4 of these border with Syria, where there is relatively a high population of Syrian refugees (Adiyaman province does not border with Syria). The proportion of Syrian population living in these provinces compared to the Turkish population is more than 20% in Hatay, Şanlıurfa and Gaziantep provinces. With a proportion of 73 %, Kilis has an exceptional situation because the city is hosting SuTPs almost as much as its local population.

The interventions build on lessons learned and previous experience (noted in programming documentation), and also relate experiences from outside of the EUTF portfolio. Action documents note lessons learned and are planned in consultation with local government, and the municipalities hosting and implementing the projects. For instance, previous experience from waste management and service delivery through municipalities was integrated into programming (T04.76). The implementing partner UNDP has a track record in waste management and working with the municipalities for which previous experience and lessons learned were incorporated.

**Lessons learned** (AD of T04.155), note that: Early investment in systems ensures national ownership and enhances opportunities for Government to explore gaps in terms of policy, national budgeting and capacity that can benefit from financial and technical resources mobilised by the EU and its partners through the emergency to ensure upgrade or sustain critical services, beyond the timeframe of the emergency.

Financial analysis of infrastructure projects that must be included in the Feasibility Study (FS) required for investments was poor and could have been better dealt with at the start of the interventions. A solution, to hire a consultant to support ILbank (municipalities bank and implementing partner for UNDP, and EIB) in its financial analysis activities was a lesson that was responded to rather late during one intervention (T04.155). With 22 infrastructure projects having been selected beforehand and budgeted by ILbank in 2016 the updated budget forecast was only delivered later in the project after feasibility studies had been carried out by the Consultant (2020/2021). In turn, there was a considerable saving due to both currency devaluation, and lower actual costs compared to initial cost estimates (based on catalogue costs). An addendum to the delegation agreement is to be signed (end of 2021) for engaging another list of 4 investment projects plus machinery and equipment provision, aiming to expend the whole budget available (up to EUR 20 million).

Related to responsiveness, intervention T04.76 produced radio spots about COVID-19-related awareness on how to keep safe and healthy. Collaboration with a Syrian radio station ensured deep reach into the target community. In addition, partner social media networks such as MoNE, Anadolu University, Human Development Foundation (INGEV), and Kizilay, were used to reach the target audience.

Four Municipalities improved their COVID-19 response capacity through technical assistance and equipment and material support, including protective equipment, disinfectant, and IT equipment for remote working (output 2.7). T04.76 included a **COVID-19 response**: 1 million face masks, 5,000 personnel protection and medical equipment were produced and delivered, and IT equipment for remote working, with technical support (formally this was not under WASH Component of the grant).

**EQ3. How effectively have specific country needs, contexts and barriers to WASH services been taken into account into the programming of country-based EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects?**

The interventions address fully justified needs in municipalities in the Turkish-Syrian border area, needs which were intensified by the Syrian crisis and, in the meantime, also by the socio-economic context in the particular region.

The interventions are **aligned with relevant policies of the Turkish government**. Municipalities in Turkey are responsible for local services including water and wastewater, and solid waste management. EUTF programmes were carried out through indirect management of the implementing partners UNDP and EIB, and were supported by ILBank, which is the bank of municipalities.. The *implementation of public infrastructure projects follows agreed national and local strategies*, in particular “The integrated urban development strategy” and its Action Plan for the period 2010-2023. Ensuring access to safe drinking water, necessary infrastructure and transportation facilities, as well as paying attention to environmental, natural and ecological equity and strengthening capacity in the planning of settlements are among the main objectives of this strategy.

UNDP, implementing partner of intervention T04.76, notes its central role in the **3RP coordination** structure, and how this contributes to complementarity and coordination to avoid programming overlap. There **is no WASH Sector in Turkey** and therefore the approach is distinctive from that in the other EUTF supported countries. Infrastructure support was coordinated and implemented appropriately through ILbank (implementer and municipalities bank), which is affiliated with the Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation.

**Barriers:** The EUD and the implementing partners (UNDP and EIB) are fully aware that local municipal capacity varies to a great extent, and suitable support is being provided, through contracted Technical Assistance (TA). TA for project preparation, tendering and monitoring was needed all along, but not available from the start due to the lengthy contracting procedure for T04.155.

ESPOO Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context was considered a constraint for implementation of the proposed Bozova drinking water project (T04.155). EU financing cannot be used for drinking water intake from the Euphrates (Ataturk dam), which is water also flowing cross-border to Syria.

**Relevant National/Regional/Local Stakeholders have been actively involved in the programming of EUTF WASH interventions.** The interventions are an essential part of Turkey’s efforts to increase the adequate resilience of host and SuTPs communities through supporting urgently needed municipal projects (water, wastewater, solid waste) in the municipalities located in Southern and Eastern Turkey with the highest rate of SuTPs per local population.

EUTF interventions complemented infrastructure support with technical capacities for municipalities, in terms of, amongst others, planning and design of services delivery. Technical support is critical to also ensure efficiency and quality of service delivery and for municipalities to be able to sustain this after the intervention has come to an end.

WASH priorities are based on population data and needs per municipality. Projects were selected by priority list of ILbank (T04.155), following with the Government’s First Stage Needs Assessment (March 2016)<sup>1</sup>. The per-selected projects by ILbank were validated by the Consultant and feasibility studies carried out, including population data, and when required also environmental needs assessments.

Priorities were also identified by municipalities and direct coordination by implementing partners (UNDP, T04.76) with the municipalities for proposing solutions following strategic plans. EUTF interventions aimed to strengthen the waste management capacities of the municipalities for waste

management investments and activities until 2050. UNDP in cooperation with municipalities prepared the Integrated Waste Management Plans of Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Hatay Metropolitan Municipalities.

Intervention T04.155 reflects the findings of an independent needs assessment that was commissioned to help guide and target short and medium-term assistance to refugees, which is to be mobilised within the framework of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (June 2016 and updated in 2018). This assessment builds on the Government of Turkey's first stage needs assessment (March 2016).

### **Effectiveness and Impact**

***EQ4. To what extent have EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects been effective in achieving their planned outcomes? What are the actually achieved outcomes in terms of what has changed, who has changed, when and how?***

***Alignment with EUTF RF:*** The interventions have a strategic vision of contribution to efficient, healthy, affordable and sustainable water supply, sanitation, and solid waste services to the local population and Syrian refugees and will contribute to improve the living conditions of people in the project areas.

***Infrastructure projects rate of completion varies for the two interventions.*** Under intervention T04.76, all infrastructure projects in solid waste and sanitation were completed and commissioned, and vehicle and equipment support delivered. For T04.155, despite delays in getting the projects prepared and to tender, construction of 16 infrastructure projects started in 2021 and remain vital and relevant municipal services and infrastructure. Additional projects are also being prepared to utilise the residual budget.

***Intervention T04.76:*** Four municipalities have strengthened technical and infrastructure capacity, Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis and Şanlıurfa, which are hosting large numbers of SuTPs. This was achieved by infrastructure, vehicle and equipment support: one Greenhouse Solar Dryer Facility in Kilis, one Wastewater Treatment Facility in Hatay- Hassa, two Waste Transfer Stations in Hatay and one in Şanlıurfa with required vehicles and equipment, three firefighting vehicles to Hatay and two to Şanlıurfa Municipalities. An additional Mobile Conveyor Waste Transfer Station has been provided to Hatay-Samandağ. In October 2021, the last project, the Solid Waste Mechanical Biological Treatment (MBT) in Gaziantep, was completed and inaugurated with EU, government officials and ambassadors. A NCE was required to complete the MBT as there were delivery delays related to COVID-19 from European suppliers. With the new wastewater treatment plant in Hassa, Haya province, untreated wastewater will no longer cause pollution of land and waterways, and hazard for public health. Uncontrolled dumping of waste, and also overfilling of landfill sites, is being reduced through improved the solid waste management capacity with recycling and reuse, including of organic waste.

***The progress for intervention T04.155*** is much slower for the 22 proposed projects which include rehabilitation and extension of water, sanitation, wastewater collection and treatment (WWTP) and solid waste projects. Two proposed projects, Solid Waste in Kilis and water project in Bozova, were to be changed for other proposed projects. Tenders for construction have been completed for 20 projects. The Technical Assistance (Engineering Consultant) made great progress to assess and prepare all projects for tender. To date one project, Kilis sewerage and storm water, is under construction and was visited during the field verification phase. The planned output of projects is still likely to be achieved, as these are entering the construction phase.

Delays occurred in the planning phase including with document preparation (Design, EIA, cost analysis, tender) leaving construction works to be carried out in a very limited time. This raises concern in terms

of project management and associated risks, in particular, due to the knowledge that with such large construction projects the timelines can change due to unforeseen circumstances. In turn this can lead to legal complications between the client and contractor, when milestones are not met.

For T04.155 there is considerable saving due to both currency devaluation, and lower actual costs compared to initial cost estimates by ILbank (that were based on catalogue prices in accordance with Turkish law). EUD was concerned as to whether the remaining projects (from contingency list) can be completed on time. In order to minimise the risk, contracts with a manageable and low risk on exceeding implementation time are to be selected. EUD is closely monitoring this and in dialogue with implementing partners to ensure appropriate projects are selected that can be delivered within the timeframe of the EUTF.

All construction contracts have a 1-year Defect and Notification (D&N) period for the contractor, and this means that all construction projects are to be completed by 31 December 2023 (EUTF completion of implementation and contract completions ends December 2024). For example, a proposed project estimated at EUR 11 M, and of 250 km of sewage line in a city (Suruc, Sanliurfa) cannot realistically meet the deadline, as the scope is too large and requires complex management in urban areas. Despite the complexity and density of Suruc project, ILBANK has maintained the activity in the list of subprojects to be implemented.

***EQ5. How well has EUTF WASH support contributed to the achievement of longer-term effects/impact? What are these actual impacts in specific terms?***

The needs remain in the targeted provinces where the population even doubled with arrival of Syrians. Continued support will be required to deal with increased pressure on municipal infrastructure and increased costs for operation and management.

The infrastructure projects are sustainable and provide long-term benefits for the communities with clean drinking water, and solid waste and sewage collection and treatment systems that reduce environmental impact.

Whilst recognising that Municipal capacity varies, those municipalities lacking human and financial resources claim that the operation of the new infrastructure will be sustained without issues. Regarding the collection of fees for the provided services, the rate is problematic in general. In Hatay (T04.155), where the non-revenue water (loss in network) rate is quite high, collection rate is expected to be increased with input from the Technical Assistance (T04.155).

Four municipalities of Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis and Şanlıurfa, hosting large numbers of SuTP have strengthened technical and infrastructure capacity (T04.76). This was achieved by infrastructure, vehicle and equipment support. In particular, the infrastructure for solid waste and wastewater treatment is for the longer term and requires adequate management. In addition, this particular infrastructure is **reducing the environmental impact**, including reduction of greenhouse gas emission, recycling waste, use of organic waste, and reduced pollution of waterways. In addition, there is a reduction of greenhouse gases. The separated solid waste from the MBT is being recycled and reduces the volume of solid waste ending up in the landfill.

With the new wastewater treatment plant In Hassa, Hatay province, untreated wastewater will no longer cause pollution of land and waterways, and will cease to be a hazard to public health.

Uncontrolled dumping of waste, and also overfilling of landfill sites, is being reduced through improved the solid waste management capacity with recycling and reuse, including of organic waste.

Under intervention T04.155, the infrastructure projects have not been completed and thus increased access to water has not had an advantage to improve hygiene conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, there the infrastructure projects are relevant and properly planned and to be delivered by the end of the EUTF.

***EQ6. What external factors (positive and negative) have had the greatest influence on the achievement of results/changes observed?***

***Currency devaluation:*** The Turkish Lira has considerably devaluated against the Euro over the last years. This has impacted financial planning of the projects such that more projects can be carried out than were originally anticipated when the interventions were awarded. Currency devaluation since the planning phase had not negatively affected the project but actually had a positive effect as Turkish contractors procure materials and services within Turkey. Materials are produced in Turkey where there is experience and manufacturing of materials required for the infrastructural works.

There were also some ***negative factors***. For T04.155 there were cumbersome administrative procedures and planning issues, and delays in both contracting ILBank (implementing partner), as well as the Technical Assistance Consultant. Initially EIB and ILbank had no agreement on tendering procedures to be used for the projects, which took a considerable time to resolve.

***COVID-19 caused delays for projects***, due to travel restrictions and lockdowns. Also, staff were directly affected by COVID-19. No-Cost Extensions were required for the two interventions. For T04.76, there was a delay from a European supplier to provide equipment to the MBT in Gaziantep, which was directly related to COVID-19 and a main reason for the required NCE.

COVID-19 also delayed the tendering of contracts as stakeholders could not meet.

***EQ7. Is the level of partnership with the national/country-specific governmental partners appropriate to support the effective achievement of the EUTF WASH objectives?***

The level of partnership with the governmental bodies for the interventions was appropriate and functions well. Both interventions (T04.155 led by EIB, and T04.76 led by UNDP) are coordinated with the government bodies. Both interventions work with the same implementing partner – ILbank - which is the bank of municipalities.

The municipal infrastructure projects in the environment sector have to be coordinated with the ILbank and the Treasury on the Turkish Government side, and with EUD and DG NEAR on the EU side. ILbank is the implementing agency on behalf of the municipalities. ILbank has administrative, project management and technical capacity but is also being supported by the EUTF intervention through Technical Assistance from the Consultant (T04.155).

***Concerning T04.76.*** It is led by UNDP Turkey with full technical and administrative support, including procurement and finance. The Programme documentation outline that there is a longstanding relationship between ILbank and UNDP, of 50 years in development project and also experience with municipalities. What is apparent is that the intervention has delivered the projects. Feedback from ILbank, municipalities and UNDP is that the cooperation is working well. UNDP also has project offices in Turkey, including in Gaziantep to coordinate and manage the projects in cooperation with the municipalities.

***Concerning T04.155.*** There were constraints and issues with delayed decision making, and contract agreements. European Investment Bank (EIB) has an agreement with the Government of Turkey. EIB

has a grant agreement with ILbank for project implementation. ILbank receives the funds from the EIB and deals further with the final beneficiaries, which are the municipalities.

**Example of a delaying factor attributed to partnership.** The project designs have to be in line with Turkish regulation since these will be implemented in Turkey. For example, an environment assessment report has to be prepared and submitted for approval to the Ministry of Environment. Technical Assistance Consultant checks if this and all other needed approvals are obtained and then aligns this information with the EU standards. This was delayed by the implementation mechanism for T04.155 with procedures and long negotiation and communication between EIB and ILbank to finalise and agree on project documentation. This proved to be a bottleneck in the project, which eventually was overcome due to persistence and communication between EIB and ILbank.

The chosen implementation mechanism of T04.155, burdened by cumbersome procedures of the various partners, is not conducive to achieving the results. The governance structure applied suffers from weaknesses that ultimately constitute a bottleneck in the project. The current internal transition of the **EIB is reflected in limited resources and team availability**. EIB structures and/or capacities do not allow for the level of flexibility, e.g. in procurement, required for efficient implementation.

**Municipalities with metropolitan status have their own water administration to implement projects, while smaller ones struggle even to provide basic services by themselves.**

The infrastructure projects are large and thus require great resources to plan and manage, which smaller municipalities do not have. The **EUD and the implementing partners are fully aware that local municipal capacity varies** to a great extent, and **suitable support is being provided**, through contracted Technical Assistance for project preparation, tendering and monitoring.

For T04.155, the Technical Assistance was contracted at a later stage due to delays with first the contract with ILbank, and finally the contract with the Engineering Consultant. Eventually, the Technical Assistance made up time by preparing the projects in a short time.

**EQ8. What are the specific advantages/disadvantages of the various implementing partners (national, regional/multi-country, international) in terms of effectiveness?**

Of the two interventions, with different implementing partners (UNDP for T04.76, and European Investment Bank (EIB) for T04.155) the intervention T04.155 suffered with considerable delays.

Both interventions have an agreement with ILbank as sub-implementing partner (Bank of municipalities, and affiliated organisation of Ministry of Environment and Urbanization), which seems appropriate. ILbank allocates the grant over the municipalities and is the decision maker and also has the credit risk for the projects.

ILbank has a far greater portfolio than EUTF and deals with many donors for infrastructural works with municipalities in Turkey. Both interventions have Technical Assistance contracts for project preparation such as identification, feasibility studies, Environmental Impact Studies, and design work, tender preparation, and finally construction supervision.

The projects had been identified and selected by ILbank at the start of 2015 and approved by June 2016. The grant agreements for T04.76 started April 2018, and for T04.155 on December 2018. For T04.76, by UNDP, the projects were identified and carried out without great delays but for T04.155, by EIB there were considerable delays in project preparation and to get these to tender.

EIB has been one of Turkey's permanent partners since 1965, works closely with and through the EU, and has EUR 20 billion portfolio in Turkey. EIB's applied governance structure suffers from certain

known weaknesses, which include in particular lengthy internal administrative processes concerning decision making and granting approvals. The largest delays occurred from the start with the grant agreement between EIB and ILbank (Contract started Dec 2018), which then also delayed the contract of ILbank with the Engineering consultancy consortium for the Technical Assistance (Contract started Dec 2019).

The Technical Assistance has proved to be effective as within 6 months all projects were prepared. In addition, the Technical Assistance is supporting some municipalities (Kilis, Adiyaman and Besni) to supervise the works. The Consultant had noted that it does not always receive the requested project documentation or to the quality required and does not have the leverage to request this.

EIB has a small engineering team to carry out the review, which is one of the reasons for delayed response to ILbank. Also, the tendering procedure is not working well for the municipalities. The governance structure applied by EIB suffers from weaknesses that ultimately constitute a bottleneck in the project. The current internal transition of the EIB is reflected in limited resources and team availability. EIB structure did not allow for the level of effectiveness required for efficient implementation.

A *main difference in the structure between the two interventions* is the tendering process that municipalities are to follow, which is national procedures for T04.76 and international procedures for T04.155. In addition, UNDP has a team in Turkey whereas EIB has not, and thus the level of engagement is different.

#### Additional outcome areas

- *community engagement with the WASH providers in terms of ultimate beneficiaries' behavioural change / making providers accountable;*
  - Programme document notes that Visibility and communication plan are to make the public aware of the new services. T04.155 notes that a component of " Providing supporting documents i.e. a Stakeholder Engagement Plan, Environmental and Social Management Plan and Grievance Procedure etc. in order for proper implementation of the Project".
  - Measurement of responsiveness of the public and engagement of the municipalities with the public (project beneficiaries) is not possible until the infrastructure is commissioned. What are the follow up plans to ensure accountability in future and to measure this?
  
- *level of responsiveness of the WASH institutions in terms of improved performance at the level of local (WASH) actors.*
  - Operation and maintenance capacity building to municipalities is part of the scope of the project. Technical Assistance is until the end of the project and thereafter the municipalities will have to manage the infrastructure and service provision for the public.
  - T04.155 programme document notes an activity: Design and pilot a social impact monitoring system, provide capacity building to the final beneficiaries to apply it and ensure compliance of the identified projects with the EIB's social standards; Establishing and implementation behaviour that is consistent with EU environmental and social standards and Providing supporting documents. Stakeholder Engagement Plan, Environmental and Social Management Plan and Grievance Procedure etc. in order for proper implementation of the Project.

## **Efficiency**

### ***EQ9. What is the currently most efficient aid modality to support the provision of WASH services under the EUTF-Syria in each of the countries of intervention?***

The projects in Turkey are infrastructure projects of high value, including new types of infrastructure for which a high technical expertise was required for both design and constructions. For this reason, in Turkey, there were two agreements of Eur 50 M, and EUR 72 M, which is a far higher amount than for agreements in other EUTF countries. The modality was appropriate through implementing partners with the institutional capacity to handle these grants, including EU procedures. ILbank, the municipalities bank, was the appropriate sub-implementing partner for both interventions in Turkey. In addition, the modality to engage a team of engineering consultants for technical Assistance was the right modality.

No other options beyond EIB, an International Financial Institution, or large UN agencies with selected expertise and in country presence were considered by EUTF. The project portfolio of the two interventions was selected by capacity of implementing partner.

**Procedures and response time:** For T04.155, efficiency is the weak point. There are substantial delays as the project is only now entering the construction phase, 2.5 years after the official start. The procedures allow for greater quality control. However, the delays are due to the long response time and also support ILbank with preparing the documentation in the required format.

For T04.76 response time was different, where UNDP allowed tendering of contracts to be carried out under national rules, which was familiar for the municipalities.

**Results:** For the two Turkey interventions, the population living in the targeted provinces will benefit from the provision of WASH services. Despite delays, all stakeholders are confident that the delivered quality is to high standards, and that procedures are followed. There is likely not to be any difference between the two interventions in terms of output and quality.

**Communication and in country efficiency:** UNDP has offices in Ankara and Gaziantep, and it works closely with the municipality. This is different for EIB that does not have active presence of staff in Turkey and operates more indirectly through a consultant. The delays may be related to lower staff presence by EIB compared to UNDP. However, it is also attributable to ILbank and municipalities not being familiar with processes and documentation, which requires improved project management from all stakeholders.

### ***EQ10. To what extent have resources been allocated and utilised in an efficient manner and achieve value-for-money?***

This cannot be fully ascertained for several reasons (not all interventions have been completed, with some additional projects still to be selected; defect and liability periods remain and detailed budget documentation has not been shared with the evaluation team). However, budget costs have not overrun and no-cost extensions were provided

**Contracting and procurement of resources:** Implementing partners did not note any deviation from procurement plans and procedures.

The *governance structure applied by EIB* for T04.155 suffers from weaknesses that ultimately constitute a **bottleneck in the project**. EIB structures and capacities do not sufficiently allow for the required response and support to ILbank such as for procurement, which is required for efficient and speedy implementation. The procurement rules of EIB and the implementing partner ILbank (national rules) were different and considerable time was required to align procurement procedures to satisfy the

requirements of both organisations. At start, the documentation and correspondence was not translated to English, which later was corrected. There could be more flexibility in processes between the partners although mandatory EU rules are still followed.

There were challenges about different view of ILbank that insisted on using national procurement procedures. EIB and EU negotiates with ILbank and finally a solution was found and EU rules are followed. ILbank insisted on using the national procurement law, which was not acceptable for EIB. The negotiations got stuck on this point and EIB spent 15 months on finding agreement. Using the international procurement rules was crucial. However, there are delays and extensive communication between EIB and ILbank to ensure that procedures and documentation are in place. ILbank is not familiar with the EIB processes.

T04.155: There was an issue with the cost estimation of the infrastructure projects of the original list as after tendering and contract award it showed that there was EUR 25 million lower than predicted. ILbank and TA partially explain this by the market conditions that changed since the design phase - including the troubled Turkish economy, effects in the construction market and the falling exchange rate Turkish Lira to Euro. Obligatory use by ILbank of the official catalogue for unit prices contributed to the over-estimation. These estimates were then converted to Euro. By the time of tendering, the Turkish Lira had decreased. Even though the tender prices are in Euro, the local market prices remain quite low and are not expected to increase so quickly. There is a highly competitive market and national construction companies bid with decreased profit margin, in order to get a safe Euro contract.

In *Turkey there are very capable and experienced contractors*, able for swift and good quality construction. Production of materials and equipment, in line with the technical specifications, is locally ensured so equipment prices or certificates should not be an issue.

***EQ11. To what extent do the various stakeholders ensure the necessary capacity (technical institutional and financial) to promote and implement EUTF-funded WASH programmes?***

The owners of the infrastructure are the municipalities for which the technical, institutional and financial capacity varies. A Technical Assistance component is included in both interventions with capacity for support of ILbank and the municipalities to carry out the works, and for institutional strengthening.

***For future operation of the WASH infrastructure*** the main concern is whether municipalities have the financial resources. This varies per municipality and also depends on revenue received for the services. The MBT is an example for income generation from solid waste separation. However, drinking water networks may not collect revenue depending on the location and subscribers.

The wastewater treatment plants gain little revenue but do have a great added value in terms of reducing the environmental burden.

Infrastructure is owned and operated directly by the municipalities or outsourced.

*Box 10 Capacity of municipalities in Turkey*

**Technical Assistance.** Municipalities responsible for water, wastewater and solid waste. Hatay, Gaziantep, and Sanliurfa have dedicated departments to manage this. However, Kilis and Adiyaman (smaller municipalities) don't have these, and EUTF Technical Assistance was adequately adapted to support. In particular for contract management as these did not have a centre of administration for this.

**Example of an infrastructure project:** Mechanical Biological Treatment Plant in Gaziantep is completed by EUTF. The MBT will have capacity to process 16-17% of Gaziantep's waste and generate 60-70% of its own power needs with gas produced from organic waste.

A second phase will follow by Agence Française de Développement (AFD) to increase MBT's capacity to process 50% of Gaziantep's waste, achieve full self-sufficiency in its energy needs, generate revenues from selling excess energy to national grid and also recyclables, and eventually contribute to reducing the need for new landfills.

The operational lifetime of the concrete structures is 50 years and 10 years for the equipment, at which point they would require upgrading or retrofiting.

Around 40 persons have been trained to work at the MBT. The facility will be handed over to the municipality of Gaziantep, which will contract a company to exploit the MBT.

**Coordination, coherence, complementarity and synergies**

**EQ12. To what extent is the support provided by the EUTF-Syria for WASH programmes/projects coherent and complementary with other major funding mechanisms (EU also including ENI/DCI/ECHO/NDICI)?**

From the needs identified by ILbank, the EU chose to cover the infrastructure related to water, wastewater and solid waste to support Turkey for welcoming refugees including, but not only for Syrians. Mayor donor support from EU is continuing from the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT) including allocations for water, wastewater and solid waste. FRiT 1 (2016), did not include WASH, whereas FRiT 2 (2018), allocated EUR 380 million for WASH projects. To date, FRiT 3 is still under programme preparation.

EUTF interventions funding is EUR 120 million for WASH infrastructure projects through ILbank. Other EU funding for ILBank is EUR 380 million from FRiT 2.

In parallel with EUTF interventions, three projects are currently under implementation from the Instrument for Pre-Addition (IPA) as shown in the table below.

IPA/2019/411-788 (421-876 is an addendum to 411-788)	Construction and rehabilitation of water supply and wastewater systems and related soft measures to improve water management efficiency	AFD	EUR 277,821,680 (Grant of EUR 214,821,680 and a loan of EUR 63 million from AFD)
IPA/2020/416-967	Municipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas	World Bank	€ 275,533,320 (Grant of EUR 140,178,320 plus WB Loan of EUR 135,355,000)

IPA/2020/415-364	Improving social cohesion by strengthening the vulnerable young by better and inclusive sport and youth infrastructure. Implemented with the Ministry of Youth and Sports.	KfW	EUR 25 million
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At the start of 2019, ILBANK presented to the EU Delegation that the total needs for the south eastern region were EUR € 585 million. In total, World Bank and AFD projects amount to EUR 553,355,000. This means that the total needs are close to being covered by humanitarian donors through close cooperation (completion is December 2025).

*Japan development agency (JICA)* is providing loans for water, wastewater and solid waste activities for the whole Turkey (not limited to the southeast) of two instalments each of approximately EUR 380 million.

**Facility for Refugees in Turkey FRiT):** Total funding is EUR 6 billion in two tranches of Eur 3 billion for FFRIT 1 (2016), and FFRIT 2 (2018). FFRIT 1 (2016) was for a focus on programmes in protection, education, and health. FFRIT 2 (2018) includes municipal infrastructure, which was committed by 2020. There remain large needs in the north of Turkey whereas the EUTF focused on the south and southeast with largest numbers and highest concentration of SuTPs.

**Coordination:** EUTF interventions do not outline the complementarity in the documents. The projects of the two EUTF interventions do not have links but are in the same geographical areas and for the same municipalities. However, these projects are planned and coordinated with the relevant authorities in country.

ILbank received funding from the EU for similar WASH projects with other municipalities in Turkey and for Technical Assistance.

T04.76 notes previous EU funding: EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). UNDP implemented a project on municipal service delivery, in particular support to infrastructure development and procurement of equipment.

Particular to T04.155, the EUTF and the EIB agreed that each of them may, upon giving reasonable notice to the other, organise a meeting and invite other stakeholders of the intervention to discuss strategic orientation issues, subject to confidentiality requirements and taking into account sensitive market information. They further agree to establish a coordination committee in respect of the activities, to be co-chaired by the Delegation of the European Union to Turkey and by the Bank, and including representatives of the Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, EIB, ILbank, and the President's Office of the Republic of Turkey. Representatives of relevant stakeholders, ministries and civil society organisations may also be invited to participate in meetings of the afore-mentioned committee, as observers.

**EQ13. To what extent is coordination/complementarity with other donors' (non-EU) programmes and with national/ country-specific WASH programmes conducive for the achievement of the EUTF's objectives?**

Grants and loans from financial institutions, including the World Bank and the French Development Agency, to cover continuing municipal needs are provided to ILBank. This allows for expansion of projects and a multi-year strategy to ensure complementarity and value for money of EUTF funded

projects. The EUTF funded MBT solid waste plant in Gaziantep received complementary funding from AfD for the second phase expansion, which is to start at the end 2021.

Funding to ILBank from EU and other sources is outlined in EQ12.

At a broader level the EU is actively contributing to overall donor co-ordination under the auspices of the United Nations in the framework of the 3RP that integrates humanitarian, development and macro fiscal interventions to increase coherence between humanitarian and development and national and regional priorities.

***EQ14. What is the quality and extent of coordination/ complementarity/synergies between national and regional/multi-country EUTF WASH programmes?***

Coordination is working well in Turkey. The Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation is responsible for coordinating actions in the area, sharing of the project pipelines, for the environment sector (through its Department of EU Investments) and for environmental permits (through its provincial directorates). ILbank is growing and its management has become active and willing to facilitate international cooperation.

In Turkey, there is no UN Cluster Coordination for in country response as it has the capacity to carry this out. The last camps with SuTPs closed in March 2018, and emergency aid is no longer relevant.

EUD Ankara is co-chairing with ECHO monthly meetings of the EU Refugees and Migration Coordination contact group with EU Member States. The EUTF Management coordinates with EU Member States contributing to the fund and with the selected implementing partners. The EU is contributing to overall donor co-ordination in the framework of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) that integrates humanitarian, development and macro fiscal interventions to increase coherence between humanitarian and development and national and regional priorities.

With regard to municipal infrastructure in the environment sector, projects are coordinated with ILbank and the Treasury on the Turkish Government side, and with EUD and DG NEAR on the EU side.

***Coordination of*** EUTF interventions in Turkey is by ILbank. The projects are not interlinked and are also planned and coordinated with the relevant authorities in country, including ILbank and the municipalities.

**Sustainability**

***EQ15. What are the main factors for sustainability of the EUTF-funded WASH programmes/ projects and to what extent are these factors currently ensured?***

The infrastructure projects are considered sustainable to an extent and provide long-term benefits for the communities with clean drinking water, and solid waste and sewage collection and treatment systems that reduce environmental impact. The needs remain in the targeted provinces where the population even doubled with arrival of Syrians. Continued support will be required to deal with increased pressure on municipal infrastructure and increased costs for operation and management.

Drinking water networks have been expanded and also waste water networks and wastewater treatment plants. The improved solid waste management and wastewater treatment is having benefits in terms of recycling waste, use of organic waste for compost, biogas production, reduced fossil fuel use, and mitigation of greenhouse gases.

ILbank has a sustainability framework/approach, and project selection methodology. The Turkish version of the document is published on ILbank website. This is a broad concept and sustainability is referred to in various documents.

**Sustainability has good prospects**, provided that existing capacities of municipalities are further and systematically enhanced. The municipalities are fully involved in the project and assisted to gain the needed capacity for managing the new WASH infrastructure. Municipalities will benefit from initial follow up for new facilities operation and maintenance. The support to municipalities and their utility companies was adapted to their needs. The projects, (once constructed) will be run by the utility companies, which are fully involved in the implementation.

**Financial sustainability** is a criterion in the appraisal of investment projects to ensure their financial viability. Non-reimbursable financing from the EUTF considerably reduces the overall cost burden for the beneficiary. The rate of fee collection for the provided services is not promising. However, in Killis for example, no additional fee is foreseen for the utility services provided following the end of the project. In contrast, in Hatay an increase of the collection rate is expected, as their system will be improved and the non-revenue water will decrease.

Appropriate **operation and maintenance** of the infrastructure facilities are considered by the interventions. However, some municipalities currently have quite modest capacities, which would have to be significantly increased to meet the requirements of the new facilities. Further investigation and follow up on operation and maintenance is required.

**Infrastructure will reduce environmental impact**, including reduction of greenhouse gas emission, recycling waste, use of organic waste, and reduced pollution of waterways.

Turkey stands out with the ability and its success to implement innovative infrastructure projects solving the burden of solid waste and sanitation in a sustainable and climate friendly way. For example, the treatment of wastewater through WWTPs as well as further treatment through Green House Solar Dryer in Kilis. Sludge will be reused and sold for example as fuel for a cement factory. Water from the WWTP can be reused for agriculture in an arid area.

Another example, is the new wastewater treatment plant in Hassa, Haya province. This intervention, is to ensure that wastewater will be treated and no longer pollute land and waterways and cause hazard for public health. Uncontrolled dumping of waste, and also overfilling of landfill sites, is being also reduced through improved the solid waste management capacity with recycling and reuse, including of organic waste. The Mechanical and Biological Waste Treatment Plant in Gaziantep separates waste for recycling and reduces the volume of solid waste ending up in the landfill. Current capacity is to handle 16% of solid waste in Gaziantep of which previously it all ended up in the landfill. Expansion will allow to handle 50% of Gaziantep's solid waste. Benefits of the infrastructure are reduced environmental impact, including reduction of greenhouse gas emission, recycling waste, use of organic waste, and reduced pollution of waterways. Captured gas from organic waste is used for power generation to run the facility.

**Electricity generation:** EUTF, and other such as EU FRIT 2 projects do not include investment in electricity projects. There is a combination of public and private electricity operators in Turkey and overall, the reliability is considered high (not many outages). Turkey has a mixture of hydropower plants (for example in Sanliurfa), planned nuclear power plants, and solar farms through public and private providers. However, Kilis municipality will be investing in a photovoltaic power station (solar power plant) and is securing donor funding. Grid power is available although not continuously. The main

motivation for investment in renewable energy is considerable cost reduction to operate municipal infrastructure. In addition, there are the positive environmental effects.

### **EU added value and visibility**

#### ***EQ16. What EU added value is resulting from the EUTF-funded WASH programmes projects?***

The municipalities that are supported by the two EUTF interventions are already providing WASH services. The new WASH infrastructure projects are longer-term solutions for areas that did not have sufficient services to provide for an increased population due to influx of SuTPs. The infrastructure is built with and for the municipalities, which will also operate and manage it. These systems are a direct extension to services provided by municipalities and cities (metropolitan status).

Turkey stands out with the ability and its success to implement innovative infrastructure projects solving the burden of solid waste and sanitation in a sustainable and climate friendly way (See, EQ15 on Sustainability). EUTF made it possible to invest in sustainable long-term solutions to alleviate already strained municipal infrastructure that also had to deal with a sudden population increase. For instance, the municipality of Kilis, on the border with Syria, saw its population double in size.

According to recent media reports, social tension is rising in Turkey concerning the long-term presence of SuTPs with no outlook on return. The infrastructure is a direct benefit to the population and has an impact on improving living conditions. However, municipalities note that continued support is required.

#### ***EQ17. Did the portfolio of EUTF funded WASH programmes contribute to the EU policy dialogue for reforms with national governments?***

The water, sanitation, and solid waste projects are a continuation of the EU and Turkey policy dialogues and fit within the scope to provide improved services for the Turkish population, and Syrian under temporary protection in an effort to address the crisis in Syria. EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (2015).

Funding in WASH is continuing for Turkey such as under the FFRIT programme.

#### ***EQ18. To what extent are the communication and visibility actions providing added value in terms of contributing to mainstreaming the WASH programmes/projects' desired effects?***

Communication and Visibility plans were prepared for the two EUTF interventions. The projects under T04.76 are opened and operational and had publicity.

The EUTF flagship project, Mechanical and Biological Waste Treatment Plant (MBT) in Gaziantep was inaugurated with high level visitors, including ministers on 5 October 2021 (T04.76).<sup>40</sup>

The Communication and Visibility Plan for T04.155 has been drafted by ILbank and is pending approval by EIB, which is now delayed. The construction projects have started. The Communication and Visibility plan was initially not sufficiently and proportionately budgeted (EUR 50 k) for the scale of the projects and thus in addendum the amount was increased (to EUR 500 k).

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<sup>40</sup> See <https://www.tr.undp.org/content/turkey/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2021/10/MBT-Launch.html> ;  
<https://undpturkiye.exposure.co/louisavintongaziantepfieldtrip>  
<https://undpturkiye.exposure.co/louisavintongaziantepfieldtrip> .

## Gender and special needs

### ***EQ19. To what extent have gender issues been taken into consideration in design and implementation?***

The focus of the portfolio is on public water sanitation/sewage and solid waste infrastructure which are gender neutral. The infrastructure will be of service to the final beneficiaries regardless of their gender.

For ease of presentation and calculation in outputs (LFA) the infrastructure is providing benefits to an equal number of men and women. For public infrastructure, it is not an added value to present this information. This would be only the case if these numbers for other reporting or targets.

### ***EQ20. To what extent have accessibility and inclusiveness of persons with disabilities (Syrian refugees, IDPs and host community members) been taken into consideration in design and implementation?***

Accessibility and inclusiveness of persons with disabilities was not outlined in programme documentation. Concerning public infrastructure this was also not addressed.

### ***EQ21. Which specific outcomes regarding gender and special needs can be identified from the EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects?***

Data for infrastructure services is not gender-disaggregated – number of women and men with access to water and sanitation services is likely to be quite equal.

Data for training is gender-disaggregated as well as for employment creation (temporary employment during construction, and permanent during the operational phase).

### ***Lessons learned: What lessons can be learned / good practice can be identified from the implementation of EUTF-funded WASH programmes / projects?***

Turkey stands out with the ability and its success to implement **innovative infrastructure** projects solving waste and sanitation in a sustainable and climate friendly way. Examples are the treatment of wastewater through WWTPs as well as further treatment through Green House Solar Dryer and reducing environmental hazard. Water can be reused for agriculture. Processes sludge can be used as fuel in cement. One of the innovative flagship projects is a waste segregation and also reusing the sludge. In addition, water is reused for agriculture and sludge

### ***Partnerships:***

EIB should have started the Technical Assistance contract (engineering consultancy contract) far earlier, and not done this in sequence following on the ILbank agreement, as much time was lost. Waiting for formal approval in sequence hampered the timeline of the project. The agreement between EIB and ILbank was greatly delayed and this caused a 'knock on' effect. Working on contracts in a parallel was required, which was a risk but one that should have been identified and managed.

### ***Project identification and preparation:***

- Projects were identified and selected by ILbank HQ according to highest need for each governorate. Both EIB and UNDP put forward a proposal to EUTF. This approach is a clear difference to other three EUTF countries where implementing partners actively engage with government counterparts for selection of projects.
- The selected priority projects by ILbank were budgeted at a considerably lower cost than the actual cost (after tender and contract award). EUTF and implementing partners are to be aware of this and in hindsight were to take planning measures. Financial analysis of infrastructure projects for

the Feasibility Study required for investment decisions, was to be improved for the municipalities. Recommendation was for a consultant to support ILbank with financial analysis activities, which is part of the Technical Assistance.

- ***Tender process and contract award:*** The Turkish construction market is highly competitive and in particular for the contracts of EUTF projects that are awarded in Euro. This means that contractors are effectively ‘buying’ themselves into the market with low bids. Although, this may seem a cost saving it also poses additional project risks, such as potential delays when contractors do not have the capacity or financial resources and credit to carry out the works. Contractor may not complete the works (cash flow issues) or mobilise sufficient personnel and equipment to carry out the works in a timely manner and at quality required. This also poses additional burden on construction supervision and contract management.
- Tender evaluation for Harbiye drinking water network in Hatay took 10 months, which is far too long. This shows that tender evaluation process and capacity can be improved. Parties were not aware which criteria could be used and to discard offers, such as very low or high bids.
- The contracts include a 3-month operation period. This is an incentive a measure for the contractor to complete the project and ensure full operation before final project completion.
- ***Challenges with construction supervision of projects.*** Information flow can be improved and better sharing of documentation between parties (ILbank/municipalities, Technical Assistance consultant, and contractors) to improve effectiveness of contract management. ILbank and municipalities are not always following up on request of EIB consultant to provide documentation.

### **Recommendations:**

#### ***EUTF agreements with implementing partners, and contracts of IPs with its implementers and consultants.***

- 1) EU Contracts are to be designed so that delays caused by constraints of timely contracting other parties are minimised. For T04.155, EIB should have started the contract with its engineering consultants for Technical Assistance far earlier, and not done this subsequent to the agreement with ILbank (the implementing agency). The challenge was that formal contractual arrangement did not allow EIB to engage in negotiation or appoint its consultant in parallel to arranging the agreement with ILbank (implementing partner for EIB). In the future, EU could consider including a ‘*suspensive clause*’ in contracts with implementing partners or other conditions to enhance performance or mitigate delays. For instance, this means that the contract between the parties will only enter into force once the agreed condition has been fulfilled.
- 2) EU to actively, and with contractual measures, enforce implementing partners to increase their efforts. EU agreements with implementing partners allow for a margin for overhead/project management costs, which has an upper limit (% for fees). This can be adjusted during the contract in case the level of effort is to be increased. Intervention T04.155 had a margin where these IP’s fees could have been increased to allow for increased involvement of EIB to manage the programme, which in retrospect was required. EIB had a bottleneck for reviewing and approving request from both the Consultant (TA) and ILbank (EIB’s implementing agency). EIB engaged Technical Assistance (TA) from a consortium of three consulting engineering firms, which carried out services for design verification and project proposals (Project Summary

Documents), Tendering, and construction supervision and contract management. EUD noted that EIB could further increase its efforts.

- 3) Project risk management by both EU and implementing partners to be carried out from the start and measures to be taken at earlier stage. For instance, at late stage of the agreement (T04.155) there was a substantial 'cost saving' as actual costs were far lower had been initially budgeted. This saving is inefficient use of funds if these are not allocated at an early stage of the intervention. Utilising funds for infrastructure projects in advanced stage of the agreement have constraints and risk for completion on time. Project management and more active follow up can avoid this. Project preparation: Financial analysis of infrastructure projects for the Feasibility Study required for investment decisions, was to be improved for the municipalities. Support to be provided (possibly through consultant) to support ILbank and municipalities with financial analysis activities.
- 4) Projects to be managed from Turkey with more direct involvement. Implementing partners to manage and have presence with office and team in Turkey and preferably at district level to manage contracts. Alternatively, an expanded and dedicated team to manage the agreements remotely and in a timely manner.
- 5) Contracts to include measurement of outputs of the operational handover period. Contracts often included a 3-month operation period after completion. This is an incentive and measure for the contractor to complete the construction phase on time and to ensure full operation before final project completion and handover. In addition, this period is used for training of personnel to operate the facility.
- 6) Health, Safety, and Environment (HSE) and informing the public for awareness of works to minimise disruption to the public and any hazards is responsibility of contractors. In addition, follow up through site supervision by consultants in cooperation with municipalities is required. Improvements can be made by ensuring clearer roles and daily follow up by an appointed organisation. There is room for improvement for use of sub-contractors as the main contractors are not ensuring their performance.
- 7) EU to improve oversight and intervention of project management carried out by Implementing partners and follow up when delays, inefficiency, or quality standards are not met in all parts of the process. This concerns delays in agreements between Implementing partners and their sub-implementing partners, and also its consultants. In addition, delays in contracting other parties, or any contractual disputes. For instance, tender evaluation and award was delayed and took 10 months for a construction project (T04.155). Both EU and EIB to intervene in future to avoid delays and ensure active follow up. This delay was caused by disagreement on tender award contracting rules. Municipalities were not clear about selection criteria and for example bids can be discarded on price anomalies (very low or very high). Contract award to the abnormally low bids is a risk. Currently, municipalities are concerned about legality of disregarding the lowest or lower bids. EUD and Implementing Partners to work with ILbank on contracting and tender rules and protocols to improve contract award to best value for money.

**Other recommendations:**

- **Electricity generation.** The availability, continuity and cost for power supply is to be taken into account for investment planning of infrastructure. Municipal WASH infrastructure often requires electricity for operation, which consist of a high operational cost. Therefore, complementarity with other projects and overall cost for the municipalities and other operators of infrastructure are to be considered. EUTF and EU FRiT 2 projects did not include investment in electricity projects as there is a combination of public and private electrify operators in Turkey and overall, the reliability is considered high (not many outages). Turkey has a mixture of hydropower plants (for example in Sanliurfa), planned nuclear power plants, and solar farms through public and private providers. The MBT in Gaziantep is generating

power from the biogas and thus is reducing the operational costs. In Kilis there are plans for investment (by other IFI) in a solar power park (photovoltaic power plant), aimed to increase autonomy and lower operational costs for municipal infrastructure. However, such investments are to be considered concerning the overall cost-benefit of the region and priorities.

- **Communication and Visibility plan** for intervention T04.155 is greatly delayed. This requires more active involvement and communication between EIB and ILbank (T04.155) to cooperate and resolve this matter. This may require EUD involvement to expedite this process. ILbank is to follow the recommendations and standards as set by EIB in preparing the C&V plan. However, EIB is to increase its efforts to liaise with ILbank to clarify the expectations, and also shorten time taken to review and approve the plan.

## ANNEXES

## Annex 1: Approach and Methodology

This Annex is a compilation of sections from the approved Inception Report and Desk Report to cover the full approach and methodology that was to be applied. Any adjustments to the approach and methodology are highlighted in Section 3 of the main report.

### A1.1 Approach to the evaluation

A conventional approach has been taken to carry out the evaluation through using the evaluation questions (see section A1.3 below) included in the ToR. However, the team also applied, where feasible, steps 2-5 of the six-steps of 'outcome harvesting'<sup>41</sup>, to answer the questions of what actual achieved results are as opposed to those that are planned, what has changed, when and how. Step 1, is considered as completed through the preparation of the evaluation ToR (identifying intended users and principle uses), specifically the development of the evaluation questions. Step 2 – 5 follow the process of data collection, analysis and verification whilst Step 6 has been limited to and where feasible, the presentation of actionable recommendations in the Evaluation Report. The evaluation team have also adhered to evaluation ethics (see box 1).

#### Box 1 Approach to the assignment

- **Integrity**, being true to oneself and the assignment is an organisational and individual core value, as well as a research and planning ethic.
- **Flexibility**, maintaining a reflective review process is crucial for any data collection and analysis, in order to capture unexpected results
- **Informed**, employing a thorough understanding of the principles of not only WASH, research, reviews, communication, knowledge products and report writing, but also the various stakeholders involved.
- **Insightful**, to ensure the approach is insightful the consultants have drawn on known methodologies for undertaking such an assignment
- **Objectivity**, in order to minimise the risk of subjectivity the consultants will ensure an appropriate mix of stakeholder engagement, and review both secondary data and primary data.
- **Inclusivity**, engagement with EUTF & EUDs, partners and other stakeholders will be key to ensuring appropriate levels of validation throughout.

### A1.2 Data collection and analysis

Both primary and secondary data have been collected by the team as the evidence base for the evaluation. The portfolio has been allocated by country to members of the evaluation team with multi/regional interventions being reviewed and assessed by two or more evaluators from a country level perspective. To ensure methodological and analytical consistency, a country level evaluation matrix (EM) was prepared that has been used by each evaluator when assessing EUTF support in their allotted countries. The country EMs have been subsequently analysed and synthesised as findings in the final evaluation report at the sector/portfolio level.

The main **primary sources** of data for the evaluation have been stakeholder interviews with individuals who have been involved in the preparation and implementation of the interventions covered by the EUTF WASH portfolio. These have been drawn from the stakeholders outlined in the ToR and preliminary stakeholder analysis conducted during this inception phase (see Annex 3). The main stakeholders to be consulted were:

- EU services (EUTF, EUDs, ECHO);
- Other relevant donors (where not already IPs) active in the WASH sector;
- UN organisations (WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR);
- National and international implementing agencies (for example, CSOs / NGOs, ++ACTED, GVC);
- Staff of counterpart national/regional/local authorities (including ministries, regional administrations, municipalities);

<sup>41</sup> [https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/plan/approach/outcome\\_harvesting](https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/plan/approach/outcome_harvesting)

- Management of beneficiary institutions (utilities +++)
- Final beneficiaries (refugees, IDP's and representatives of host communities that ultimately benefit from EUTF assistance).

Given the strategic nature of the evaluation and the limited timeframes available for the country missions, priority was given to those stakeholders able to give sector level insights, such as EU Services, national/regional partners, UN organisations and IPs. These were consulted whenever possible via face-to-face semi-structured interviews (or if not available in person, then via Skype or telephone). Site visits to projects were conducted only where there is clear justification for this.

Interview schedules and focus group discussion guides were developed during the Desk Phase guided by the indicators and judgement criteria and in response to preliminary findings from the document review. These findings could also provide 'topic' and or 'analytical' coding to help manage the data collected from the country interviews and synthesis up to portfolio level.

The main **secondary sources** of data that the evaluation team have consulted are:

- EUTF Programming documents (including EUTF strategic orientation document; action documents; descriptions of action/logframes/budgets);
- EUTF project documents (QINs; narrative/interim/annual reports);
- Other EUTF documentation (e.g. EUTF Results Framework);
- ROM reports for individual EUTF interventions (where available);
- Project evaluations for individual EUTF interventions (if available);
- Reports and analyses from other international organisations (including 3RP Syria reports, Vulnerability Assessments);
- Reports from national authorities (e.g. Jordan Response Plans);
- National policy documents (e.g. National WASH Strategies).

The evaluators were provided with a substantial amount of documentation from the Particip internal database and sourced additional sector and country level documentation.

### Data analysis

Three main tools were used for analysis. The first is the evaluation matrix, the second is the Quarterly Information Notes (QINs) analysis template and the third is an outcome harvesting (OH) capture tool.

During the Desk Phase, each evaluator used the EM to assess performance of each intervention in the sample at indicator and judgement criteria (JC) level. The evaluator firstly analysed each intervention against the indicators in the matrix, providing a written assessment for each indicator. The basis for this assessment was the data collected from primary and secondary sources listed above, including the analysis from using the second tool for the QINs analysis. This second tool – QIN analysis template provided the analysis for those EQs related to performance issues (linked to effectiveness, efficiency and impact). Aside from being part of the evidence base for the EQ answers, the QINs analysis were also used in the synthesis phase to compare performance as reported in the project level indicators against the sector level indicators contained in the EUTF Syria Results Framework. This fulfils the ToR requirements of the evaluation and subsequent analysis needing to be based on a clear link to the EUTF's identified objectives and the EUTF Results Framework.

A simple 'degree of evidence' scoring system for internal use was used for each indicator to assess how well the intervention meets the indicator (3-strong/2-medium/1-weak). This guided the evaluator when compiling the assessment for JC.

Once the indicators have been completed, the evaluator then creates a synthesis of the indicators per JC and provides an answer for each. The evaluator does this for each project in the sample, until all the

indicators and JCs are complete for all projects. The evaluator then answered each EQ in turn – again, synthesising the findings in the individual JCs as the basis for the analysis.

Finally, after the EM for each country is ready, it can be integrated into the final analysis at portfolio level. This was done by the evaluation team leader during the reporting phase.

The third tool – the OH capture tool - was used during the document review to harvest information on actual outcomes not necessarily specifically planned as part of the intervention. As reported above Steps 2-5 of the six key steps was applied of which this tool responds to Steps 2 and 3 – capturing the outcome descriptions from documentation review and engaging with informants. The tool is based on the tool currently being tested within the EUTF. Step 4 – the need to substantiate was carried out in the verification phase and Step 5 – Analyse and interpret was conducted as part of the reporting phase with the synthesis of intervention to portfolio level findings.

**Triangulation**

The evaluators have triangulated all findings to ensure that they are objectively balanced and methodologically robust. In practice this means that every key finding should be checked from at least two separate sources (ideally three if possible) and documented accordingly e.g. from one or two primary sources such as interviews with EUTF staff, focus group with final beneficiaries, and from at least one secondary source e.g. programming document or project progress report.

The robustness of findings was further strengthened by the activities conducted within the verification phase (see next section). All the main findings were discussed between the evaluators during the course of the assignment. Furthermore, at each stage of reporting within the desk, verification and reporting phase, the various reports have undergone a quality control (see below) review.

**Verification Phase (as updated within the Desk Report)**

Maintaining flexibility around three options was proposed within the Inception Report:

- **Fully-field based:** whereby each of the evaluators would conduct field missions to their allocated countries to verify the preliminary set of findings as assessed during the desk phase.
- **Fully remote:** in the event COVID-19 travel restrictions prohibited the evaluation team to travel to and/or within the intervention countries.
- **Hybrid approach:** in the event that international travel only, is not possible. Given one of the consultants is based in Jordan, some level of field-based verification may be possible both in Jordan and regionally with remote support and engagement from the internationally based consultants.

Both the evaluation team and EUTF/EUDs have been monitoring the situation and noted there have been some changes to the rules of travel to and from EUTF countries from the respective home-base countries of the consultants. Notwithstanding the possibility of further changes (both positive or negative) the situation as of mid-July 2021 (Table 16) would suggest that fully **field-based verification** is possible. In readiness, passport details of the team have been provided to EUTF in order to prepare letters of invitation. The indicative timing of travel is set out in Table 1 and detailed itineraries were prepared from 1 September 2021 in consultation with the EUTF/EUDs.

Table 16 Indicative travel itinerary for fully-field based verification

Team member(s)	Country	Indicative Dates
Andy West	Turkey	14-17 September 2021
Jasna Ljubisic & Malik Alkhawaja	Jordan	12-18 September 2021
Andy West &	Lebanon	20-28 September 2021

Team member(s)	Country	Indicative Dates
Rachel Norman		20-25 September 2021
Andy West & Malik Alkhawaja	Kurdistan/Iraq	3-6 October 2021

### Data collection

Both primary and secondary data collection activities remain relevant for the verification phase. Given the limitations as described in section 2.3 (of the Desk Report), more emphasis has been placed on conducting key informant interviews (KIIs) for capturing data to populate the outcome harvesting tool (step 3 of the process: see section 2.2.3) triangulation as well as verification. Additional secondary data has also been sourced focusing on the gaps presented in the country level preliminary findings reports.

### Data analysis

With further primary and secondary data having been sourced both prior to and during the field-based verification, the EM matrix was updated. Flexibility was maintained that should any final verification questions remain following the in-country visits, these were followed-up with relevant persons remotely. In the event that any remain unanswered, they were acknowledged as limitations in the final report.

### Triangulation

As previously reported, the evaluators have triangulated all findings to ensure that they are objectively balanced and methodologically robust. In practice this means that every key finding should be checked from at least two separate sources (ideally three if possible) and documented accordingly e.g., from one or two primary sources such as interviews with EUTF staff, focus group with final beneficiaries, and from at least one secondary source e.g., programming document or project progress report.

All the main findings were discussed between the evaluators during the course of the assignment.

### Quality control

The evaluation team sees internal quality supervision as critical to the success of this evaluation. Whilst the Evaluation Team Leader has reviewed the quality of each report, a nominated Quality Control Expert (QC) has also ensured consistency and coherence between findings, conclusions and recommendations; that the findings reported, are duly substantiated and that conclusions are supported by relevant judgement criteria.

All draft evaluation outputs were subject to assessment by the QC expert. These will also be scrutinised by the M&E Team Leader to ensure a final quality control before each report is sent to the Contracting Authority for approval. Overall quality assessment has consisted of a thorough review of the report focusing on the following criteria.

- ✓ Meet information needs;
- ✓ Appropriate design;
- ✓ Reliable data;
- ✓ Sound analysis;
- ✓ Credible findings;
- ✓ Valid and useful conclusions;
- ✓ Realistic recommendations;
- ✓ Clarity.

## A1.3 Evaluation questions, judgement criteria and indicators

### Evaluation criteria

As set out in the ToR, the evaluation criteria are:

- Relevance;
- Effectiveness and Impact;
- Efficiency;
- Coordination, Coherence, Complementarity and Synergies;
- Sustainability;
- EU Added Value and Visibility;
- Gender and Special Needs;
- Lessons Learned.

The evaluation team are in agreement with the evaluation criteria. However, the point of 'lessons learned' was considered as a separate section independent of the evaluation questions.

### Evaluation questions

The ToR proposes a total of 29 EQs and includes an additional number of sub-evaluation questions (SEQs). The evaluation team analysed these questions and rationalised for the purposes of coherence and clarity to 21 EQs.

A summary of the changes is set out in the table below.

Original EQ in ToR	Proposed Change
<b>Relevance</b>	
Is programming of WASH programmes / projects strategically aligned with the EUTF's underlying guiding principles and approaches? Is there any common base among the "theory of change" of the EU Trust Fund WASH projects/programmes?	The sub-question: "Is there any common base among the "theory of change" of the EU Trust Fund WASH projects/programmes?" Is now written as an indicator (1.1.2): "Extent to which EUTF WASH intervention Theory of Change (ToC) have a common base".
How effectively are barriers to WASH services being addressed by EUTF-funded programmes' design?	Included in the revised EQ 3: "How effectively have specific country needs, contexts and barriers to WASH services taken into account into the programming of country-based EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects?"
More specifically, how effectively have programmes/projects responded to the unexpected challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic?	This has been added into EQ 2 as a Judgement criteria and associated indicator. JC 2.2: EUTF interventions have responded to the challenges posed by COVID-19 pandemic. Ind 2.2.1: Additional COVID-19 specific activities included in original WASH intervention designs.
<b>Effectiveness and Impact</b>	
To what extent have EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects been effective in achieving their planned results?	These two questions and been re-formulated as follows: EQ 4 To what extent have EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects been effective in achieving their planned outcomes? What are the actually achieved outcomes in terms of what has changed, who has changed, when and how? EQ 5 How well has EUTF WASH support contributed to the achievement of longer-term effects/impact? What are these actual impacts in specific terms?
What are the actually achieved results/outcomes? In particular in terms of longer-term and/or wider effects: what has changed, who has changed, when and how?	

Original EQ in ToR	Proposed Change
	Whilst EQ4 will remain as an EQ, the reporting of it will likely fall into a separate section or take a slightly different format as is the question which will draw on outcome harvesting techniques (see section 4.2 approach to the evaluation and 4.3 data collection and analysis).
More specifically, how and to what extent have EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects addressed the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic? If already present, what are the COVID-19 specific outcomes?	As discussed in the kick-off meeting, evaluation of the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are specifically related to the achievement, success and sustainability of the WASH portfolio and are not related to the Health implications of COVID-19, albeit it indirectly linked. For this reason the question is removed as in part addressed under JC 2.2 and indicator 2.2.1; under JC 5.1 and indicator 5.1.2; and JC 6.2 and indicator 6.2.2:
What was / is the role of the EUTF-funded WASH programmes / projects in this change?	The evaluation team believe this question is superfluous and already covered under previous questions.
What are the specific advantages/disadvantages of the various implementing partners (national, regional/multi-country, international) in terms of effectiveness?	The evaluation team assume this question relates to implementing partners working on country and / or regional/multi-country level as opposed to a national IP or an regional IP and so on.
<b>Efficiency</b>	
To what extent have resources been allocated and utilised in an efficient manner? This should include a minimum assessment of value-for-money, i.e. the extent to which the programmes/projects have obtained the maximum benefit from the outputs and outcomes it has produced within the resources available to it.	The EQ has been rephrased to read: "to what extent have resources been allocated and utilised in an efficient manner and achieve value for money?". The explanation of a VfM minimum assessment has been added to the Glossary.
<b>Coordination, Coherence, Complementarity and Synergies</b>	
More specifically, what immediate impact has the COVID-19 pandemic had on cooperation, complementarity, coordination and synergies?	This EQ has been added to EQ14 as JC 14.3 and indicator 14.3.1.
<b>Sustainability</b>	
What are the main factors for sustainability of the EUTF-funded WASH programmes/ projects and to which extent are these factors currently ensured? To what extent are EUTF-funded WASH programmes/ projects likely to produce continued benefits on the community, country, and regional and levels? To what extent are EUTF-funded Health programmes/pilot project likely to be replicated/continued at national level with national resources?	These different dimensions of sustainability are captured in three separate JCs under one EQ: "What are the main factors for sustainability of the EUTF-funded WASH programmes/ projects and to what extent are these factors currently ensured?"

Taking into consideration the proposed changes as presented in the above table, the list of EQs is now as follows:

### **Relevance**

- EQ1. Is programming of WASH programmes/projects strategically aligned with the EUTF's underlying funding principles and approaches?

- EQ2. How has the WASH portfolio developed since the beginning of the EUTF with regard to relevance, targeting and responsiveness?
- EQ3. How effectively have specific country needs, contexts and barriers to WASH services been taken into account into the programming of country-based EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects?

### **Effectiveness and Impact**

- EQ4. To what extent have EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects been effective in achieving their planned outcomes? What are the actually achieved outcomes in terms of what has changed, who has changed, when and how?
- EQ5. How well has EUTF WASH support contributed to the achievement of longer-term effects/impact? What are these actual impacts in specific terms?
- EQ6. What external factors (positive and negative) have had the greatest influence on the achievement of results/changes observed?
- EQ7. Is the level of partnership with the national/country-specific governmental partners appropriate to support the effective achievement of the EUTF WASH objectives?
- EQ8. What are the specific advantages/disadvantages of the various implementing partners (national, regional/multi-country, international) in terms of effectiveness?

### **Efficiency**

- EQ9. What is the currently most efficient aid modality to support the provision of WASH services under the EUTF-Syria in each of the countries of intervention?
- EQ10. To what extent have resources been allocated and utilised in an efficient manner and achieve value-for-money?
- EQ11. To what extent do the various stakeholders ensure the necessary capacity (technical institutional and financial) to promote and implement EUTF-funded WASH programmes?

### **Coordination, coherence, complementarity and synergies**

- EQ12. To what extent is the support provided by the EUTF-Syria for WASH programmes/projects coherent and complementary with other major funding mechanisms (EU also including ENI/DCI/ECHO/NDICI)?
- EQ13. To what extent is coordination/complementarity with other donors' (non-EU) programmes and with national/ country-specific WASH programmes conducive for the achievement of the EUTF's objectives?
- EQ14. What is the quality and extent of coordination/ complementarity/synergies between national and regional/multi-country EUTF WASH programmes?

### **Sustainability**

- EQ15. What are the main factors for sustainability of the EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects and to what extent are these factors currently ensured?

### **EU added value and visibility**

- EQ16. What EU added value is resulting from the EUTF-funded WASH programmes projects?
- EQ17. Did the portfolio of EUTF funded WASH programmes contribute to the EU policy dialogue for reforms with national governments?

- EQ18. To what extent are the communication and visibility actions providing added value in terms of contributing to mainstreaming the WASH programmes/projects' desired effects?
- EQ19. To what extent have gender issues been taken into consideration in design and implementation?
- EQ20. To what extent have accessibility and inclusiveness of persons with disabilities (Syrian refugees, IDPs and host community members) been taken into consideration in design and implementation?
- EQ21. Which specific outcomes regarding gender and special needs can be identified from the EUTF-funded WASH programmes/projects?

### **Lessons learned**

Lessons learned were considered as a separate section in the Evaluation Report, linked to the ToR question “What lessons can be learned / good practice can be identified from the implementation of EUTF-funded WASH programmes / projects?”

#### **Judgement criteria and indicators**

The proposed EM contains 38 JCs and 75 indicators. These are directly linked to the EQs listed above and these will ensure that all the relevant data is collected and analysed in a comprehensive and consistent manner by the evaluation team. The indicators are the starting point for collection of data from primary and secondary sources. The analysis of JCs and all their associated indicators provide a composite finding for use in answering the associated EQ.

## **A1.4 Desk report and evaluation report format**

Taking into account the requirements as set out in the ToR, both the Desk Report and Evaluation Report content outline are proposed as follows:

### **Desk Report Content Outline**

1. Executive Summary
2. Introduction and country contexts
3. Approach, methodology, limitations
4. Performance assessment based on QIN analysis
5. Preliminary findings by evaluation question
6. Aspects requiring further verification
7. Annexes

### **Evaluation Report Content Outline**

1. Executive Summary
2. Introduction and country contexts
3. Approach, method, limitations
4. Key findings per EQ
  - a. Synthesis of whole portfolio
  - b. Specific case/examples to illustrate key findings
  - c. Outcome harvesting summary overview
5. Lessons learned
6. Conclusions

- a. Portfolio level
- b. Country level where applicable
7. Recommendations
  - a. Portfolio level
  - b. Country level where applicable
8. Annexes
  - a. Completed Evaluation Matrix
  - b. List of interviews
  - c. Documents reviewed

## A1.5 Limitations

Extensive time taken to review documents due to not only the complexity and component-based nature of interventions, but also due to the quality and quantity of documentation from which to source evidence. There is a variance in documentation naming nomenclature and document dates and version control which has created some challenges in terms of understanding the sequencing, decision-making and general content of documents. In addition, there is an inconsistency in the level of reporting contained within some of the QINs as well as missing information in some of the intervention logical frameworks.

Fluctuations in the evaluation team resulting in a need to reallocate the country evaluation of Iraq and Turkey to the WASH expert and eventually bringing in a WASH expert to lead the Jordan verification and reporting phase. With a certain level of lost time the consequences have been a need to push back the submission time of this Evaluation Report.

Access to beneficiaries has been challenging therefore having a limitation on primary data collection with respect to the additional outcome areas.

## Annex 2: Evaluation Sample Intervention List

Project No.	Title	Partner	Country
T04.20	Promoting Sustainable Management of Water Services and Resources in Lebanon by Strengthening infrastructural and managerial capacities of local water establishments	GVC	Lebanon
T04.27	Improved Access to Water, Water Distribution Performance and Related Sewerage Disposal in Irbid Governorate for Host Communities and Syrian Refugees	AFD	Jordan
T04.34	Providing Lebanese and Jordanian communities hosting Syrian refugees with improved WASH infrastructure and facilities at community, institution, and household level.	ACTED	Jordan and Lebanon
[T04.77] T04.40	Strengthening the Resilience of Host Communities and Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (Kurdistan)	IT COOP	Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq
T04.53	Restoring the Water Supply for Food Production and Livelihoods in Post Conflict Areas	FAO	Iraq
T04.76	Strengthening the Economic and Social Resilience of Syrians, their Host Communities and Relevant National and Local Government Institutions	UNDP	Turkey
T04.90	Mitigating Social Tensions Among Vulnerable Populations Through Improved Water Services in Lebanon	UNICEF	Lebanon
T04.98	Improving Access to Safe and Affordable Water to Vulnerable Communities	NRC	Lebanon
T04.100	Sustainable Safe Drinking Water Supply for Vulnerable Communities Living in a More Protected Environment	CISP	Lebanon
T04.121	Supporting resilience for host communities, returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq	ACTED	Iraq
T04.132	Strengthening the Long-Term Resilience of Subnational Authorities in Countries Affected by the Syrian and Iraqi Crisis	UNDP	Lebanon and Iraq
T04.136	Dealing with Displacement – Resilient Subnational Government in Communities in the Region Affected by the Syrian Crisis	VNG	Lebanon and Iraq
T04.155	Technical Assistance and Support for the Municipal Resilience Facility (MRF)	EIB	Turkey
T04.172	Education and WASH COVID-19 response Programmes for Vulnerable Syrians and Syrian and Host Community School-aged Children in Jordan	UNICEF	Jordan
T04.206	Structuring water and wastewater services in Arsaal and two villages in the valley- Lebanon	AFD	Lebanon
[T04.208] T04.229	EUTF Support for an Integrated Solid Waste Management System in Syrian Refugee Camps and Neighbouring Communities Affected by the Syria Crisis	GIZ	Jordan
T04.247	Support for Urban Recovery and Peacebuilding in western Ninewa, Iraq	UN Habitat	Iraq
T04.272	Water and Wastewater Programme for Host Communities and Syrian Refugees in Lebanon	ACTED	Lebanon
T04.92	EUTF contribution to the West Irbid waste water network construction project	EBRD	Jordan
AD March 2021	<i>Top-up of AD Dec 2019 to insert: - Blast response and; - Sector support during financial crisis.</i>	UNICEF	Lebanon
AD March 2021	<i>Top-up of AD "EUTF support for an integrated Solid Waste Management system in Syrian refugee camps and neighbouring communities affected by the Syria Crisis"</i>	GIZ	Jordan

## Annex 3: List of interviews

Name	Organisation	Position
<b>Central EUTF HQ</b>		
Angela Atzori	EUTF	Deputy Head
Paola Pallotto	EUTF	M&E Officer
Diego Cardenas Foruzanfar	EUTF	Communication & Visibility Officer
Maxime Montagner	EUTF	International Aid Officer
<b>Iraq/Kurdistan</b>		
Mauro Gioe	EUD	OM, EUD in Iraq
Zardasht Abdul-Khaliq Sarsam	Water Directorate - Erbil	Director of Water Directorate - Erbil
Kamal Sharo Hassan	Municipality Directorate - Sinjar	Head of Municipality Directorate - Sinjar
Abdul-Razaq Mohammad Sobhi	Ninewa Water Directorate	Director of the Coordination Unit with Organizations
Khalat Ababakir Othman	Duhok Water Directorate	Head of Directorate of Water - Dohuk Surrounding (including Sumel)
Abulkerim Al-Khafaji	UNDP	Regional coordinator for the Headway Programme
Mazin Talat	UNHABITAT	Programme management specialist for the MADAD project
Lindesay Harkness	UNHABITAT (T04.247)	Programme Manager for MADAD project
Elsadish Saeed		Supervising engineer
Ahmad Jihad		Engineer
Shelby Searles (PM)	ACTED	Project closed (short call)
<b>Jordan</b>		
Omar Abu Eid	EUD	Energy, Environment & Climate Change Programme Manager
Maha Katami	MOPIC	Capacity Development Officer
Omar Nuseir	MOPIC	Director - Humanitarian Relief Coordination Unit
Yazan Bagaeen	AFD	Senior Water Project Officer
Wa'el Safi	GIZ	Programme Manager EUTF
Trevor Surrudge	GIZ	Component manager EUTF
Himalaya	UNICEF	WASH Specialist
Tamara Rabadi	UNICEF	Programme Officer
Ahmad AlTarawnah	UNICEF	Programme Officer
Kholoud Radaideh	West Irbid Municipality	Engineer
Muhammad Al-Batainen	West Irbid Municipality	Engineer – services / projects
Mahmoud Shariideh	Yarmouk Water Company – West Irbid branch - operation and maintenance team	Maintenance team lead
Khawat	Yarmouk Water Company – West Irbid branch - operation and maintenance team	Maintenance technician
Emad AlDougmi	Marfaq Municipality	GIZ project Focal Point
Eng Muhammad ElMouesh	Marfaq Municipality	Executive Municipality Manager

Name	Organisation	Position
Ibrahim Abu Samaqa	Marfaq Municipality	Manager of Engineering Services
Ali Hussien	Marfaq Municipality	GIZ EU MADAD focal point
Eng. Ibrahim Obada	Water Authority of Jordan	Director of Crisis Management at WAJ
Mohammad Al Dwairi	Ministry of Water and Irrigation	Secretary General Assistant for strategic planning
Iyad Alsamawi	World Vision	Project Manager
Fadi Ayyash	World Vision	Finance, Admin and Logistics Coordinator
Yasmeen AlKurdi	World Vision	Field Coordinator
Hani Hassan	Zaatari camp refugees	Public Health Engineering- plumber
Kholoud Farouq Awad	Zaatari camp refugees	Public Health Engineering
Bassam Mohammad Aleid	Zaatari camp refugees	Community engagement
Raja Hussein Ta'ani	Zaatari camp refugees	Recycling technical team leader
Laila Dkeidek	Zaatari Oxfam team	Oxfam cash for work team
Waleed Arrar	Zaatari Oxfam team	Oxfam WASH officer
Aline Milev	ACTED	Country director
Esther Griffies Weld	EBRD	Principal banker
Sufyan Bataineh	Yarmouk Water Company	Secretary general advisor for technical affairs
<b>Lebanon</b>		
Michele Pierpaoli	EUD	Delegate, EUD
Simone Abou Jaoudeh	Sabil Consortium T04.100 (CISP, ACTED, CARE, ACH)	Consortium Program Manager and CD of CSIP
Mirdza Abele		Senior Engineer, CISP
Ciara Noone		WASH Technical Coordinator, ACTED
Fatima Daher		Civil Engineer / WASH Deputy Program Manager-South ACF
Ahmad Hamad		CARE
Rawad amine		Engineer, Acted
Hussein Fakih		UNICEF T04.90
Charbel Hanna	WASH Specialist	
Ciara Noone	WAAD Consortium T04.34 (ACTED, Intersos, AAH)	WASH Technical Coordinator, ACTED
Rawad Amine		Engineer, Acted
Alessia Mortada		Program Coordinator, Intersos
Francis		Logistics Coordinator, Intersos
Ibrahim Mustafa		WASH Coordinator, Action Against Hunger
Antoine Zeghbi	EBML (Beirut)	Chief Engineer/Deputy Director
Rizk Georges Rizk	Bekaa Water Establishment	General Director
Elena Diato	GVC	Program Manager
A trainee		
Natalia Athanasiadou	H2All Consortium T04.98 (NRC, GVC, OXFAM, WVI)	Consortium Coordinator NRC
Jean Paul El Khoury		NRC
Aya Houcheimi		WASH PM Bekaa, NRC
Jihad AbdulGhani		WASH Advisor Solar, Oxfam
Badar		Oxfam

Name	Organisation	Position	
Ahmad Al Baff		Project Manager Bekaa, WVI	
Elena Diato		Program manager, GVC	
Lea Mascaro		Consortium Coordinator, ACTED	
Ciara Noone		WASH Technical Coordinator, ACTED	
Ibrahim Mustafa	Hawkamaa Consortium T04.247 (ACTED, GVC, SI, ACF, LebRelief, LEWEP)	WASH Coordinator, Action Against Hunger	
Yann Pastel		WASH Coordinator, SI	
Jawad Taher		Water Advisor, GVC	
Ahmad Ibrahim		Grants Manager, Lebanon Relief	
Jasmine El Kareh		LEWAP	
Elena Diato		Miyahcon Consortium T04.20 (ACWUA, GVC, CISP)	Deputy Country Director for Programmes GVC / consortium PM
Jawad Taher			Water Advisor, and Capacity Building Coordinator
Simone Abou Jaoudeh			CISP Country Representative
Yasmeen Khashman	ACWUA		
Conversation with local residents	Site visit to Beirut Port and blast affected area		
Khaled Obeid	NLWE	General Director	
Gaby Nasr		Deputy GD/Chief Engineer	
Conversation with local beneficiaries (residents)	Site visit (independent): Minyara, Akkar (North Lebanon); Water pumping station (gate was open)		
Wassim Daher	SLWE	General Director	
Simone Abou Jaoudeh Mirdza Abele	Group discussion (alternative to field visit to South for Wadi Jilou2-Maaroub water scheme): CISP, AAH, CARE	Consortium Program Manager/CD of CSIP	
Fatima Daher		Chief Engineer	
Ahmad Hamad		Civil Engineer, AAH	
Suzu Hoayek		CARE	
	MoEW	Donor liaison/Advisor to minister	
<b>Turkey</b>			
Michel Cat	EUD Turkey	Infrastructures Programme Manager, FRIT Section in Ankara Delegation	
Arda Kostem	UNDP, Ankara (T04.76)	Portfolio manager Syria Crisis Response and Resilience	
Emre Hakyemez		Environmental Engineer	
Tekin Cotuk	EIB (T04.155)	Principal Advisor Lending Operations in Central and South East Europe.	
Şevket Altuğ Taşdemir		Head of International Relations Department.	
Gamze Aslan, Also, other members joined the meeting, including finance manager, logistics and technical staff.	ILbank, Ankara (municipalities bank and implementing partner for UNDP, and EIB)	Technical Manager	
Sanda Pamfil	EIB Consultant/Technical Assistance for T04.155	Team leader of consortia of consulting engineers of Optimal, Suez, and Gazisher	

Name	Organisation	Position
Kürsad Karapinar		infrastructure projects coordinator, Optimal.
Arda Dereli		SUEZ, project manager
Mustafa Tansel	ILbank Gaziantep Regional Directorate (Gaziantep)	Project and Spatial Planning Manager.
Said Ozer		Engineer
Abdullah Furkan		Environmental engineer.
Emel Patir		Environmental engineer.
Gökhan Yaman		Gaziantep metropolitan municipality
Mahir Emre Yalcin		Environmental Engineer
Hamit Dogan	UNDP Gaziantep (T04.76)	Regional Coordinator Syria Crisis Response and resilience portfolio.
Seracettin Yüzgülen		Project manager.
Murat Günsel		Civil Engineer.
Embiya Ince	Field visit: MBT Mechanical Biological Treatment Plant (T04.76).	The Principal construction supervisor of Atlas Insaat (contractor).
Murat Bilecen	Kilis Municipality and Field Visits	infrastructure manager, Kilis Municipality.
Field visit 1: Green House Solar Dryer (T04.76) at Kilis wastewater treatment plant.	Engineers, laboratory technicians, and operators of WWTP and GHSD, and municipal manager waste water, and municipal manager solid waste	
Field visit 2: Sewage network under construction in Kilis (T04.155).	Munat Akbel, Construction supervising Engineer of Optimal. Also, spoke with chief engineer of contractor, and construction workers.	
Kilis Mayor's office	Deputy mayor, and advisors from UNDP (technical assistance to mayor)	

## Annex 4: Documents reviewed

This is available as a separate Excel Workbook.